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PREFACE 
Only in recent years have the decades bridging the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries been accorded the attention 
their importance in the historical framework merits. The lnade· 
quacy of historical investigation for this period Is particularly 
evident In the area of Franco-Italian relations. 1 Yet, a study 
of France during the earlier half of her Third Republic reveals 
that this aspect of French foreign affairs was far from being in-
significant. The consequences of a political accord the two na· 
tlons reached in 1902 were to react favorably for France in the 
ensuing years and to culminate In ultimate Italian participation 
as a French, and not German, ally in World War I. 
Camille Barrere served as French Ambassador to Rome 
during the decisive years In which the Franco-Ital Ian rapproche· 
ment was realized. Barrere's diplomatic colleagues have gen· 
erally acknowledged that his role was Indispensable In the work 
of effecting the rapprochement-·Pau1 and Jules Cambon, Fran~ols 
Charles-Roux, Leon Noel, to name but a few. As surprisingly few 
1 Pierre Renouvln notes the Inadequacy of critical studies 
in this area in La Palx arm6e et la Grande-Guerre 18 1-1 1 , 
Vol. II: L'Epoque contempora ne , ar s, , 
pp. 486-95 •. At the same time, since 1945 a formidable amount 
of documentary material has become available to the historian 
on both the French Third Republic and post-Rlsorgimento Italy. 
I I 
studies have been devoted to either Barrere or the Franco-
1 tal ian accords he successfully concluded, this dissertation 
has examined Franco-Italian rapprochement and the Importance of 
Barrere's role In effecting Its achievement. 
The pertinent collections of published diplomatic docu-
ments have been utilized In the study, principally: Documents 
dielomatlgues francals, I do£uroenti dlelomatlcl, La polltlgue 
~terieure de l'Allemagne, 1870-1914 and British Documents on 
the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. The study draws as well on 
unpublished archival material obtained from the Mlnlstere des 
Affaires Etrangere In Paris: Paplers Barrere, Paplers Delcasse 
and Nouvelle Serie, ltalle. Several articles published by Bar-
rere himself In Revue de Paris and Revue des Deux Mondes have 
been invaluable, as has been the research made available In the 
publications of the Italian scholar, Enrico Serra. Serra's 
studies, for which he had access to the private Visconti Venosta 
and Stucchl·Prlnettl archives, permit the documentation of cer-
tain aspects of Franco-Italian relations in this period that 
would not otherwise be possible. 
I I I 
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SETTING THE STAGE 
Pierre-Eugene-Cami 1 le Barre re, who would represent France 
In the Ital Ian kingdom as Ambassador to Rome from 1897 to 1924, 
was born In the town of Charlt6-sur-Lolre on October 10, 1851. 1 
A grandson of the French Revolutionary leader Bertrand Barrere, 
his father Pierre was originally from the region of the Pyrenees 
and had married Agathe Cr6pln. Camille was the fifth of their six 
children. Until Louis Napol6on's coup d 1 6tat compelled him to 
seek exile In England, M. Barrere supported his family as director 
of one of the free secondary schools that were quite numerous In 
the French provinces In those days.2 Not surprisingly, the 
1Barrere left no personal papers that document his private 
life. Two volumes by former French diplomats are dedicated to 
Barre re and h Is work however: L6on No~l 's Camll 1 e Barre re, ambas -
sadeur de France (Bourges, 1948) and Jules Laroche 1s Qulnze ans ~ 
Rome avec Camille Barr~re (Paris, 1943). A distinguished member 
of the French diplomatic corps, N~l was elected to the Acad6mle 
des Sciences morales et polltlques In 1945. Under de Gaulle he 
served on both the Comlt6 consultatlf constltutlonnel and Consell 
constltutlonnel. (His study Is referred to hereinafter as Camille 
@arrere.) Neither Nol:!I nor Laroche atte'llpted an ane.lysls of 
Barr~re's diplomatic activity. The first work of this nature was 
undertaken by Enrico Serra In Camille Barrere e 1' Intesa ltalo-
francese (Milan, 1950). (It' Is hereinafter referred to as 
C. Barr-ire e l'lntesa.) L.B. Atkinson's "Camille Barrere, Ambas-
sador of France: the Fl rst Eight Years of a Miss Ion" (unpubl I shed 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1951) studies 
Barrere's diplomatic activities during the first eight years of 
his residence In Rome. (Hereinafter referred to as "Ambassador 
of France.") 
2The coup of December 2, 1851 had aroused a great deal of 
opposition among the Nlvernals. Pierre Barrere was one of those 
2 
Barreres experienced considerable hardship tn England. To provide 
for his family, M. Barrere gave private lessons to the children 
of other ~mlqr~s living In London.3 
Barrere passed his childhood in England; his early educa-
tion was essentially British, factors which may well account for 
his facility in English which he spoke as fluently as his native 
tongue. It Is Important, too, for an understanding of Barrere's 
mature years, to real lze that his philosophical and pol ltical 
attitudes were developed In the milieu of French refugees then liv-
ing in London, a milieu representing all shades of contemporary 
republ lean opinion. 
When the Empire fell In 1870, Barrere returned to France, 
serving for several months as secretary to Martin Nadaud, with whom 
he had established contact earlier In London.4 The passionate con-
victions of the nineteen-year old republican then led him to ally 
himself with the Communards against the Versailles government of 
Adolphe Thlers and what he viewed as its policy of submission to 
arrested by the authorities In their reaction to the activities of 
small lnsurrectionary groups opposing Napo16on's tactics. 
3Mme Saint-Ren~ Tatllandler relates that Barr~re himself 
told her of his personal ex~rlences of hunger during these years. 
Intimate friends of the Barr~res, M. Saint-Ren~ Talllandter had 
served with Barrere In his early diplomatic assignments In Cairo 
and Munl ch. "S 11 houettes d';mbassadeurs ," Revue d'Hlstol re di plo-
mat I gue, LXV ( 1952), 7-22. 
4Nadaud had been a member of the Legislative Assembly 
under the Second Empire. He was appointed Prefect of Creuse by 
the Government of National Defense. He resigned the post In 
March, 1871 and lctter became a member of the Chamber of Deputies 
during the Third Republic. Nol!l, Camille Barrere, pp. 13-17. 
-
5 the enemy. He served with the Central Committee of Artillery, 
headquartered in the St. Thomas d 1Aquin quarter of Paris. At the 
same time Barre re embarked on a journal lstic career In his native 
)and, becoming affll iated with L'Estafette, La Fronde I 11ustr6e 
and La Soclale.6 His vehement antl·governmental outbursts In 
3 
La Soclale resulted In his Inclusion on a list of journalists des-
tined for deportation when the Corrmune was subdued In 1871 .7 
In this second exile, Barrere again had recourse to British 
hospitality. Reinstated In London, he supported himself by trans-
lating and writing for a number of papers and reviews, among them: 
The Manchester Guardlan,Fortnlghtly Review, Corhlll and Frazer's 
Magazine.a He also represented La R6pub1igue Francaise, founded by 
L6on Gambetta in Paris In 1871.9 The topics on which he wrote were 
varied, ranging from history and 1 lterature to pol I tics. Foreign 
affairs was apparently of major Interest to him, his contacts with 
51n Barrere's obituary, the New York Times Indicates that 
he enlisted In the French army when the Franco-Prussian war broke 
out. New York Times, October 10, 1940. Barrere was enraged by 
the treatment accorded Commune prisoners by the Thlers government 
at Versailles. Edouard Do116ans quotes his description of the 
inhumane conditions in Hlstolre du mouvement ouvrier, 1830-1871 
(Paris, 1936), p. 381. 
au 
a dally pol I ti cal journal under the di rec-
See A. Z6vaes, Henri Rochefort le pamph16-
125, n. 1 • 
8z~vaes Indicates that Barrere's translations probably In-
cluded the English editions of Rochefort's La Lanterne, published 
In London In 1874 after Rochefort's escape from New Caledonia. 
Ibid., p. 19, n. 1. 
9paul Deschanel, Gambetta (London, 1920), p. 152. 
both French refugees and English 1 lberals presumably confirming 
the attraction. Among Barrere's contacts In these early days 
were Sir Charles Dllke and Louis Blanc.10 Despite his admiration 
for Blanc, however, he was sufficiently astute even then to ob-
serve to a friend, "Revolutions are made with Ideas but pol I tics 
requ I res ski 11 and fores lght •11 11 
When the Russo-Turkish war broke out In 1877, the young 
journalist was sent to the Balkans. In Constantinople he became 
acquainted with Mlle Irene Damad, the daughter of a well-to-do 
Armenian banker. They were married several years later.12 
4 
As a result of the competence he demonstrated In his reports 
from the Balkans, Barrere was assigned to cover the proceedings of 
the Congress of Berlin. It was a decisive appointment In the devel-
opment of his career, affording him an opportunity to observe first-
hand some of the leading European statesmen of the age: Otto von 
Bismarck, Benjamin Disraeli, Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, Marquess of 
Sal lsbury, Alexander Gortschakoff. France was represented at the 
Congress by her Minister of Foreign Affairs William Waddington. 
10rhe liberal Dllke, who served as Gladstone's Under-
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs In 1880 and as Minister of 
the Interior In 1882, would be a witness at Barr~re's marriage 
along with Gabriel Charmes, editor of the Journal des D6bats and 
author of numerous studies on the Orient and Egypt. 
Blanc, French socialist, had been a member of the Provi-
sional Government from Febru~ry to May, 1848. Blamed for the 
failure of the National Workshops, he fled to England In June, re-
maining there until 1871. After hts return to France he served as 
a deputy for Marseilles under the Third Republic. 
11 Quoted by Noll, Camll le Barre re, pp. 19-20. 
12Mlle Damad was Roman Catholic and had received a com-
pletely French education. Her parents eventually settled In France, 
where she and Camille were married while he was serving as Consul 
General In Cairo. 
F 5 
Impressed as much by the young Barrere's extraordinary grasp of In-
ternational affairs as by his judgment and reliability, Waddington 
took him on as a secretary and subsequently helped arrange for his 
return to France, made possible by an act of amnesty of March 4, 
1879. 
The Berlin assignment may have provided Barr~re as well 
with international contacts that would prove invaluable in his fu-
ture diplomatic activities. Bernhard von BUlow, with whom he would 
later deal extensively, was also assigned to the Congress.13 In a 
journalistic capacity, Barrere also travelled to Rome In February, 
1878, interviewing Italian Minister Agostino Oepretis on the sub-
ject of lrredentism.14 
In Paris Barrere was profoundly influenced by Gambetta. 
He joined the editorial staff of La R6publlgue francaise and appears 
to have served as Gambetta•s secretary for a brief perlod.15 The 
impact of the republican journal on Barrere was of paramount Impor-
tance in the shaping of his lifelong diplomatic activities, particu-
larly by bringing him into contact with a group of men who were 
destined to be leading figures on the French political scene in the 
13From November, 1879 to July, 1884 von BUlow acted as 
Secretary of the German Embassr In Paris. He was named German Am-
bassador to Rome in 1894, Fore gn Minister in 1897 and served as 
Chancellor from 1900 to 1909. In 1914 he returned to Rome as Ger-
man Ambassador in an attempt' to prevent Italy with allying herself 




14see A. Sandona, L'lrreden lsmo nelle lotte 
contese di lomatlche alo-austr1ac e Bologna, , I, 190. 
15stephen Gwynn and Gertrude H. Tuckwell, The Life of the 
Hon. Sir Charles W. Dllke (London, 1918), I, 299. {Herein-
referred to as Sir Charles W. Dllke). 
p 6 
--
period leading up to the First World War. Eugene Spuller, Paul-
Armand Challemel-Lacour, Paul Bert, Charles Freyclnet and Eugene 
Etienne were among the well-known personalities on the paper's edi-
torial staff In these days. From Its ranks Barrere would form 
lasting friendships with Gabriel Hanotaux, the three Charmes broth-
ers and Theophlle Delcasse. His friendship with Delcasse was un-
wavering and certainly crucial In the development of Franco-Italian 
rapprochement that occured between 1898 and 1902. Of Gambetta's 
Influence on him, Barrere wrote many years later, "I experienced 
It myself to such a degree my whole career has been affected. 11 16 
Gambetta, In turn, recognized the worth of his dlsclple. 17 He con-
sidered the young editor well qualified to pursue a career In di-
plomacy, and as his ability to Influence the political futures of 
aspiring young men In the Third Republ le was considerable, had him 
nominated French Delegate to the European Committee on the Danube 
In 1880. Barrere embarked on the path of diplomatic service with 
the rank of Embassy Secretary of the First Class. 18 The Danubian 
commission had been created by the Treaty of Paris in 1856; its 
political, administrative and technical competence confirmed at the 
l6camllle Barrere, "La chute de Delcasse, 11 Revue des Deux 
Mondes, 8, X (1932), 603. 
17After Gambetta's death Gabriel Charmes wrote Barrere of 
the statesman's high regard for him, remarking that "of all those 
around him you were certainly the one on whom he counted most. 
How many times didn't he tefl me~ How often he spoke of the won-
derful future he bel leved was In store for you. 11 Quoted by No~l 
from an unedl ted letter written by Charmes to Barre re several days 
after Gambetta's death. Nolfl, Camille Barrere, p. 22, n. 2. 
lBN~l comments on the preoccupation of republican leaders 
of this era with building up a new regime staffed with administra-
tive and diplomatic personnel dedicated to their own Ideals. In 
his judgment the Ir cHoi:ces for Implementing this program were often 
Inspired by Gambetta. Ibid., p. 27. 
r 1 
congress of Berlin in 1878. Barrere profited from the contacts 
and experience it provided. In 1882 he was signatory to an addi-
tional convention to the act which regulated navigation on the 
Lower Danube. The following year he sat as Plenipotentiary at an-
other conference assembled In London to negotiate a treaty dealing 
with this same problem. 
By 1883 French Foreign Minister Challemel-Lacour had ap-
pointed him French Consul General In Cairo with the task of study-
ing the rights of suzerainty over the Khedlve reserved to the 
Sultan. Barrere's task was essentially that of obtaining the prom-
ised evacuation of British garrisons in Egypt maintaining, at the 
same time, the positions France still occupied In the area, Hts 
dispatches reveal the extent of his opposition to British pollcy. 19 
Barrere's success In grasping the complexities of the situation In 
Egypt and promoting France's best interests led to his next assign-
ment as First French Delegate to an International Finance Conference 
that was convened in London In the summer of 1884. 20 The following 
spring he presided over another conference, this one In Parts, 
charged with preparing a treaty relative to the Suez Canal. As the 
result of French initiative the conference successfully drafted a 
l9France, Mtntstere des Affalres Etrangeres, Documents dl-
lomatl ues fran als relatlfs aux orl Ines de la uerre 
Pars, 1929- • Series 1 \ V, Nos. 5, , 19 , 00, , 20, 
393, 403, 543, 559, 561; VI, No. 23; VII, Nos. 142, 268. (This 
French diplomatic correspondence has been divided Into three 
series: 1, 1871-1900; 2, 190011911; 3, 1911-19142 (Hereinafter Series 1 ts referred to as DDF; Series 2, as DDF .) Sir Charles 
Dllke expressed surprise th~an ex-refugee In London could demon-
strate such opposition to English policy. Gwynn and Tuckwell, 
SI r Charles W. 0 I 1 ke, II, 56. 
20ooF1, v, No. 317. 
F 8 
convention which guaranteed the Great Powers rights of Interven-
tion In Egyptfon finances. Barrere's German and English colleagues 
testify to his competence In discharging his duties while at the 
same time managing to defend the Interests of his own country. 21 
In all probability ft was the successful Impression being 
created by the young French diplomat that prompted Count Herbert 
von Bismarck to arrange for a meeting with Barrere In Koenigstein 
that September. The Chancellor's son was In the habit of under-
taking missions for his father during these years, and Barrere's 
future apparently appeared sufficiently promising to warrant his 
cultlvatlon.22 
The premature death of Gambetta In 1883 was an Irreparable 
loss to Barrere.23 Fortunately, his work In Egypt had already 
brought him to the attention of Jules Ferry, then French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. Ferry encouraged Barrere to write him directly, 
and In the course of their correspondence expressed confidence In 
21 Prlnce Bernhard von BUlow, Memo I rs (Paris, 1931), 111, 
207; IV, 383; Gwynn and Tuckwell, Sir Charles W. Dllke, II, 56. 
22clted by Nol!l from an unedited letter of Baron de Courcel, 
then Ambassador to Berlin to Barrere, September 2, 1884. Camille 
Barre re, p. 32, n. 2. De Cou rce 1 represented France In Germany from 
1881 to 1886 and was Ambassador to London from 1894 to 1898. No@l 
suggests that the contact between Barrere and Herbert von Bismarck 
may have been established through Bernhard von BUlow, with whom 
Barrere was acquainted. Ab?~e, p. 5. 
231n "La chute de Delcasst!, 11 p. 64, Barrere alluded to the 
loss of Gambetta to both friends and country, consoling himself 
with the remark that "his teachings had germinated. Young and 
ardent men were Impregnated with them. 11 Nol!l also relates that 
Barrere always kept a large portrait of Gambetta In his study, which 
was framed with a letter Barrere had received from him on the occa-
sion of an older brother's death. Camille Barrere, p. 33. 
p 9 
the manner in which the Cairo consul was conducting French affairs. 24 
When Ferry's colonial policy brought him Into disrepute, Barrere 
felt deeply what he regarded as the injustice of public opinion to-
wards one who had given France both Tunisia and Tonkin. Ferry's 
death In 1893 was almost as grent a loss to him as Gambetta's. 
Both shared in his admiration, and he wrote of "the two ••• so 
great In spirit and heart who, each In his own way, lived only for 
la patrie. 112 5 
In November, 1885 Barrere left Egypt to become French 
Minister to Sweden. 26 Three years later he was entrusted with the 
Legation to Bavaria where he remained for more than five years. 
During this period he was less involved In high politics than he 
had been in Cairo; his role consisted more In being a well-informed 
observor, an experience that was to contribute to the maturation of 
his diplomatic talents. In 1892 and 1893 Barrere also participated 
In the International Sanitation Conferences that were held In Venice, 
Paris and Dresden, serving as president of the French Delegation In 
1892. Here, as In Berlin earlier, he made contacts that would be 
extremely valuable when he became France's Ambassador to Rome. 
24No!l quotes an unedited personal letter from Ferry to 
E!c;r;~re, March 8, 1884: "I admire your activity and your dll lgence. 
You ~re In an extremely difficult situation, everyone In the depart-
ment ls counting on you ••• I congratulate you also for your 
prudence and have enough confidence In your wisdom to dispense with 
the need of preaching to yot.1. 11 I b Id., pp. 33-34. 
251 b Id., p. 34. 
26Apparently one of the reasons for Barrere's transfer 
from Cairo was the antagonism created with the English representa-
tive Sir Evelyn Baring, the future Lord Cromer, by the antipathy 
between their wives. See Atkinson, "Ambassador of France," p. 25, 
n. 32. 
p 10 
Among the Ital Ian statesmen with whom he establ I shed cordial rela-
tions In the course of this work was Emilio Visconti Venosta. 
In these years Barrere was forming judgments on German pol -
ltlcs that provide Invaluable Insight Into his later attitude to-
wards Italy's participation In the Triple Alliance. There had been 
a brief Interval In which he apparently entertained some possibil-
ity for peaceful rapport between France and Germany. 27 Yet his 
fundamental attitude towards the German Empire ls more likely that 
conveyed during the course of several conversations he had with 
Herbert von Bismarck. The two great obstacles to peace, Barrere 
reports saying, were Germany's policy of repression In Alsace-
Lorratne and the national antipathy towards France that had been 
provoked by Prince von Bismarck. In Barrere's opinion, Bismarck 
wanted peace but he wanted It only as a means of gaining time to 
consolidate the Gennan kingdom, found a colonial empire and build 
up the German navy for war·.2a 
As for Kaiser Wit 1 lam II, Barrere wrote French Foreign 
Minister Alexandre Ribot In 1891, "If my Instinct doesn't deceive 
me, he will be responsible for hastening the hour In which the he-
gemony and even the greatness of England will be put In questlon. 1129 
By 1892 his distrust of the German sovereign was still more 
27ooF1, VII, Nos. 3,5, 453, 484, 500. E. E. Berger In 
"Camille Barr~re", Berliner Monatshefte, XVIII (1940), 707 Infers 
that the role of peacemaker was assumed by Barrere In an attempt 
to be named Berlin's French Ambassador. Serra dismisses the valid-
ity of Berger's study for Its lack of objectivity. c. Barrere e 
l'lntesa, p. 33, n. 23. 
28ooF1, VII, Nos. 375, 453, 484, 500. 
291bld. , IX, No. 55. 
p 11 
pronounced. He described him as one "lured on by the force of 
events and h Is own temperament to want to govern Eu rope. n30 Bar-
rere considered that day relatively distant, with sufficient time 
for Germany's adversaries to prepare themselves and to weaken her 
alliances. At the same time he was concerned lest they relax their 
efforts. "Time," he warned, "Is our most precious ally. 11 31 
There are documents which Indicate that as early as 1892 
Barrere had arrived at the fundamental position that was to underlie 
his subsequent attitude towards the policy he believed France should 
adopt In her relations with Italy. The Triple Alliance was a threat 
to France. The weak spot In the al I I ance was Italy. In order to 
avol d "disastrous diplomat I c consequences, 11 It was therefore essen-
tl al that the peninsular kingdom be detached from the menacing 
coa 1 I ti on. 32 
There were obstacles Impeding the achievement of this ob-
jective, however, and Barrere was not unaware of them. While In 
Munich he had undertaken a study of Italian public opinion and 
concluded that there was a distinction between the dispositions of 
the Italian monarch and the nation towards the Trlpllce. The fi-
delity of King Humbert to the Triple Alliance appeared to be un-
questionable; that of public opinion, less certaln.33 Yet despite 
widespread Ital Ian disenchantment with her al 1 les, In Barrere 1s 
' 
estimation it remained a decided possibility that defection could 
provoke Italy's invasion by the belligerent Kaiser. Nor was the 
301bld., No. 246. 
321bld., X, No. 68. 
31 Ibid. 
331 bid., V 111 , No. 166. 
p 12 
issue a simple one from a strictly Italian viewpoint. When presi-
dent of the Italian Council in 1888, Antonio Rudlnl had remarked 
to Barrere that Italy actually found herself In a vicious circle: 
To ameliorate the economic relations of France and Italy, 
It's necessary to modify our political relations; and the 
amelloratl~Q of those requires the amelioration of economic 
relations. 
Barrere's reply at the time was to suggest a third solution: si-
multaneous modification of both the political and economic rela-
tions of the two countries. Yet In 1893, as he observed to French 
Foreign Minister Jean Casimir-Perler, that solution was no longer 
possible. It could only be achieved after a long period of pre-
1 lminary detente on the part of the Italian government.35 
In April, 1894 Barr~re was named Ani>assador to Switzerland. 
There he successfully negotiated a commercial treaty with the 
Confederation that resulted In a notable Increase In French trade. 
During these years he was also formulating the program he 
was to follow later In Italy. Fran~ols Charles-Roux, associated 
with Barrere In Rome as Secretary and then Conselller d'Ani>assade 
from 1916 to 1924, states explicitly that "Everything he accom-
plished In Rome he had In the back of his mind before arriving 
there. His work was the realization of a plan he'd formulated 
while Ambassador to Switzerland ••• 11 • 36 As Barrere noted to-
wards the close of his own 'diplomatic career, "For thirty years, 
34 tbld., X, No. 486. 351bld. 
36F. Charles-Roux, Trots ani>assades francalses a la vellle 
de la guerre {Paris, 1928), p. 111. A distinguished diplomat and 
author, Charles-Roux was attached to the French embassies In 
St. Petersburg, Constantinople and London. From 1932 to 1940 he 
served as French Ambassador to the Holy See. 
p 
I was convinced Germany could only be subdued by the detachrnent 
of Italy from her alliance. It was In this framework I came to 
Rome i n 1 89 7 • " 3 7 
13 
The major preoccupation of the future French Ambassador to 
Italy now became a search for the means by which this objective 
could be accomplished. The first step lay In dissipating the anti-
pathies that existed between the French and Italian governments. 
The opportunity for effecting such a rapprochement was afforded 
Barrere at the end of December, 1897 when French Foreign Minister 
Gabriel Hanoteux appointed him Ambassador to Rome.38 
Barrere's appointment coincided with a recent thaw in 
Franco-Italian relations. Rapport between the two nations had been 
severely strained since 1881 as a result of their conflicting in-
terests in the Mediterranean. The rivalry was not unexpected, 
Bismarck had foreseen It In 1866 and Tunisia was the anticipated 
point of contest.39 Despite the traditional ties binding the two 
37Quoted by No~l, Camille Barrere, p. 38, from an unedited 
note of Barrere's dated August 12, 1919. 
38The appointment obviously had been under consideration 
for some time. Visconti Venosta was first alerted to Billet's 
replacement in a dispatch from his minister In Vienna, Count 
Costantino Nlgra, on January 22, 1897. Serra, C. Barrere e 1' lntesa, 
p. 62, n. 42, from unedited material In the Archlvlo Visconti 
Venosta. Serra's study makes extensive use of material In the 
private Visconti Venosta and Stucchl-Prlnettl archives. For com-
plete citations refer to C. 9arr•re e l'intesa. 
39The Tunisian question and Its bearing on Franco-Italian 
relations are treated by: W. L. Langer, "The European Powers and 
the French Occupation of Tunis," American Historical Review, XXXI 
(October, 1925), 55-78 and (January, 1926), 251-65· J. Ganlage, 
Les orlglnes du protectorat fran~als en Tunlsle, 1~61-1888 (Paris, 
1915); Luigi Chlala, Paglne di storla contem1iTranea (2d ed.: 
Turin, 1896), (hereinafter referred to as Pa9ne df storia,) 
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Latin sisters--affinities of language, culture and religion•-the 
Mediterranean interests of both countries made ultimate conflict 
in the area almost lnevltable.40 
14 
France, of course, was deeply Involved in the events domi-
nating nineteenth century Mediterranean history: Italian unification, 
the opening of the Suez Canal, and North Africa's Europeanization. 
The configuration of her coasts and establishment of French rule in 
Algeria had led Gambetta to regard the western Mediterranean as 
France's particular "scene of action. 1141 There were innumerable 
other arguments, however, to support French involvement in the Medi-
terranean basin. As well as strategic Importance and economic con-
siderations, France sustained the concept of her role as mlsslonnalre 
civilisateur. In the nineteenth century the view still prevailed 
that the civilization and Institutions of Paris could only be a 
blessing to the world's underdeveloped regions. 42 In this era 
II: Tunis!; T. J. Powers, J. Ferr and the Renaissance of French 
Imperial ism (New York, 19'+4 , an E. Serra, La quest one tun s na 
da Crlspi a Rudinl (Milan, 1947). (Hereinafter referred to as 
La guestione tunisina.) 
40As Christopher Seton-Watson noted, the French seizure of 
Tunisia "caused an emotional revulsion against France and brought 
to the surface, in their most virulent form, all the mutual sus-
picions that have so persistently divided the two Latin nations." 
Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 1870-1925 (London, 1967) 1 p. 109. See also Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 190'+·1906 
(Chicago, 1930) and Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History 
(Ann Arbor, 1959). 
' 41 Quoted by Andr~ Tardleu, France and the Alliances (New 
York, 1908), p. 82. Brace and Brogan both infer that the Tunisian 
question was actually opened In 1830 when, on July 5, Algiers fell 
to France. See: Richard M. Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), pp. 30-36 and D. W. Brogan, France 
Under the Republic (New York, 1940), p. 224. 
42Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, p. 41. 
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colonialism also afforded France a degree of prestige, providing 
certain compensations after the defeat and Isolation that followed 
In the aftermath of Sedan's defeat.43 However, any hopes France 
entertained of creating a bridge across North Africa from the At-
lantic to the Red Sea were thwarted at Fashoda.44 Yet Morocco 
remained to round off the French North African emplre.45 The "pearl 
of North Africa" would actually entice Oelcasst! Into acquiescing 
In the arrangements Barrere ultimately negotiated with Italy In 
1900 and 1902--the Mediterranean and Neutrality Accords, of which 
the Franco-Ital Ian rapproachment was Integrally constltuted.46 
It was Inevitable that France's Mediterranean activities 
would engender certain difficulties for her In the realm of Inter-
national relations, particularly with: Great Britain, entrenched 
In Egypt, Gibraltar and Malta; Spain and Italy. The Anglo-French 
problems would be resolved with the conclusion of an African Con-
vention In 1899.47 Differences with Spain, In marked decl lne dur-
ing this period, were of relatively less significance. Agreements 
with her on the question of Morocco were reached between 1899 and 
1904.48 
43 Be 1 ow, p • 2 l . 44Below, pr. 44, 4G, 47. 
4SAccordlng to Christopher Andrew, for five years after 
Fashoda the main purpose of a section of the Comlt6 de l'Afrlque 
f ranc;a lse was to persuade De,,1 cass6 to seek an "agreement wl th 
England based on the barter of Egypt for Morocco~' Th6ophlle Oel-
cass6 and the Entente Cordlale (London, 1968), p. 52. 
46see 
tudes towards Horocc"). La colonisation fran 
...,____,......_.._........,---__.,,._.-:..r..,_.,.... ....... _........,.,._.._ __ ...._.....__ 
du Nord: Alg6rle, Tunis e, • 
47 Below, pp. S2 59. 
L 48Andrew, Th6ophlle Oelcass6 and the Entente Cordlale, pp. 147-51; 216-27. 
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Italy, now striving to attain the status of European power 
and wholly a Mediterranean country, was a different matter. The 
Mediterranean Sea and Its surrounding lands were the sphere of her 
major Interest. Seekl ng a real lzatlon of her pol It I cal unity, the 
leaders of the Rlsorglmento had proclaimed the young nation's right 
to her national patrimony. Pagan and Christian Rome had been the 
capital of civilization! In her bid for empire the third Rome re-
claimed domination of the Mediterranean, marking North Africa for 
her future expansion. Tunisia, within sight of Sicily and adjacent 
to Algeria, was the object on which Italy's ll11lledlate attention was 
focused. Yet France, In possession of Algeria, dominated the west-
ern Mediterranean~ 
Italy saw In Tunisia a guarantee of her Mediterranean se-
curity. She also viewed the region as an outlet for her constant 
flow of emlgrants.49 Tunisia had actually been a sphere of Ital Ian 
economic activity prior to the young nation's unification. Since 
1869 Italy had exercised joint financial control over the territory 
with France and Great Britain. 
Theoretically a part of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, 
Tunisia was poorly governed during these years by a native dynasty 
that had left It largely uncontrolled, underdeveloped and subject 
to Innumerable problems stemming from Irresponsible financial man-
' 
agement. The major Powers were acutely aware of the Inherent danger 
in a disturbance of European equilibrium. Due to the ramifications 
49By 1881 there were 11,200 Italians in Tunisia. The French, 
by comparison, only numbered 700. Brace, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
p. 37. 
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of colonialism, danger was Implicit in North African territorial 
changes as well. Tunisia's relationship to the Ottoman Empire 
would ordinarily lend a particularly dangerous aspect to an alter-
ation in her status quo. However, Tunisia had figured unoffi-
cially in the discussions of the Congress of Berlin, where French 
Plenipotentiary William Waddington was led to understand by both 
Germany and Great Britain that France might enjoy a free hand In 
the territory.SO Bismarck encouraged the French interest, regard-
ing Tunisia as compensation for France's loss of Alsace-Lorraine 
and a means of destroying francophllism In Italy. Great Britain 
acquiesced as a concession to French acceptance of the Cyprus Con-
vention. 
Ital Ian pretensions In Tunisia apparently moved France to 
definitive action. Dissatisfied with Ital Ian Minister Benedetto 
Cai rol 1 's "clean hands" pol Icy In the negotiations that transpl red 
In Berlin, Italy had adopted the unalterable position that France's 
occupation of Tunisia would be totally unacceptable.51 She pre-
ferred a preservation of the status quo that would have permitted 
free play to both French and Italian Interests In the region. 
Italy's Tunisian Consul, Signor Hacclo, enjoyed an unlimited exer-
cise of power that permitted him to engage In a war of prestige 
and economy with his French colleague M. Roustan. Macclo's activ-
ities played Into the hands'of French colonialists. Opinion 
SOFor these aspects of the Congress of Berl In see W. N. 
Medltcott, Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe (London, 
1956), pp. 65-70, 113-34, 197, 306-11. 
51catroll headed two Italian ministries: the first, Harch-
December, 1878; the second, July, 1879-Hay, 1881. 
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deepened that lt<ily w<:s threztenln9 Frsnce's position. In 18fO 
French Premier Charles F'reyctnet offTclrilly notified lt«'ly that 
fr;ince con-» I de red Tunis la her sphere of f nfl uence. HI s country 
wauld not permit another power "to establish its influence in oppo-
sition to ours in u territory like Tunisfa v.1hfch Is the nritur;-11 
annex and mll ltary key to our Afrlcen holdtngs.1152 The situation 
came to a he~d in 1081 when France estobllshed n virtual protec-
torate over the territory. Italy protested the French ~ctlon ef-
fected by the Treaty of Bardo, claiming prior rights In Tunisia on 
the basis of a treaty of friendship, navigation and c0111nerce she 
had concluded with the Bey In 1t:6s.53 Her objections, however, 
proved to be of no avail. 
R~tlflcatlon of the Treaty of 80rdo led Sidney Sonntno, 
Influential leader of the Italian par1 lamentary center, to appe.nl 
for closer ltalfan ties with Germany ns \'#ell as for friendship 
with Austrla-Hung~ry and England. Convinced a rapproAchment with 
the Central Powers was essentla1 tf Italy were to surmount the 
dnnlhllatton of iso1atton, Sonnlno's position was supported by the 
King and Queen as well as by Parliament and the Ital tan press. 
Thus in 1882 Italy coimtltted herself to Bismarck, becoming party 





52ooFI • t 11, No. 214. Btzerta would become a gr?.ve obstn-
to already embittered Franco-Italian relations In the 1890's. 
below, pp. 27-28. 
treaty see: Italy, HlnJstero esterl, 
e no d' Ital la e gl I fl trl sta,tl., 
the elllance hed been 
Count Carlo Robllant, 
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The Triple Alliance (Triplice) became a fundamental Inter-
national alignment of the age. The original treaty of 1882 se-
cured Italy the support of Germany and Austria-Hungary against a 
French attack. When renewed in 1887, Italy won far more advanta-
geous terms than those she obtained when originally orienting her 
policy towards the Central Powers. Supplementary accords with 
Germany and Austria-Hungary and a series of Mediterranean agreements 
with England, Austria-Hungary and Spain completed the stipulations 
of the original treaty of 1882. Italy received support for her 
Mediterranean policy as well as a pledge of German assistance against 
France If the latter attempted to modify the status quo In North 
Africa. Her Balkan problems with Austria-Hungary were brought un-
der control and her traditional dependence on England In the Medi-
terranean was reinforced.SS With the agreements of 1887 Italy be-
came a connecting link between the German orbit and British Medi-
terranean power, precisely when France was attempting to force Eng-
land out of Egypt. Italy's International position during this 
period had been greatly enhanced.56 
for one, would have preferred Italy to wait "with calmness and 
prudence for the dangers which threaten us to make themselves felt 
by others who would then come In search of us." Quoted In Chlala, 
~lne di storia, Ill: La Trlpllce e la Dupllce Alleanza, 96-98. 
On the Tri pl fee see also A. F. Prlbram, The Secret TreatL~-~-9f 
Austria-HungarT, 1879-1914 (Cambridge, 1921), II, 3-43 and 
L. Salvatorell , La Trlpllce Alleanza (Milan, 1939). Texts of the 
Triple Alliance treaties are Included in Prlbram, I. 
' S5see Medl I cott' s "The Med I te rranean Agreements of 1887", 
Slavonic Review, V (June, 1926), 60-80 on the Mediterranean ac-
cords and James L. Glanville, Italy's Relations with England, 1896-
!2Qi (Baltimore, 1934) for Anglo-Ital fan relations. 
S6serra attributes the improvement to Robilant's diplomatic 
skill in a complex, changing International climate, the Italian 
minister successfully transforming a continental alliance Into a 
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France viewed the situation with Increasing concern, con-
vinced It constituted a grave threat to her security. She found 
herself subjected to Increased Isolation and surrounded by a coa-
1 ltlon that was determined to maintain the status quo and prevent 
her from Initiating any action that might alter lt.57 Signifi-
cantly, the Franco-German d6tente of 1885 had ended with the fall 
of Jules Ferry's ministry. The departure of Ferry (staunch advocate 
of Franco-German colonial accord) from the political arena coin· 
clded with the rise of nationalistic, germanophoblc sentiment In 
France. When General Boulanger was appointed French Minister of 
War In 1886, the danger of war between the two countries became 
acute.58 Furthennore, Franco-German estrangement was evolving as 
Germany C!!galn began to support British policy. Disturbed by the 
prospect of Russian aid to France with the Increasing possibility 
of an outbreak In hostilities, Bismarck sought a defensive alliance 
with England. Count Wlldenburg Hatzfeldt, German Ambassador to 
London, was Instructed to convey to Lord Salisbury the Gernlan 
chancellor's personal conviction that the surest way to peace lay 
conttnental-Hedlterranean one. Bismarck, ;:>ware of Russia's growing 
animosity towards her Balkan rival, Austria-Hungary, and of the 
spirit of revanche prevailing in France (due to the growth of Bou-
langer's popularity among the masses), foresaw a confrontation by 
France were Germany to Intervene In the event of a Russian attack 
on Austria. Thus the chancellor's objective In 1887 was to localize 
an eventual Austro-Russlan conflict. In order to do so, he had 
first to guarantee Italian t'eutrallty. C, Barcere e l'lntesa, 
pp. 38-40. 
57Langer sees the acute tension In Franco-Ital Ian relatlons 
developing directly from France's discovery that a potentially 
hostile coalition existed against her. European Alliances and 
Alignments (New York, 1935), p. 236. 
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In the conclusion of a treaty binding the respective powers for 
a limited period "to combined resistance against a French attack. 11 59 
Tunisia and the Triple Alliance were not the only sources 
of contention between France and Italy, however. Italy's annexa-
tion of Rome In the wake of France's defeat at Sedan remained an 
act of Infamy to an overwhelming number of Frenchmen. France's 
Ambassador to Rome In 1874, the Marquis de Noailles, would attribute 
difficulties between the two countries to Italian ambitions as well--
to Italy's desire to replace the defeated France of 1870 as the 
great Mediterranean power.60 
A fear of French republicanism figured prominently in the 
framework of Italian antipathy. The possibility of a republican 
overthrow Initiated and supported by French radicals was regarded 
as a threat to Italy's monarchy and the continued existence of her 
national unity. Still a new creation, the Ital fan monarchy lacked 
the supports on which other monarchies rested; ancient loyalties, 
an old aristocracy, the clergy, surviving elements of feudalism.61 
The alienation of the neighboring Latin sisters became more 
59ersmarck'sRe1atlons with England, 1871-1890( German Diplo-
matic Documents, 1871-1914; ed. by E.T. S. Dugdale New York, 
1928), I, 369-72. Although Germany's proposal was not followed up 
at this time, relations between England and Germany continued to 
improve. See Langer, Eurofhan All lances and Alfgn~ents, pp. 491-94 
and L. Albertini, The Orig s of the War of 1914, trans. by Isabelle 
M. Massey (London, 1952), I, 61-64. 
60see Enrico Serra's reference to an unpublished "Note sur 
les relations entre la France et 1' ltalie" by de Noatlles, Included 
among unpublished Carte Hanotaux at the Qual d'Orsay. La questlone 
tunlsfna, p. 3, n. 1. 
6IB. Croce, A History of ltala, 1871-1915, trans. by 
Cecelia M. Ady (London, 1929, pp. 10 -09. 
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pronounced after Francesco Crtspi's rise to power In 1887.62 Given 
the Italian minister's tempestuous temperament and widely-known anti-
French attitude, the deterioration was not too surprtstng.63 As 
early as 1871 Crtspl had expressed his strong belief that "without 
force and grandeur, Ital Ian unity would be useless. 11 64 He resented 
what he considered France's appropriation of Nice and Savoy and her 
opposition to the Ital tan conquest of Rome, unshakable In his con-
viction that a natural rivalry existed between France and Italy both 
tn the Mediterranean and with the Vatican. Benedetto Croce has des-
cribed his attitude as that of one, "obsessed by the nightmare of 
France In alliance with the papacy, planning an Invasion of Italy 
and the destruct ton of Ital tan untty. 1165 Crlspi 1s anti-French sen-
timent was augmented by an admiration for the Prussia of Bismarck, a 
Prussia the Ital Ian minister regarded as a natural French adversary. 
62A Mazzinlan revolutionary after 1848, Crlspl figured 
prominently in Garibaldi's Thousand. Initially a member of the 
Italian Parliament's extreme left, he soon became one of the 
monarchy's most fervent supporters, seeing In the Crown the best 
unifying force for the new kingdom. Crlspl directed Ital tan poli-
cy as Prime Minister from 1887 to 1891 and a9aln between 1893 and 
1896. See G. Volpe, F. Crisp! (Venice, 1928) and G. Salvemini, 
La pol ltlca estera di F. Crfspl (Rome, 1919) for differing Inter-
pretations of Crtspl and his work. Volpe's study, with reserva-
tions, Is more positive: Salvemlnl's, substantially negative. 
631n fairness to the Ital tan minister, It has been noted 
that Cris pl 's counterpart In this period, French Foreign Minister 
Ren~ Goblet," was hardly less I rasclble and passionate than Crlspl 
himself." Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. !1?5. 
64Quoted by Serra th La ~uestlone tunlslna, p. 33 from an 
article entitled "Italia e Franc ah originally appearing In La 
Rlforma, February 21, 1871. 
65croce, A HlstorT of ltala, 1871-1915, p. 168. De Noallles 
had, tn fact, related ant -Frenchemonstratlons In the 1870's to 
Ital Ian resentment over the alleged theft of Nice! attributing the 
disturbances to the Instigation of Bismarck. DDF, 11, No. 242. 
p 
The conflict In Franco-Ital ten relations assumed major 
proportions tn 1868 when Italy concluded a military convention 
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with Germany In which the representatives of the Trtpl tee formu-
lated a COf11110n plan to counteract possible French aggresslon.66 
France retaliated by breaking off negotiations for a new tariff 
treaty with Italy. In 1886 the Influence of rising protectionist 
sentiment, along with anger over France's rejection of a naval 
treaty, had led the ltallan chambers to denounce a French tariff 
treaty that had been In effect since 1881. The rupture of negotia-
tions for a new agreement that had been opened In 1887 Initiated 
the equivalent of a tariff war between the two countrles.67 This 
rift In commercial relations had grave consequences for Italy and 
was seized upon by the French government as an economic weapon In 
Its efforts to wrest Italy from the Triple Alliance. 
There were other Nasures than economl c pressure, however, 
which France was able to bring to bear on Italy In their contest. 
Italy was fully as sensitive to the Romcn question as she 
had shown herself to be with regard to Tuntsla.68 France was not 
66see Prlbram, The Secret Tr:eatles of Austrla-Hungary 1 1879-1914, II, 81·88. 
6Zsee below, pp. 32-51; A. Billot, ~a Fran~e et l'ftalte 
(Parts, 1905), I, 47·56, 77-78 and £. Decleva, Da Adu~_;l__Sara)P..Y2, 
(Bi'.lri, 1971) • pp. 61-68. 
' 68see William Halperin, ltalx and the Vatican a~ War (Chicago, 1939); E. L. Woodward, 11The 6ip1omaey of theatfcan 
Under Popes Plus IX and Leo XIII, .. Journal of the British Institute 
<>f International Affairs, Ill (1924), 113-39; F'. Salata1 "La ques· 
tlone romana e la Trlp1tce Alleanza," Nuova Antalogla, "• CCXXXI II 
(1923), 219-63 and E. Bourgeois, "Les orlglnes de la Triple Al-
tlance et la question romaine." Revue de Parts, CXCll (1926), 37-58. 
averse to exploiting this vulnerability. The young kingdom had 
been apprehensive of the threat to her monarchy, Implicit In any 
forced restoration of papal temporal power, since fl rst appropriat-
ing church territory during the course of Ital Ian unification. The 
conclusion of the Triple Alliance in 1882 relieved much of her anx-
iety that Bismarck might support such a drlve. 69 Suspicions then 
reverted to France as the principal source of support for any move-
ment aimed at restoring Rome to the papacy. 
Animosity towards France became more embittered during the 
first Crlspl ministry, which coincided with the ralllement and 
Pope Leo XII l's efforts to secure an entente with a re-Christianized 
France. In the succeeding decade France's influence at the Vatican 
became paramount, Italy's attitude towards the church changing to 
one of open hostlllty.70 Leo XII l's conviction he would be forced 
to abandon the Vatican aggravated existing tensions still further. 
The situation assumed crisis dimensions in 1889 when the erection of 
a statue of Glordano Bruno (considered a sixteenth-century victim of 
papal Intolerance) resulted In an eruption of anti-papal demonstra-
tions In Rome. Franco-Ital Ian relations had deteriorated to such 
an extent by then that an outbreak of war between the two countries 
was believed to be Imminent. Pope Leo XI 11 seriously considered 
leaving Rome, and It was conman knowledge he hoped for Intervention 
by the Ca tho 11 c powers If h I~ de pa rtu re was res I sted by the I ta 11 an 
691taly's concern over this possibility had Increased 
after the chancellor ended his quarrel with the Roman Curia. 
70see Alexander Sedgwick, The Ralllement In French Politics, 
1890-1898 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969). 
.... 
government. Although a major International crisis was averted, 
Crlspi contended that considerable pressure had been brought to 
bear on the pope by France throughout the eplsode.7 1 
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Relations between France and Italy were also strained by a 
conflict of Interests In the Red Sea during these years. Italy's 
attempts at colonial expansion, under the aegis of England, encoun-
tered the vigorous opposition of France, whose government refused 
to recognize the protectorate Italy established in Abyssinia or to 
conclude an accord regulating the two countries' respective spheres 
of Interest .72 
A number of Incidents took place during this period as well 
that contributed In no small measure to steadily-Increasing dis-
cord between France and ltaly.73 
The first of these occured In December, 1887 when Italy 
learned France had concluded an accord with the Porte which extended 
the Tunisian frontier thirty kilometres to the east. ltallan pro-
tests were Ineffective; France proceeded with the territorial 
changes Italy debated. 
In January, 1888 the extra-territoriality of the French 
Consulate in Florence was violated by Italian officials demanding 
71The Memoirs of Fr~ncesco Crlspf, ed. by Thomas Palamenghl-
Crlspi and trans. by Mary Prl chard-Agnettl (London, 1912), 11, 
393-407. 
72see R. Pinon, L'empf re de la M6dlterran6e {Paris, 1912), 
pp. 36-37 and E. Serra, La ?uestlone tunlslna, pp. 177-234. Serra 
also accuses the French of netting the hostility of the Abys-
slnfans against Italy. 
73For details, see Serra, C. Barrere e l'fntesa, pp. 43-46 
and Billot, La France et 11 Ital le, I, 75-263 • 
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the papers of a deceased Tunisian subject. France reacted to this 
affront by concentrating a fleet of warships at Toulon, a move 
Italy regarded as Indicative of France's intent to open hostilities 
against her and launch a surprise naval attack at La Spezia. 
Alarmed at the possibly dire International repercussions Inherent 
In the situation, Gennany requested the dispatch of a British fleet 
to the Mediterranean for precautionary measures. Officially, London 
declined to view the affair as serious; yet a British squadron did 
arrive In Genoa and its appearance, accidental or Intentional, was 
believed to have saved the situation In both Rome and Berlin. 
Another dispute arose In June, this clash centering on the 
validity of the capitulations tn Hassawa.74 Disregarding what 
Italy claimed as her rights In the city, France supported a number 
of foreign businessmen protesting the authority of Italian munici-
pal officials to tax them. Austro-Gennan intervention prevented 
this disagreement from assuming greater proportions. 
Additional difficulties then emerged In September, 1888 
when the Bey of Tunis promulgated new legislation effecting educa-
tion and associations. Apparently Instigated by France, the decrees 
were contrary to the capitulations of Italy's 1868 Tunisian treaty. 
Efforts at resolving the conflict were merged with the unsuccessful 
negotiations for a Franco·l~allan commercial accord then In progress.75 
Despite British and Ital tan protests, France also engaged 
74A Red Sea port, Massawa was within the confines of the 
territory establ lshed as Eritrea tn 1890. 
75eelow, pp. 32-51. 
In the fortification of Blzerta, by Its strategic location des-
tined to be the great port of the French Medlterranean--a Toulon 
of Algeria-Tunisla. 76 Italy considered the fortifications an 
indication of France's intention of proceeding to Tunisia's out-
right annexation. To Crisp!, an extension of French sovereignty 
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In Tunisia made Italy's occupation of Tripoli mandatory. In fact, 
since the establishment of France's Tunisian protectorate, Italy 
had attempted to penetrate Trlpolltanla and Cyrenalca with a 
number of scientific expeditions and had expended great effort 
developing Ital Ian conmerce. While Interest In Trlpolltanla was 
tied to the Imperialists' program of political and economic expan-
sion in the eastern Mediterranean, it also excited a great deal of 
enthusiasm throughout the Italian penlnsula--basically, as a means 
of achieving Ital Ian domination of the Mediterranean. The Interest 
was not superficial. In 1888 Robllant had Informed the French 
Embassy in Berlin that a seizure of Tripoli would result In war.77 
France had no direct Interest In Tripoli herself. Yet she 
was convinced that the presence of a signer of the Triple Alliance 
on the flancs of Algeria-Tunisia constituted a grave danger. In 
76on Blzerta's significance see: G. Hanotaux, La palx latlne 
(Paris, 1903), p. 12; Crisp!, Memoirs, II, 441-76 and Pinon, L1emplre 
de la M~dlterran~e, pp. 338-82. Italy regarded the Mediterranean 
military base as "a pistol pointed against Sicily." Quoted by Serra, 
La guestlone tunlslna, p. 52 from an unedited dispatch of Italy's 
Tunisian Consul.General Mach1avelll to Crispi, September 30, 1890. 
Nor was Blzerta's Importance under-estimated In France. Pinon quotes 
Jules Ferry's remark, "If I took Tunis, It was to have Blzerte. 11 
L'emplre de la Medlterranee, p. 343. 
77Quoted from a "Very Confidential" telegram of French 
Charge d 1Affalres, M. Ralndre, August 27, 1888 In E. Bourgeois 
and G. Pages, Les orl Ines et res nsablllt~s de la Grande Guerre 
(2d edition; Paris, 9 3 • 
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the event of war, Italy would become an enemy. France would be 
compel led to defend her African frontiers, and Tri pol I afforded 
a fonnldable base of operations against Blzerta, Indeed against 
the entire Tunisian Regency! 
When enlargement of the Tunisian borders continued, accom-
panied by further French claims to the hinterlands (territory which 
Included the caravan routes uniting the Sudan with Tripoli), Crisp! 
Initiated negotiations with Paris for a solution to mutual Tunlslan-
Trlpol itan problems. Yet France was unwilling to reach an accord 
while Italy remained In the Triple Alllance.78 
An Impasse had been reached.79 The situation remained 
substantially the same during the Interim ministries of Italy's 
Rudin! (February 1891-May, 1892) and Giovanni Glollttl (May, 1892-
November, 1893). In 1892 Rudlnl renewed the Triple Alliance a second 
time; Glollttl's term at the Consulta was marked by the explosive 
Incident at Algues-Mortes, In which a group of Italian workers were 
massacred by French workmen. 
With Crlspl's return to office In 1893 prospects for achiev-
ing Franco-Italian rapport appeared less promising than ever. Italy 
was experiencing the economic disabilities of tariff war with France 
in full. At the same time, Italian aspirations over Ethiopian 
' 
78see Crlspl, Polltlca estera {Milan, 1912), pp. 376-86. 
The basis of the proposal was Italy's acquiescence In France's 
annexation of Tunisia In exchange for French support to Italy's 
pacific acquisition of Tripoli. 
79For details of the period between 1891 and 1896 see 
Billot, La France et l'ltalle, I, 278-484; II, 3-291 and Serra, 
C. Barr~re e 11 Intesa, pp. 43-62. 
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Harrar collided with French manoeuvres to separate Italy from Great 
Britain and gain recognition of the Tunisian protectorate. Even 
more slgntftc2nt was the tennlnatlon of French Isolation In the 
5 unmer of 1892, with the conclusion of a Franco-Russian military 
convention that entered Into vigor at the beginning of 1894.80 
To complicate matters still further, Germany and Austria-Hungary 
were again making overtures to France. An International situation 
of these dimensions left Italy tn an adverse position.Bl A d~tente 
In Franco-Ital tan relations only emerged after Italy's disaster at 
Adowa In 1896. 
While Italy struggled to regain her equll lbrlum after the 
African debacle, France announced her Intention of ending the diplo-
matic arrangements that had existed tn Tunisia since 1868. The 
move was an obvious demand for formal recognition of the protec-
torate France had essentially established In 1881. Although reluc-
tant to abandon the favorable Tunisian capitulations, Italy had 
little hope of reversing the decision and attempted to obtain a new 
conmerclal accord tn return for the political and economic conces-
sions of a new Tunisian treaty. 82 French Foreign Minister Hanotaux, 
BOThe Franco-Russian rapproachment ts treated by Langer 
in The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894 (Mass., 1929). 
81 As Decleva points out, when Germany sides with France 
and Austria-Hungary with Russia, any hope of ltaltan compensation 
vanishes. Italy Is Isolate~ with only the Insufficient platonic 
friendship of England. Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 49. 
82she learned In July, 1896 that Austria-Hungary had signed 
an accord which renounced the capitulations and recognized favor-
able treatment for France In Tunisia. Simultaneously, England 
was negotiating a new treaty In which Egypt would serve as a counter-
part for the concessions France sought In Tunisia and Horrocco. 
Serra, La questlone tunlstna, pp. 406-15. 
however, was unwilling to negotiate on such a basis. The obstacles 
blocking a solution to the Tunisian problem were only surmounted 
when Italian foreign policy was given a new direction by Minister 
of foreign Affairs Emit lo Visconti Venosta, patriot and eminent 
Italian statesman. 83 
Confronted with the serious economic difficulties the 
customs war was infl feting on Italy when he was recalled to active 
political life In July, 1896,Vlscontl Venosta made the decision to 
salvage as much as possible for Italy in a new Tunisian treaty and 
await an opportune moment to negotiate a new commercial accord. 
A Tunisian treaty was subsequently concluded September 28, 1896 
that held the promise of developing Franco-Ital Ian rapprocrement 
In the future. Included In the Tunisian arrangements were: a 
convention of commerce and navigation, a consular convention and 
a convention of extradition.84 
In April, negotiations were initiated for a conmerclal 
accord between the two countries. Although little progress was 
made towards its completion during the remainder of 1897, one of 
83vlscontl Venosta served as minister of Foreign Affairs 
under Rudini from July, 1896 to June, 1898 and under General Luigi 
Pelloux and Giuseppe Saracco between May, 1899 and February, 1901. 
His program is known as one of raccoglimento. Convinced of the 
necessity of remaining in the Triple Alliance, he also realized 
the Importance of Improving Franco-Italian rapport. To achieve the 
latter he accepted a renuncfatlon of the capitulations as stipulated 
by France In the terms of a new Tunisian treaty. Decleva, Da Adua 
a Sarajevo, pp. 32-60. See also William S. Halperin, Diplomat 
under Stress: Visconti Venosta and the Crisis of July, 1870 {Chi-
cago, 1963). 
84The treaties are covered in detail by Billot, La France 
et 11 Ital le, II, 357-73 and Serra, La guestione tunlslna, pp. 405-53 • 
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Ambassador Barrere's first accomplishments In Rome was the success-
ful conclusion of a Franco-Ital Ian commercial treaty In October, 
1898--less than a year after he had assumed his new responsibilities 
In the Italian kingdom. 
32 
CHAPTER 11 
ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES: 
THE COMMERCIAL ACCORD OF 1898 
Barrere arrived in Rome on February 3, 1898. Tall, slender, 
with blonde hair and beard, conwnent was often made on the resemblance 
of the new French ambassador to Henri IV. 1 Despite the Impression 
of great dignity his presence conveyed, the poised, elegant Barrere 
was in no respect a retiring or self-effacing figure. Friends and 
diplomatic colleagues emphasize equally his vigor, the aura of author-
ity that emanated from his person and an Imperious quality that would 
permit him to be "none but chlef. 112 
The Farnese Palace, which then served as the French Embassy 
In Rome, provided a distinguished setting for Barrere's ambassado-
rial activities. The famed Ecole fran~aise d 1 Arch~ologie et d 1 Hls-
tolre, then under the direction of the Abb6 Duchesne, was also housed 
in the Farnese, adding to French prestige already enjoyed In Rome 
1Mme Sal nt-Ren6 Ta 111 andler, "S 11 houettes d 1 Ambassadeu rs, 11 
pp. 7-22. 
2Hme Salnt-Ren6 Talflandler, "Avant le sacerdoce. Le 
sacerdoce. Le Vlcomte Chaptal dtplomate, 11 Revue des Deux Mondes, 
LXXVI (August 15, 1943), 392. Descriptions of Barr~re 1 s appearance 
are also given by Charles Benoist, Souvent rs (Parts, 1932-34), 11, 
13; No!l, Camille Barrere, p. 77; Laroche, Qutnze ans a Rome avec 
Camtl le Barr~re, p. 11. 
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that of the highest scholarshlp.3 Barrere's own personal interests, 
however, ran less to the academic than the arts: painting, litera-
ture, and muslc--whlch was his first love. 4 He was also an ardent 
spcrtsman. 5 Despite these varied Interests, the new ambassador 
soon acquired the reputation of being an indefatigable worker. 
What were the objectives of the newly-assigned minister 
as he embarked on the mission that would occupy him for a quarter 
of a century? Ultimately, Barrere hoped to effect a corrosion of 
Italy's ties to the Triple Alliance, to empty the Trlpllce of its 
substance. 6 His Immediate concern, however, was to suppress a11 
sources of discord between France and ltaly.7 Many years later he 
was to clarify this position. He regarded the state of France's 
relations with Italy at that time, Barrere wrote, as the equivalent 
of a demi-rupture whose effects were being felt more and more acutely. 
French occupation of Tunisia had unleashed so violent a reaction 
beyond the Alps It had led Italy to enter Into her German alliances, 
3Among the lnstltute's students were: Andre Chaumelx, 
Jerome Carcoplno, Lucien Rornler, Paul Hazard, Masslgll, Cavet and 
Zelller. Laroche, Qulnze ans a Rome avec Camille Barrere, p. 23. 
4sarrere began to study the violin while assigned to 
Stockholm. Mme Saint-Rene Talllandler refers to his obvious enjoy-
ment In performing duets while In Munich. "Silhouettes d'Ambassa-
deu rs," pp. 7-22. Acco rd i ng to the New York T Imes, Barre re was the 
author of an article on Stradivarius that appeared In the Revue de 
Paris. One of his most prized possessions was a genuine Guarnerfus 
violin. April 9, 1922. 
• 
Ssenolst describes Barrere as a passionate chasseur. Sou-
ven I rs, ff, 131. He a 1 so enjoyed horseback rid Ing. N~l re 1 ates 
that embassy business was often conducted during the course of his 
morning ride. Von BUlow, who lived In Rome after his retirement, 
was a frequent riding companion. Camille Barrere, pp. 80-81. 
218. 
6ooF2, I, Nos. 118, 185, 201, 235, 238; ff, Nos. 76, 99, 
7ooF1, XIV. No. 512. tOYOlA UNtVERSffY USRARV 
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a policy Barrere feared had grave consequences for France. The 
paris Bourse was also closed to Italian securities, and commercial 
exchange between the two nations was broken. Assuming his new 
responsibilities, Barrere was resolved to end a state of affairs 
he considered extremely prejudicial to the Interests of the two 
neighboring countrles. 8 To this end he attached a palltlcal 
Importance "of the first order" to reaching a co11111erclal arrange-
ment--on even an lnfonnal basls.9 For as he wrote Hanotaux In 
February, 1898, the key to Ital Ian foreign pol Icy lay In a resump-
tion of Franco-Italian economic rapport.lo 
Not that Barrere underestimated the difficulties Inherent 
In the goal he proposed; nor did he believe France could expect 
any outside assistance in achieving It. English policy accomodated 
Itself well to Franco-Italian dissidence; It assured her own pre-
ponderance In the Mediterranean. Russia, France's new ally, re-
mained Indifferent to the problems Inherent In the Franco-Italian 
situation. The Holy See clearly had no Interest In seeing a Franco-
1 tali an rapproachment; the Ge nnan I c powers we re open 1 y host I 1e.11 
"Effacing the prejudices and griefs In the minds of our 
neighbors," the first step towards achieving the more lrrmediate 
aspect of Barrere's program for Italy, was actually embarked on 
8cami11e Barrere, "L'ettres a Delcasse, 11 Revue de Paris, 
XVIV (1937), 721-22. 
9ooF1, XIV, Nos. 120, 253, 512. 
l O I b Id . , No • 52 • 
11 camllle Barrere, "Lettres a Delcasse, 11 pp. 721-22 • 
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before he arrived In Rome. 12 He began to lay a favorable ground-
work for his new assignment while still In Berne, confiding to 
Italian Minister Plenipotentiary Alessandro Riva his own loyalty 
to Italy's dynasty. 13 It may well have been an attempt to off-
set any prejudicial opinion a Communard past might arouse against 
him. Barrere Informed Riva he didn't consider Italian constitu-
tionalists good patriots or true Italians and that It was his belief 
dynastic sentiment not only cemented Italian unity but the very 
existence of Italy as a nation. He also indicated to the Ital Ian 
minister that France's ambassadors to Rome were the target of 
repeated enticements by representatives of radical and clerical 
parties, mistakenly hoping through them to achieve their objectives. 
These contacts could not be evaded, Barrere added, but should 
occasion no concern once the probity and loyalty of the head of 
the French mission was known. 14 
This attitude accorded with fundamental principles Barrere 
had long upheld. As far back as 1887 he had advocated the pursuit 
of a policy that was not only in opposition to the monarchical 
right within France but the extreme left as well . 15 Barrere also 
understood how essential It was to the success of her foreign policy 
that France renounce any attempts to export her own Institutional 
12ooF2, 1, No. 118., 
l3Quoted by Decleva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 81, from unedited 
documents of the Archivto storlco del Minlstero degl I Affari Ester!. 
14oec1eva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 81. 
lSFrancel Archives du Mlnistere des Affalres Etrangeres, 
Paris. Barrere a Delcasse, Paplers Delcasse, February 6, 1887, I. 
(Hereinafter cited as AAE, rn.) 
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form of government. 16 A few months after his arrival in Rome he 
confirmed this position during the course of a conversation with 
King Humbert. Assuring the Ital Ian monarch that French democracy 
was essentially conservative, he made the remark that France's 
government "as much as a monarchy • looked with disfavor on the 
attempts of extremist parties and was In complete accord with the 
countries surrounding her on the need for maintaining order. 111 7 
There were concrete steps, however, which If taken Barrere 
believed would provide the keystone for effecting a Franco-Italian 
reconciliation. They were to be found In the resumption of economic 
rapport, the "principal object of concern on the part of official-
dom" In Rome. Barrere considered the conclusion of a commercial 
accord a question of life or death for the moderate Rudin! ministry 
then in power in the Italian government. Rudin! himself, his 
Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta, and the francophiltc Minister of 
the Treasury, Luigi Luzzattl, all agreed on the des I rabll tty of 
concluding the accord and concluding it quickly. Barrere warned 
Hanotaux, however, that nothing was more uncertain than the disposi-
tions of the men who could succeed the Rudin! ministry In power. 
The issue was crucial since the general consensus of Ital tan opinion 
was that economic rapproachment between France and Italy would 
begin a new chapter In Ital Ian political life. Barrere was convinced 
that Ital Ian hatred of Fran'ce, rooted as It was In economics, was 
actually artlflclal--created by men who dreamt of rebuilding the 
l6Decleva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 82. 
l7Barrere a Hanotaux, May 31, 1898, AAE, Nouvelle S~rle, 
ltalle, XIII, D. n. 77. (Hereinafter cited as AAE, NSI). 
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grc•ndeur of Italy on the spoils of France's ruin. Their work 
could be undone by dealing with the immediate problem at hand: 
seizing the opportunity of an opening and through It reaching a 
more satisfactory economic arrangement.18 
When appointed Ital Ian Foreign Minister In July, 1896, 
Visconti Venosta had unsuccessfully attempted to link a commercial 
accord with negotiations for the Tunisian treaty. However French 
Foreign Minister Hanotaux refused to join a study of the commer-
cial question to that regulating Tunisian affalrs. 19 Once the 
Tunisian accords were signed on October 1, 1896, the Rudini ministry 
again pressed for a treaty of corrmerce on the basis of reciprocal 
concession of the French minimum and Italian conventional tariffs. 20 
The overtures drew no positive response from Hanotaux and Billot, 
Hanotaux conceding only to a continuation of secret discussions 
directed towards the negotiation of a commercial treaty. 21 
In early 1897 Franco-Italian relations were aggravated 
further by a massing of French troops along the Tunisian frontier 
bordering on Tripoli. Italian Ambassador to Paris, Count Giuseppe 
Tornle111, expressed concern that France was contemplating military 
action in Tripolltania, forestalling an Italian move should the 
18ooF1, XIV, No. 52. 
19Bi11ot, La France'et l'ltalle, II, 433. 
20The convention of commerce replacing the ltalo-Tunlslan 
treaty of 1868 was signed on September 28; the navigation conven-
tion on October 1. See above, pp. 29, 30. 
21 ital y, Mlnlstero degl I affarl ester!, I document I diplo-
matici ltallani. Third Serles: 1896-1907. (Hereinafter referred 
to as 0013.) I, Nos. 382, 385, 386, 389, 396, 403, 409. See also 
below, pp. 39-51. 
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Sep<'irate negotiations for a commercial accord did continue, 
however. Nevertheless, French reservations regarding their ultimate 
success, together with extensive economic concessions demanded of 
Italy, resulted in a series of misunderstandings and stalemates be-
tween October, 1896 and December, 1897. At that time, Luigi Luzzatti 
formally requested a resumption of Franco-Ital Ian commercial negotia-
tions. Billot, In the interim, had submitted his resignation, and 
on December 24 announcement was made of Barrere's nomination as 
French Ambassador to Rome.27 
Arriving in the Italian capital on February 3, 1898, one 
of Barrere's first moves, February 14, was to request of Hanotaux 
the list of tariff reductions France demanded of Italy in exchange 
for commercial rapproachment. As France's ambassador In Rome, 
Barrere considered It essential he be involved in a mvtter he re-
garded as vital to the development of improved Franco-Italian rap-
port. A knowledge of the French demands obviously was indispensable 
for any participation In the negotiations. Barrere believed his 
involvement to be all the more necessary In view of his conviction 
that a more conciliatory attitude towards these demands prevailed 
in Rome than in Parls.28 
Barrere's own relationship with Italian Ambassador to Paris, 
Tornlelli, had never been felicitous. Tornlelll had opposed Barrere's 
• 
nomination fiercely. Totally reactionary, the aristocratic Italian 
27ooF1 XIV, No. 151; Billot, La France et l'ltalle, II, 
412-420; Luigi Luzzatti, Opere (Bologna, 1926), II, 526. 
28ooF1, XIV, No. 52. 
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diplomat was un2lterably opposed to the ide~ of de2l ing with 2n 
heretlc2l ex-commun2rd 2nd, recognizing the inevlte"blllty of 
s2 rrere's <"ppolntment, had requested his own tr<lnsfer from Pcris. 
rornlell I justified his request on the basis of hostility he felt 
he had encountered In the French city, Intolerably manifested, In 
his mind: with Barrere's nomination, made "behind my back," 2s 
well as with abuse of the Schwartzkoppen-Panlzzardl correspondence 
In the Dreyfus affalr.29 
B<>rrere, in turn, repeatedly voiced his suspicions of 
Tornlelll, not only finding a dlvergency between the ~mbassador's 
attitude and that of his government but ?ccuslng him as well of 
111 will towards the successful conclusion of the negotl2tlons In 
which both France 2nd Italy were engaged.30 This was not the case 
with respect to B2rrere's relationships on the ministerial level 
In Rome.3 1 He had no doubt of Rudlni's desire to conclude an eco-
nomic accord with France.32 His judgment had been reinforced, 
Barrere wrote Hanotaux, with both Visconti Venosta and Luzzatti's 
assurances of Rudinl 1 s wish to modify Ital Ian policy. Luzzattl 
29rornie11 I considered the letters Introduced In the Zola-
Dreyfus trial to be arocryphal. SerrR, C. B2rrere e 1' Intesa, 
p. 63. For Tornlelll s position with regard to Panlzzardl, see 
H. Wickham Steed, Throu~h Thirty Years (London, 1924), I, 147. 
According to Decleva, t e Dreyfus Affair not only raised Interna-
tional uncertalnty--and the corresponding danger France would be 
thrown Into European lsolatlon--ltaly also feared France might 
become militaristic again a~d threaten peace. Da Adua a Sara)evo, 
p. 101. 
D. n. 
30ooF1, XIV, Nos. 52, 120. 
31Barrere a Hanoteux, Februery 12, 1898, AAE, NSI, XIII, 
25. 
32ooF1, XIV, Nos. 52, 120; Barrere a Hanotaux, February 12, 
1 89 8, AA E , NS I , X I I I , D • n • 2 5 • 
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had also affirmed the sincerity of Rudlni's desire to do so In 1892 
during his preceding ministry. At that time however, the financier 
reminded him, there was Insufficient understanding on the part of 
France to help Rudlnl achieve his objectlve--an objective for which 
an opportunity was once again presenting itself .33 
As regards Visconti Venosta, Barrere considered him Italy's 
foremost statesman, whose eminent qualities had gained respectabil-
ity and prestige for his country. Barrere also attributed to the 
Italian foreign r;ilnister the Intention of making Franco-Ital Ian 
rapport the base of diplomacy in the Italian kingdom.34 Visconti 
Venosta had told him he regarded the source of division between 
their respective countries to have had Its origin in the Mediter-
ranean--responslble, in turn, for the alliances subsequently im-
posed on Italy. To change Italian orientation, liquidation of the 
Tunisian question was fundamental. Visconti Venosta had undertaken 
the serious rapprochement of the two nations on the terrain of In-
terest, he added, "and policy Inexorably follows Interests; po1it-
lc;:il rapprochement Inevitably results from material rapprochement. 11 35 
Barrere also regarded Visconti Venosta's Independence of action 
significant for Franco-Italian relations, finding him devoid of 
servitude to anyone: King, Court or a111es.36 In Barrere's opinion, 
33ooF1, XIV, No. 120. In 1891 Rudlnl had attempted to 
improve relations with Frarfce. His efforts were unsuccessful, 
France refusing to engage In any negotiations until Italy evi-
denced her non-aggressive Intentions by disclosing the terms of 
the Triple Alliance. 
34!bld., No. 168. 
351 b Id., No. 219 . 
361bld., No. 168. 
this quality w2s further enhanced by the opposition various 
political parties In the kingdom voiced towards Fr2nco-ltallan 
r2 pproachment 2s well as by a degree of uncertainty with respect 
to King Humbert's attitude towards lt.37 This attitude expl2lns 
2 great deal of Barrere's Insistence on concluding an economic 
2 ccord without any necessary delays.38 
Luzzatti, of course, was the most ardent champion In the 
cause of resuming economic relations between the two countries. 
42 
An eminent Italian economist, he had long sought a policy of friend-
ship with France within the framework of Italy's existing alliances. 
When Visconti Venosta resigned from the Rudin! Cabinet In May, 1898, 
Barre re was not hesitant In writing Hanotaux that the former Ital Ian 
foreign minister had told him everything pertaining to the commer-
cial talks would have had to be begun anew If Luzzattl had left 
the ministry with him.39 
The conmercial discussions showed signs of decided progress 
during Barrere's first months In Rome. In May Visconti Venosta 
was able to speak of his elation on learning Paris would raise no 
political objections to a resolution of the economic question. 
That day, he remarked, he glimpsed the future realization of every-
thing towards which he had directed his efforts and desires. For 
371bld., Nos. 52, f20. See Decleva's Da Adua a Sarajevo 
for a receii't"analysls of Italy's Internal political groupings dur-
ing this period. Most hostile to the Idea of Franco-Italian rap-
proachment were the Crlsplans and Sonnlnlans. 
38 1bid., No. 52. 
391bld., No. 219. Visconti Venosta resigned over a law 
regarding ~withdrawal of the exeguator to bishops which was 
proposed by Zanardelll. The foreign minister deemed It Inopportune 
and dangerous. Ibid., n. 3. 
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in Visconti Venost2 1 s judgment, Frr>nce's persistence in subordin.::>t-
ing the resumption of economic and fin2nclal rel2tlons to the 
rupture of past Fr?nco-ltalian all lance had compelled Italy to 
perpetuate lt.40 Nevertheless, June was a crucial month for the 
negotiations, with the direction of foreign policy In both France 
and Italy changing hands. Not only was Admiral Felice Canavero 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs In the Pelloux cabinet, 
Th~ophlle Delcass~ replaced French Foreign Minister Hanotaux in 
the afte nnath of Fashoda. 41 
Delcass~ and Barrere were old friends. Their association 
dated back almost twenty years to the period In which both were 
launched on the Ir journal istlc careers as staff members of 
Gambetta's La Repub1 lque francalse. Barre re first encountered 
Delcasse when,ln an editorial capacity, he was required to super-
vise the work of the clever, young provincial lawyer-journalist. 
Gambetta's mark on both hls proteges was evident. Delcasse him-
self testified to the Influence, remarking that all he accomplished 
in his career went back to Gambetta's teaching and the precepts 
of his more immediate companions and spiritual heirs. However, the 
Idea of Franco-Ital Ian rapproachment cannot be traced directly to 
40 . ~· 
41oelcasse, in turn, was forced to resign in the aftermath 
of the Moroccan Crisis of 1905. From 1911-1913 he served as naval 
minister. After a brief period as ambassador in St. Petersburg 
he returned as foreign minister in 1914, remaining In office until 
October, 1915. For studies of Oelcasse consult: C. W. Porter, 
Career of Theophlle Delcasse (Philadelphia, 1936); P. J. V. Role, 
Entente Cordiale (London, 1969); and Andrew's Theophlle Delcasse 
and the Entente Cordlale. 
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the m0ster, although he would cert.~inly have been aw?re of the 
signiflc2nce to Fr2nce of Italian frlendship.42 
In July Barrere brought French Foreign Minister Delcasse 
up-to-date on developments In Rome after the Pelloux cabinet re-
placed that of Rudlnl. His major preoccupation during the prolonged 
ministerial crisis, Barrere related, had been to learn whether or 
not discussions for a commercial accord could be continued and what 
the attitude of the new ministers towards economic rapport actually 
was. 43 He had also to determine the wisdom of dealing with some 
of them--men with whom Barrere was certain transactions of this 
nature become "morally lmposslble. 1144 
It was then, Barrere related to Delcasse on July 10, he had 
received a visit from Italian Senator Rattazzi, Intimate friend 
and ~dvlser of King Humbert and the most Influential architect of 
the new Pelloux cabinet. Rattazzl told Barrere of Pelloux's desire 
to further develop the cordial relations with France that had been 
established by Rudin! and Visconti Venosta. According to Rattazzl, 
even the King was genuinely hopeful of uncovering areas of agree-
ment between the two countries. Barrere reacted to Rattazzl's 
words, he reported, by suggesting the sentiments the senator was 
expressing might best be put to the test by confiding responsibility 
for continuation of the commercial discussions to Luzzattl. His 
• 
proposal had been fruitful, Barrere observed, for several days later 
in the 
L 
42see below, pp. 143-9 for an evaluation of Delcasse's role 
Franco-Italian rapproachment. 
43Barrere a Delcasse, AAE, NSI, XIII, T. n. 224. 
44ooF1, XIV, No. 253. 
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Luzzattl informed him he had been approached by Rattazzl and ac-
cepted the mission proposed to him. Luzzattl appended one stipu-
lation to the offer, however: that there be no contradiction 
between the Intentions of the Italian government and the work of 
reconciliation In which he would be engaged. Luzzattl was shrewd 
enough to recognize that the commercial advantages of an eventual 
economic accord might not live up to Italian expectations, Yet, 
like Barrere, he viewed Its Importance primarily as a turning point 
In Franco-Italian relations, one with serious consequences for the 
future. Above all, he saw In the successful completion of a com-
mercial accord 11 the creation of a new situation, of numerous and 
unpredictable common Interests that will make It difficult If not 
Impossible to continue in the errors of an unfortunate past. 1145 
Following his conversation with Luzzattl, Barrere continued, both 
General Luigi Pel loux and Adml ral Canavero had Informed Barre re of 
the role being assigned Luzzattl and assured the French ambassador 
of their own amlcal sentiments. Similar assurances were expressed 
by King Humbert, Barrere added, with whom he had requested an 
Interview. On that occasion, Barrere noted, he glimpsed the first 
Indication of the strong Interest the King attached to the success 
of the negotlatlons.46 
Barrere then left Rome on annual leave. In October Luzzattl 
arrived In Paris, having reeelved virtual carte blanche from the 
Italian government to conclude the negotiations for the commercial 
accord. In Paris he was put In touch with MM. Bompart and Chandeze, 
45 1bld. 46 1bld. 
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce respectively, 
and with M. Bousquet, Director General of Customs. Barrere and 
rornlelll collaborated In these final discussions which were 
brought to a successful conclusion on November 21, 1898.47 
46 
Ne got I at Ions had resulted In an accord, consisting of two 
letters exchanged by the M f n f s te r of Fore lg n A ff a i rs for France, 
Th~ophlle Delcass~, and Ital fan Ambassador to Paris, GI useppe 
Tornfel 1 i •48 Under the terms of the agreement I ta 1 y accorded 
France most-favored nation treatment, France extending her minimum 
tariffs to Italy In return.49 
The last stages of discussion had been complicated by In-
ternational apprehension over Fashoda.so Italy was alarmed by the 
prospect of naval war between France and England In the Mediterra-
nean. In such an event, the necessity of protecting her neutrality 
would pose grave financial and political problems for Italy. 
Yet when he returned to Rome In early November, Barrere 
found his Immediate task had assumed a greater dimension than that 
of merely calming Ital fan alarm over possible repercussions of the 
47A1 be rt B t 11 ot, "Le rapprochement comme ref a 1 ent re 1 a 
France et l'ftalfe, 11 Revue des Deux Mondes, 4, CLI (1899), 144. 
48see Appendix I for texts of the letters exchanged by 
Delcass~ and Tornfellt. The accord, In Its entirety, Is reproduced 
in Basdevant, Tralt~s et cohventlons en vlgueur entre la France et 
Jes Pulssances (Parts, 1922), II, 760. 
1·9 
•See Billot for details of the arrangements. La France 
et 1' Ital le, II, 431-33. Silk was excluded from the tariff arrange-
ments and France also maintained Its demand for a modification of 
the Italian tarlfft on wines, woolens and materials for upholstery 
and blankets. ODF , XIV, No. 529. 
s0ooF1, XIV, Nos. 497,508, 518. 
Anglo-French African conflict. On October 26, Italian Minister 
of Post and Telegraph,Nunzio Nasi, had pronounced a discourse at 
Trapani, Sicily that endengered ultimate ratification of the com-
mercial accord then In the final stages of negotiation in Paris. 
Referring to the Italian colony In North Africa, particularly that 
In Tunisia, Nasl hAd alluded to the land which may not belong to 
Italy "but whose soul is ours. 11 51 The Italian government formally 
disassociated Itself from the minister's statements.52 Yet from 
the French viewpoint, the Incident had been poorly reported In the 
press. Barrere considered It essential to convince Italian Foreign 
Minister Canavero It was Imperative any future journalistic po-
lemics be prevented that could unfavorably dispose French public 
opinion towards economic rapproachment with ltaly.53 In Barrere 1 s 
estimation a favorable attitude on the part of the French public 
was an Indispensable condition for the success of the commercial 
arrangements awaiting ratification by the French Parllament.54 
The Nast declaration was a specific Instance of attacks against 
France by the Ital Ian press. To Barrere, all obstructed not merely 
economic rapport but every other favorable effect that could flow 
from friendship between the two peoples.SS His endeavors were 
5 1 I b I d • , No • 51 2 • 
5200 I 3, I I I , Nos • 100, 102 • 
53Accordlng to Barrere, Nasi's remarks had been unduly 
publicized by Crlsplan newspapers opposed to Franco-Italian rap-
proachment. OOFl, XIV, No. 512. 
541bld. Although subslding,protectionist sentiment remained 
a significant factor In French political life In 1898. 
551bld., No. 526. 
apparently successful for the attacks of the Trlbuna, at least, 
ceased Immediately. 
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Luzzattl had also returned to Rome In early November, 
elated over the successful conclusion of the accord In Paris. In 
view of King Humbert's obvious satisfaction, Luzzattl suggested 
the Italian monarch, In his next royal discourse, refer specifi-
cally to the excellent relations existing between France and Italy. 
However the opposition of several Crlsplan ministers, and their 
threats to submit their resignations were he to do so, precluded 
adoption of Luzzattl's proposal. 
Yet general reaction to the treaty was quite favorable. 
Barrere heard from Luzzatti that Pelloux looked on the accord as 
a point of departure, attaching more political Importance to It 
than comnerclal Interest. Nor, In Pelloux's estimation, did Germany 
regard the accord with Indifference. Although Italy was a guarantee 
of Germany's territorial lntegrlty--she herself gained nothing from 
Germany now that France was no longer a menace.56 Foreign Minister 
Canavero also apprised Barrere of his Interest In the political as-
pect of the transactlon.57 
In effect, Barrere remarked to Delcass~, the accord pro-
duced a veritable thunderbolt. Everyone concurred In finding It 
useful, adroit and of great'polltlcal lmport.58 Assessing the 
more significant non-economic consequences of the treaty, Barrere 
laid great emphasis on the Impossibility It created of Italy's 
561bld., No. 527, n. 1. 
57tbld., No. 527. 58J.!LLQ.., No. 535. 
participation In a maritime war. He stressed as well the Inability 
of Italian francophobes to continue forcing the hand of government. 
The Crtsptan-Sonntntan offensive, NS he expressed it, whose arms 
had been deployed against France for ten years had been broken.59 
Despite his elation Barrere lost no opportunity of bene-
fiting from the slightest occasions that might further improve 
Frenco-ltalian relations. He would advise Delcass~, for Instance, 
to encourage the exchange of decorations In which Admiral Canavero 
had expressed interest and suggest that Luzzattl be awarded the 
Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honor. The motive behind these ges-
tures was always deliberate: the more manifestations of good will 
with which France surrounds this affair, he wrote the Quat d'Orsay, 
the better.60 
Although the Impressions created by the Commercial Accord 
surpassed all his expectations, Barrere was aware ft was a develop-
ment no one had actually expected or believed could be achieved. 
Public sentiment had attributed Implacable hatred for Italy to 
France for too long, along with a desire to reduce her by ruin and 
revolution. The gallophobtc and Crlsplan press had reinforced these 
attitudes, presenting France as Italy's enemy and responsible for 
?11 her llls.61 The Commercial Accord had not succeeded In trans-
forming Ital tan sentiment. While he knew It was too early to fully 
' 
evaluate Its consequences, Barrere was convinced all the same the 
accord had created a significant Impact. As he remarked to Delcass~, 
591btd. 60 tbid. 
61 Ibid., No. 552. 
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everyone was now aware that the economic peace achieved should 
lead to financial peace. At the same time they realized financial 
peace would never be obtained without compensations and guarantees. 
That was precisely why, he explained, he had not wanted to attach 
any political conditions to the Commercial Accord. Doing so would 
have created an Impossible situation and demanded more of Italy 
than she was capable of giving. Yet from the beginning, Barrere 
also reminded Delcass~, he had Indicated he would pose the political 
question the very day the royal government decided to have recourse 
to France and extend the benefits of the conrnerclal rapproachment 
to financial ground.62 
Barrere predicted approval of the accord by a strong majority 
In the Ital Ian Parl lament. It received an overwhelming majority: 
236-34 In the Chamber, 105-16 In the Senate.63 Reporting on the 
four-day discussion accompanying the ratification proceedings, 
Barrere was obviously Impressed with the care taken during the course 
of debate to avoid any remarks that might be received adversely In 
France. While certain aspects of the treaty were criticized, chiefly 
those of an agricultural nature, the dominant note of the discus-
sions centered on those aspects "which put an end to a troublesome 
tension and reconciled the two countrles. 11 64 
Parliamentary sanction left the French ambassador with a 
• 
sense of security. Italy had returned! He held all the reins of 
the team In his hand; "It only remained necessary to avoid any ruts, 
63 I b Id., XV, No. 5 3, n. 2. 
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not permitting one's self to be overturned. 11 65 The violent, tense 
Italy of a year ago, enraged at the first sign of French criticism, 
was no longer In evidence.66 
65Barrere a Del casst!, January 30, 1899, AAE, PD, I. 





THE MEDITERRANEAN ACCORD OF 1900 
Although the threat of Anglo-French conflict had deeply 
dlstrubed Italy during the height of the Fashoda crisis, she was 
far more perturbed to learn France and Great Britain had concluded 
a convention March 21, 1899 which, In effect, divided North Africa 
Into B rl t I sh and French spheres of Influence. 1 
Italian Ambassador to London, Francesco de Renzls was 
particularly Incensed at Lord Salisbury's attitude in the matter, 
Inexplicable to de Renzls In view of England's professed friend-
ship for ltaly.2 No mention was made In the accord of Italy, who 
was concerned not only for Tripoli but for the caravan routes lead-
ing from Lake Tchad Into Trlpolltanla as well. Under the terms of 
the agreement France gained control of that region south of Lake 
Tchad and Tummo on the Tropic of Cancer. Thus the hinterland, 
still claimed by Turkey and coveted by Italy, from the Ital Ian point 
of view appeared to be falilng Into French hands.3 
• 
1The text of the Convention Is reproduced In DDF1, XV, 
No. 122, Annex. Delcass~ wrote Barrere of the lmmlneii"t""concluslon 
of the treaty he described as being "equally honorable and advan-
tageous to both parties." Delcass4! a Barrere, Paolers Barrere. 
March 2, 1899, V. (Hereinafter cited as AAE, PB.) 
2 3 6 DD I , I 11 , No. 20 • 
31bid., Nos. 209,210; British Documents on the Origins of 
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General Ital Ian reaction to news of the convention, as 
would be expected, was one of anger. Italy's Interest In the area 
was longstanding, and since the French occupation of Tunis In 1881 
she had been particularly sensitive to any change In the Mediter-
ranean status quo. Officially, however, the governmental attitude 
remained calm. Admiral Canavero Informed the Ital Ian Senate that 
both the French and British governments had assured him Italy 
need have no fear for Tripoli and Its trade route.4 
Yet Italy regarded the situation In which she found her-
self as a difficult one. Friendship with England had long been 
the cornerstone of her policy, and she was anxious to maintain 
close relations with her traditional al ly.5 Thls--desplte the 
obvious deterioration In Anglo-Ital Ian relations that had occured 
during the course of the 1890's.6 Even the temperate Visconti 
Venosta had remarked rather bitterly that England regarded Italy 
as no more than a quantlt6 n6gllgeable, and It was no secret Lord 
Salisbury was known to lack confidence in Ital Ian reliability and 
had expressed doubt as to her ability to come to terms with France.7 
the Warf 1898-1914, ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London, 
1926-26, (hereinafter referred to as BO), I, No. 246. According 
to Serra, Italy was also concerned because if merely encircled, the 
economic value of the Trlpolitan hinterlands declined. c. Barrere 
e 11 Intesa, p. 79. 
4 BO, I, No. 247. 
• 
5Attl farlamentarl della Camera det Oeputatl e del Senato (Rome, Turln,848-1921), Oeputati, OLll, 3609. 
~ee Glanville, Italy's Relations with England, 1896-1905 
(Baltimore., 1934), pp. 79-93. 
\ 7Bo\~ VI, No. 780. 
Canavero was the more distraught for having considered 
Tripoli secure in view of discussions he had held on the matter 
54 
with British Ambassador to Rome, Lord Currie, the preceding Novem-
ber. 8 Complaining to Germany of the shoddy treatment England had 
accorded her, the Ital Ian foreign minister let it be known the only 
amends England could make lay In British support of Italian ambi-
tions in China and recognition of her rights In Tripoli. Accord-
ingly, Canavero proposed to Currie that Italy station a small 
military force In Tripoli as a joint garrison with Turkey or, as 
an alternative, that England and France issue a declaration dis-
claiming their Intentions of acquiring territory or political Influ-
ence in Tripoli. The Italian minister Indicated there would be no 
difficulty with France In doing so since the French government had 
recently stated to Ambassador Tornlelll It would have no objections 
If the Ital I ans were to take Trlpol 1.9 A week later Canavero's 
proposal was more explicit. He requested a joint Anglo-French de-
claration that neither country would acquire "territory or political 
Influence north of the parallel of latitude touching the southern 
extremity of Fezzan ••• and that there be full and entire lib-
erty of conmerce for the caravan routes coming from Lake Tchad and 
the neighboring regions towards Tri pol I .ulO Britain refused, In-
forming Ital Ian Ambassador de Renzls that neither Britain or Italy 
had any right to discuss the future of a country whose ownership 
' 
was not in doubt. Britain had other bases for the refusal. Such a 
81bid., I, Nos. 236, 246, 247. 
9 I b Id • , No. 24 7 • 
10 4 I b i d • , No • 2 9 • 
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'ts 
declaration was obviously unilateral. There was also the possi-
bility of a disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the more serious 
In light of Britain's fear of French action In the event this oc-
cured. And Italy's own Internal situation was highly unstable. 11 
Italy was accurate in assessing her need of International 
support. Her finances were In a precarious state. Compounding 
the problem of dire poverty In rural and southern regions of the 
Peninsula was the marked contrast of relative prosperity In the 
north. Yet the necessary political correctives were not forth-
coming. A spirit of malaise, of parliamentary lmmaturlty,largely 
the result of selfish aristocratic and bourgeois rival rles, pre-
cluded any direction of the country along the paths of essential, 
constructive programs. As a result, there was a tendency to suc-
cumb to those feelings of Inferiority which had reached their 
peak In 1896 and since then never entirely subsided. Thus Italy 
was nurturing a political policy of maneuvering In these years which 
did not always reflect creditably on her.1 2 
Barrere had been on leave In Paris when Italy first pro-
tested the Anglo-French African Conventlon. 13 The Qual d'Orsay had 
11 I b Id., No. 252 • 
12on Italy's Internal this period see Seton-
Wcitson, Ital from Liberalism 18 0-1925, pp. 41-164. 
Conmentlng on Italy s tra I on o "aving as many Irons In the 
fire as possible ••• " von BUlow remarked in his Memoirs that any-
one familiar with earlier Venetian dispatches or Instructions written 
by the Papal Cancellaria cannot be In the least surprised by this 
tendency. It rather fills one with "admiration for the political 
Intelligence displayed therein." I, 664. 
1 13He was away from Rome between March 24 and April 7. QQ.E., XV, No. 129, n. 1; No. 131, n. 5. 
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been advised by the French Embassy In Rome on April lof the Ital Ian 
government's "pained surprlse"--not only on learning the terms of 
the accord but by the silence with which the two powers had sur-
rounded lt. 14 The reaction was apparently conveyed to Barrere as 
well by his friend Luzzattl, then In Paris to improve certain clauses 
of the commercial accord. 15 Barrere contacted Oelcass6, at the time 
tn Sesses, suggesting a course of action he believed would alleviate 
the tension In Franco-Ital Ian relations created by the agreement. 
Barrere felt certain benefits would ensue if France were to advise 
Italy of her disinterest In Tripoli and Its legitimate hinterlands. 
Accordingly, he sought Oelcass6 1s pennlsslon to offer Italy 
a political concession of this nature, warning the French foreign 
minister that If he returned without It his credit In Rome would 
be rulned. 16 Barrere obviously believed such an admonition to be 
necessary since Paul Cambon, aware of Italian Interest In the area 
when Initial Anglo-French negotiations were In process, let Delcass6 
know he saw no Inconvenience to French possessions In central Africa 
If the hinterlands of Tripoli and the Cyrenalca, "In other words 
the Libyan desert," were attributed to Italy when cl rcumstances 
might permit the realization of her designs In Tri pol itanla. Delcass~ 
had rejected the Idea, considering the region of the Libyan desert 
to fall within England's sphere of Interest and that area behind 
Tripoli to be within France'~ and of decisive Importance for these-
curity of her littoral establishments and the Medlterranean. 17 
14 1 b Id., No. 129, n. 3. 
161bld., No. 129. 
15 I b i d • , No • 1 7 8, n • 2 ; No • 1 80 • 
171btd., No. 42, n. 1. 
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oeJcass6 was unwlll Ing to go the extent of his ambassador's re-
quest, preferring Barrere to be more gener~llzed In any discussions 
tn which he became involved In Rome. The foreign minister was con-
cerned lest the results of the Anglo-French convention be put In 
question and felt as well that since Italy had discussed the subject 
with England, she should at least have advised France of her posl-
tion.18 
The day before he returned to Italy, Barrere heard from his 
friend, Russian Ambassador to Rome,Aleksandr Nelldoff, that the 
situation In Italy had grown extremely serious and was likely to 
Involve the fall of both Canavero and the Italian cabinet. 19 It 
was also Nelldoff's considered opinion that a subsequent ministry 
would be forced to adopt an anti-French policy. By offering Italy 
some vague hope for her African Interests, Barr~re wired Delcass6, 
France could not only counter Italian apprehensions but safeguard 
the future as well. He pleaded for permlss Ion to tel 1 Canavero 
"the day the Italians become our neighbors in Africa, they will meet 
only with our good will in facilitating their legitimate expansion. 1120 
However, Delcass6's attitude remained unchanged. Barrere 
was to adhere to generalities in his discussions with the Italian 
government. 21 He did refer his ambassador, however, to the argument 
with which he had allayed Turkish apprehension over the convention • 
• 
18 4 19 b I b Id • , No • 129, n • • .LJs!. , No . 1 30 • 
201btd. British Ambassador Currie also reported that If 
the Italian government was unable to produce some explanation or 
assurances that would satisfy public opinion, It would probably 
be overthrown. BO, I, No. 247. 
21DDF1 , XV, No. 130, n. 4; No. 131 • 
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In It he conveyed France's Intention of Infringing In no way on the 
rights or possessions of the Sultan In Turkey, and although acknow-
ledging the exercise of French control over a portion of the hinter-
lands, pointed to the fact that French colonies also served as pro-
tection for commerce and the caravans--from which the Tri pol itan 
22 interests of the Sultan could only benefit. "Reaffirm on your 
return to Rome, 11 Delcass6 Instructed Barrere, "that we have no In-
tention of harming the Ital Ian government." He hoped in this way 
to convince not only Canavero of France's Intentions but those who 
were exploiting the situation as well--exploltlng It against the 
Pelloux cabinet as much as against France.23 
When Barrere subsequently presented the official French 
position, Canavero admitted that France's stand was unattackable 
but nevertheless made the same request for a declaration of dis-
interest that had been proposed to Great Brltaln.24 Reaffirming 
France's known disinterest In Tripoli, Barrere reserved further com-
ment until he had an opportunity of becoming more fully Informed. 
Delcass6, In the meanwhile, continued to caution the most prudent 
reserve to his ambassador. 25 Barrere •s own opinion was that France 
had everything to lose In refusing the declaration while she stood 
to gain everything by acceptlng.26 
In his assessment of the situation Barrere reminded Del-
• 
cass6 that the Ital Ian foreign minister, and to a lesser degree the 
22 1bld., No. 127. 231bld., No. 131 • 
24 1bld., No. 138, Annexes 1 and 2. 
251bld., No. 135. 261bld., No. 137. 
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government, were being accused of having lost foreslght--not only 
on this Issue but with respect to other matters as well. While 
canavero undoubtedly feared the loss of his portfolio. In Barr~re•s 
judgment a degree of agitation over the African convention did 
exist that a gesture on the part of France would do much to dlspell •27 
Bar~re doubted Canavero would succeed In protecting himself against 
the attacks of his enemies but at the same time envisioned French 
policy as operntlng In a far larger fr0mework than that of the per-
son of the lt~l Ian foreign mlnlster.28 
A private letter to Delcass6 was far more revealing of 
Barr~re 1 1 views on the matter. c~navero told Bar~re th?t Delcassf 
had lnfonned Ambassador Tornlelll Italy could have Tripoli If she 
wanted It. Dumbfounded• Bar,..re asked for a detailed report of 
all th<'.'t had transpired to be sent him inwnedlately. "Pas de deux 
langues, 11 he chided the French minister In a frequently quoted ad-
monition, "It can result In serious problems, Inevitable when one's 
Instruments aren't hannonlzed~ 1129 Fronce could no longer avoid e 
declar<'tlon of disinterest In Tripoli after Delcass6's remark, the 
letter continued, something had to be done. Bar~re concluded with 
an Ironic reference to the superfluous recommend~tlon of prudence 
the foreign minister had urged on his ambassador In a recent wl re. 
Replying to Barrere'f remonstrances, Delca1s6 explained that 
his remarks had been Inaccurately reported. He had merely stated 
France planned nothing In Trlpoll-·whlch he was furthermore In no 
27 8 Ibid •• No. 13 • 28 1bld 
-· 
29caml11e Barr•re. "Lettres lt Delcasst!," pp. 7?. i-26. 
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position to offer Italy since It was not his to give. He had 
mollified Tornlelll, Delcass6 continued, by telling him that If 
Italy nourished hopes and ambitions for Tripoli she would not find 
the French foreign minister standing In her way.30 
Delcass~ still opposed Issuing any declaration dealing with 
an eventual division of the Ottoman Empire, since a declaration of 
that nature would ultimately have to be read In parliament and 
made publlc,3 1 He did not object, however, to Canavero's Informing 
the Ital Ian parliament of his earlier remarks to the Turkish ambas-
sador regarding the March 21 agreement.32 After expressing satis-
faction with this arrangement, Canavero made a point of reading 
Barrere a telegram from Tornlelll. It alluded to Delcass~'s pur-
ported statement that he would not refuse continued discussions 
with the Italian ambassador aimed at reaching a secret accord, 
satisfying to Italy with regard to both Trlpolltania and the pene-
tr2tlon of her African routes.33 
Despite Delcass~'s refusal to give Canavero written assur-
ances that French colonial expansion In the region would stop at 
the borders of Trlpol I and Cyrenafca, a later letter of Barrere's 
relates that Delcass6 did advise Luzzattl--then In Parls--of his 
willingness to do so were Visconti Venosta returned to power. 34 
There Is no further documentation of this offer, nor Is there any 
• 
Indication of the precise moment It was extended. 
30oorl 
-- ' 
XV, No. 143. 3llbld., No. 148. 
321 b Id. 331bld., No. 152. 
34 1 b Id., XV I, No. 79. See below, p. 64. 
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All negotiations, however, were interrupted by the minis-
terial crisis that developed at this time over Italian affairs In 
chtn2. 35 When General Pelloux subsequently resigned, Barrere was 
alormed lest a reconstitution of the Italian cabinet include Sidney 
sonnino, "the man of the German al 1 lances •11 36 Barre re cons Ide red 
sonnlno hostile to France.37 However, when a new Pelloux cabinet 
was formed May 14, Visconti Venosta was named foreign minister. 
earrere wrote Delcass~ that In terms of Franco-Italian relations 
he regarded Visconti Venosta's nomination as Indicative of the Im-
portance France had come to assume In Italy's political life. He 
felt the francophoblc sentiment apparent In the current ministerial 
crisis was of a different character than that which had surfaced 
following the conclusion of the comnerclal accord In 1898. In the 
latter Instance, Ital Ian antipathies towards France were longstanding 
and not unexpected. In the cabinet crisis of April-May, 1899, how-
ever, Barrere believed a great deal of anti-French feeling had been 
stimulated by foreign lnterventlon.38 
Cagl larl revealed the extent of apprehension aroused by the 
Improved Franco-Ital Ian relationship. In April, during the height 
of the cabinet crisis, the French fleet was sent to Cagllarl to 
salute King Humbert of Italy, then on his way to Sardlnla.39 Bar-
rere had seized on the occasion In an attempt to create an Impression 
• 
II, 
35w. L. Langcr's The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York, 1935), 
677-709, analyzes European involvement In China in this era. 
36oecleva, Da Adua a SaraJevo, p. 103. 
37ooF1, XVI, No. 39. 381btd., xv, No. 166, n. 3. 
39 I b Id . , No. 149, n • 1 • 
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of Latin solidarity. England subsequently followed suit, dispatch-
Jng the English fleet to pay Its respects to the Ital Ian monarch 
in turn. English Ambassador Currie was well aware of the direction 
In which B2rrere's efforts h<-ld been aimed. In a dlspAtch to Lord 
Salisbury he related Canavero 1 s remark to him at the time, that 
"B<'lrrere's attempt to coin money with the French fleet was going 
too far .•. and that Paris was mistaken if she expected any fur-
ther results beyond the general friendly feel Ing Italy had for her 
powerful nelghbor. 1140 It was precisely this sense of friendship, 
of course, that Barrere wanted to strengthen. 
Nor had the Implications of the French gesture at Cagl larl 
been overlooked by Germany. Von BUlow subsequently warned Italian 
Ambassador Lanza of the dangers accruing to a "new orientation" on 
the part of Italy. Barrere was convinced that the von BUlow-Lanza 
confrontation had been responsible for Pelloux's initial attempt 
to form a cabinet agreeable to Gennany. 41 Canavero himself told 
Barrere of the strong protests he'd received from Germany as a re-
sult of "the commercial accord with France and all that's followed. 
You wouldn't believe the assaults I've hl'd to submit to ..• ",he 
complciined.42 
Rome's Influential salons had natur211y not remained aloof 
during the political upheaval. Barrere attributed the anti-French 
• 
stances adopted by many of them to snobbishness, fear of democracy, 
love of power, 2nd women who wanted their husbands to be ministers 
40 BO, I, No. 250. 41 1 DDF , XV, No. 196. 
42s;irrere ~ Delcass~, May 12, 1899, AAE, NSI, XV. 
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or their sons, ambassadors.43 
In general, Barrere wrote Delcasse, he felt that only the 
unceasing efforts of Rattazzl and Luzzattl had blocked the forma-
tion of an anti-French ministry during the last governmental 
crisis and led Instead to one whose foreign minister was France's 
friend, Visconti Venosta.44 A country's customs and policies do 
not radically change from one day to another, the ambassador phi-
losophized to Delcasse, convinced as he was at the same time that 
the Italy of Hay,1899 differed essentially from what ft had been 
earlier. In the Interim Italian relations with France had become 
a factor of the first order.45 
Shortly after his return to the Consulta, Visconti Venosta 
made a point of telling Barrere he Intended to continue developing 
bonds of friendship between their two countries and that with good 
will he was certain France and Italy could also come to terms In 
the Mediterranean. The Ir Interests were perfectly compatible In the 
area, he remarked, since the base of both French and Italian policy 
was the maintenance of the status quo. 46 As for Italian undertakings 
In Tripoli, the Ital Ian minister was emphatic In his opposition to 
such ventures, noting all the same that France understood how Impor-
tant It was to avoid upsetting certain Italian sensitivities In that 
di rectlon. With great discretion, Barre re wrote Delcasse, Visconti 
• 
Venosta made It clear that France--wlthout putting rights In question 
or alienating legitimate liberty of possession, could engage In 
43 1 8 DDF , XV, No. 1 O. 
451bld., No. 181. 
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r confidential discussions with Italy that would forestall any mls-
1 
' understanding as to her Intentions and eliminate all suspicions 
between the two nations originating In the Medlterranean.47 Visconti 
venosta was obviously reopening discussion of the French declara-
tion of disinterest In Tri pol I, offered by Delcasst! In April •48 
Despite the encouragement extended Barrere, Visconti Venosta 
was at the same time lnfonnlng Ambassadors Lanza In Berlin and 
Nlgra In Vienna that Italy would continue to regard the Triple Alli-
ance as the fundamental base of her policy.49 Yet the words of 
reassurance to Barrere were not mere rhetoric. In July Tornlel 11 
was advised that Visconti Venosta did not Intend to alter his past 
pol Icy with regard to France. I rratlonal lty and prejudice, he was 
told, had already wrought too much destruction! Still, the achieve-
ment of the goal would be futile, the foreign minister added, If 
there were no means of maintaining and consolidating Franco-Ital Ian 
rapproachment. In view of the new International situation, he no 
longer saw any Incompatibility with the obligations of Italy's other 
alliances in adhering to such a policy.SO Anglo-French antagonism 
had come to an end; that between England and Germany had begun! 
Austria and Russia had concluded a Balkan agreement, with Italy of 
course regarding any Austro-Russian rapproachment as harmful to her 
own aspirations. 
• 
He had been reluctant to sign a fonnal act with Hanotaux, 
Visconti Venosta told Tornlelll, In his concern It might be associated 
471bld. 48see above, p. 60. 
490013, Ill, No. 257. 
SOserra, c. Barrere e l'intesa, pp. 83-84. 
65 ~with other exchanges Italy was unwilling to dlscuss.51 There had 
also been the question of Tripoli's guarantee by Italy's Gennan 
allies. It would have been difficult not to advise them of any 
such action she might have taken. It was a different matter when 
there was no longer any question of a true bilateral act.52 Vis-
conti Venosta may well have found tt far more significant that since 
Hanotaux's earlier overtures, Germany had limited what she considered 
her obligations to Italy under the terms of the Triple Alliance, 
specifically excluding from them the Trlpolltan hinterlands. 
Visconti Venosta therefore Instructed Torntelli to continue 
the negotiations, secretly and prudently, cautioning him that when 
speaking of Tripoli he was to be certain the Cyrenatca was Included 
in the term. Luzzattl was also to be questioned as to any Informa-
tion he may have uncovered regarding French plans for Morocco.53 
In reply to the instructions he received from Rome, Tor-
niel 1 t expressed doubt the French government, then experiencing 
grave internal difficulties, would grant a unilateral declaration 
on Tripoli when England had refused a similar request. 54 
A few weeks later Barrere left on vacation, continuing the 
negotiations, however, and entering Into personal discussions with 
510013, 111, No. 3\0. 
52serra, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, pp. 83-86. 
531bld.; ODF1, XV, No. 178, n. 2; No. 180. 
S4serra, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, p. 86. Torntelll's allusion 
was to the Dreyfus Affair. See above, p. 40. French Internal gov-
ernmental Instability was a constant preoccupation with the Ital Ian 
ambassador. See DDFl, XV, No. 298; 0013, Ill, Nos. 336 and 338. 
Tornlell I In Paris.SS In October he Informed the Ital Ian ambas-
sador of France's readiness to grant a written declaration on 
Tripoli and Cyrenalca but that Delcass~, In turn, wanted to know 
what Italy's reaction would be to French expansion In Morocco.S6 
sarrere himself was not In favor of grafting Morocco onto the 
Tripoli questlon.S7 
66 
Tornlelll's reaction, as he Indicated to Visconti Venosta, 
was that a substantial difference existed between the previously 
discussed status quo and element of French expansion the new pro-
posal Introduced.SS He wondered, as well, If the substitution 
was prompted by French plans for llTITllnent action In Morocco or Ins-
pired by Barrere, "who could have found In the archives of the 
Farnese Palace something which made him suspect the existence of a 
secret Anglo-Ital Ian accord. 11 S9 Visconti Venosta responded to the 
French proposal by Instructing Ambassador Lanza to determine Ger-
many's attitude towards the eventuallty of a French move In Morocco.60 
Tornlelll, If questioned In the meanwhile, was advised to reply he 
was awaiting lnstructlons.61 
Both Visconti Venosta and Tornlelll then avoided any further 
discussion of the Morocco-Tripoli declaration. 62 Luzzattl confirmed 
the foreign minister's hesitation, at the same time acquainting 
SSooFl 
_, XV, No. 29 8, n • 1 ; 0013 _, I I I , No. 336. 
S60013 
_, 111 , No. 336. S7ooF1 XVI 
- ' t 
No. 79. 
S80013 
-- t 111 t No. 336. S91bld., No. 344. 
60 I b Id., No. 337. 61 1bld., No. 338. 
62 1 8 OOF , XV, No. 29 • 
r 67 aorr1' re of Torn I e 11 i's neg at Ive attl tude towards the new di re ct I on 
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' tn which France appeared to be moving. Luzzattl cautioned Barrere 
to proceed slowly, reminding him that although Italy was in need of 
8 t least ten years of peace--lf the question of Morocco were to be 
opened, the Ital Ian public would become inflamed and demand compensa-
tion. Tunisia was not forgotten~ To this Barrere replied that 
Italy's share would be precisely Tripoli. "We h2ve to take things 
as they are, not as we'd like them to be!", he reminded Luzzattt. 63 
When the Ital Ian silence continued, Barrere decided to 
sound out Visconti Venosta and attempt to discover his actual atti-
tude to the French proposal. He learned the Ital Ian minister would 
still be happy to receive a written declaration of the verbal assur-
ances Barrere had given Canavero In April. As for going further, 
he preferred to proceed gradually "to the extent events made adjust-
ment necessary •1164 
The Boer War, of course, had complicated the situation from 
the Italian point of view. It was generally conceded in the Consulta 
that either an enlargement or diminution of the English African 
patrimony would result In war, war which in turn could well produce 
a grave contrecoup in the Mediterranean. 65 The probability of 
France's move to an occupation of Touat at this time had also begun 
to alarm Visconti Venosta. 6~ He was concerned that a French 
64 I b Id., Annex. 
6S1bld., XVI, No. 14. In this regard, while discussing the 
possible annexation of Transvaal and Orange, King Humbert told Barrere 
he feared the repercussions certain to fol low: "There are too many 
Interests Involved for such a development to take place peacefully." 
66sarrere a Delcass6, November 13, 1899, AAE, N:S!, XV. 
Barrere wrote Delcass~ of Visconti Venosta's preoccupation, adding 
68 
occupation of Morocco, at a time lt2ly herself was unable to go 
Into Tri pol I, might arouse such discontent within Italy the dynasty 
Itself would be lmperilled.67 
Visconti Venosta's fe2r of the French occupation of Touat 
was not ungrounded. In late 1899 and early 1900 France actually 
began the penetr<'1tion of Interior Morocco. Franco-Moroccan rela-
tions were regulated by a treaty dating back to 1845. Although the 
Algerian-Morocco border was governed by the tre2ty, sections of the 
frontiers remained Indefinite. Border Incidents were frequent, and 
possession of the Touat, Gourara and Tldlkelt oases--dlscovered 
after the treaty was drawn up--had never been settled.68 When ob-
jections were raised to French occupation of the oases and the 
construction of railroads to them, Oelcass~ merely replied that 
France had no Intention of changing the status quo In the Mediter-
ranean. She was merely exercising the legitimate exp2nslon of her 
influence In the reglon.69 Visconti Venosta 1 s apprehension over 
that If the Ital Ian minister entertained doubts as to France's 
Intentions they were surely lnspl red by Engl lsh sources 11 ••• try-
ing to profit from Engl lsh embarassment and acquire a preponderant 
situation In lt?ly ••• ". 
67PEA, XVI II, No. 4474 []ts[]. 
68see Anderson, The Fl rst Moroccan Crisis, 1904-06, pp. 5-18. 
69ooF1, XVI, Nos. 92, 96. French acquisition of Morocco 
was being actively promoted at this time by the Comlt~ de l'Afrlque 
fran~alse, organized In 1899 to popularize African questions with 
the French people as well as to exert pressure on the government 
and carry on an organized campaign for colonial expansion. Its 
membership, although small, was Influential and included in its 
numbers French deputies, senators, military and naval officers, gov-
ernment officials, newsp?per editors and owners and members of var-
ious geographic 2nd colonl2l societies. Delcass~ 1 s own policy, 
from the start of his ministry, was associated with the Moroccan 
question--whose settlement he believed would both fortify and aggran-
dize France's situation In Europe. Anderson, The First Moroccan 
69 
passlble French action In Touat eventually led him to express his 
concern to Lord Currie. Yet Currie merely advised the Italian 
minister to keep a strict watch and be prepared to avert any Injury 
to Italian Interest. As for British resistance to French Inter-
ference with the Integrity of Morocco, Currie expressed the opinion 
that despite traditional English policy to forcibly resist any 
attack on the Mediterranean coast, It would be extremely difficult 
to prevent a French occupation of Touat.70 This English Indiffer-
ence undoubtedly Influenced Visconti Venosta In his decision to 
have Tornlelll reopen the Morocco-Tripoli discussions with Delcass~ 
a few weeks later.71 Yet after Informing the French foreign minis-
ter of this decision on December 18, Tornlelll--as well as Visconti 
Venosta--again reverted to silence on the subject. 72 
In the meanwhile Tornlelll came to believe that England's 
current preoccupations made the present a most propitious time for 
French expDnslon In Morocco. Under those circumstances he thought 
Italy's silence would be a serious mistake, one which could only 
weaken her diplomatically and leave an impression of her complete 
disinterest towards France's eventual expanslon--wlthout any opportu-
nity of obtaining compensatlon.73 
Crisis, 1904-06, pp. 5-18. On French colonialism, see also 
H. Brunschwtg, French Colonialism 18 1-1914. M ths and Realities, 
trans. by W. G. Brown London, 19 
• 
70Bo, 1, No. 288. 
71ooF1, XVI, No. 3, n. 1. In May, 1899, Barrere also wrote 
Delcass~ tnat Canavero's brother-In-law, the Due de Zoagll, had 
confided to him that Italy had nothing to hope for from British co-
operation In the Mediterranean. Barrere a Delcass~, May 23, 1899, 
AAE, NS!, XV. 
72ooF1, XVI, No. 3, n. 1, 2; No. 24. 730013, Ill, No. 352. 
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Yet Visconti Venosta was unwilling to take decisive 
action. On January 14, 1900 he wrote Ambassador Lanza of his 
concern with the International situation and fear of a possible 
alteration In Mediterranean conditions. Should that be the case, 
he told Lanza, he himself would be unwilling to adopt Italy's tra-
ditionally negative policy of the past. In Visconti Venosta's esti-
mation, the solution to which Italy should resort was a state of 
calm preparedness. Diplomatically, the first step In this course 
of action would Involve a frank exchange of views with Gennany, 
since the Italian minister was convinced It was in Italy's own 
best Interests to act In harmony with her Central Ally.74 
When approached, however, Germany proved unresponsive. 
Von BUlow had high regard for Visconti Venosta, considering him a 
wise and prudent statesman In whom Gennany could have full con-
fidence. Nevertheless, Lanza reported, It was almost certain von 
BUiow would avoid any accords or exchange of Ideas on eventual 
Ital Ian action In the Mediterranean. Ostensibly the reluctance 
derived from the secretary's fear a less prudent man than Visconti 
Venosta might some day provoke a causus foederls which overreached 
Germany's understanding of her obl lgatlons to her Ital Ian ally. 
Any discussions, consequently, would have to take place on a strict-
ly personal basls.75 
• 
Von BUlow was less diplomatic when he informed London of 
Lanza's overtures. He intended to limit himself, he wrote, to the 
remark that Oelcass~ had given Gennany precise assurances France 
--~~~~~~~~-74 
Ibid., No. 353. 
751bid. , No. 361. 
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would respect current treaties. At the same time, he was going to 
make It clear that British Indifference with respect to Touat was 
such that little hope remained for any protest over the controver-
sial border. He would avoid any detailed discussions with Italy 
on the Moroccan question, von BUlow added, considering It preferable 
that Germany approach Italy only after having reached agreement with 
Britain on how best to proceed.76 
While for all practical purposes, then, an Impasse had been 
reached on the Morocco-Tripoli declaration, there had been progress 
In resolving another Franco-Ital Ian problem: that concerning the 
borders between Eritrea and French Somallland. A protocol estab-
lishing the frontiers was signed in Rome on January 24, 1900.77 
Barrere had urged Delcass~ to adopt a conciliatory approach In the 
negotiations, regarding the settlement as a deflnltfve conclusion 
to a source of much mfsunderstandf ng between France and ltaly.78 
During a meeting that finalized the Red Sea boundary settle-
ment, Barrere and Visconti Venosta again resumed an exchange of 
views on Tripoli and Morocco. According to Barrere the discussions 
were Initiated when he expressed the hope they could also resolve 
other problems between the two countries. Agreeing wholeheartedly 
with his sentiments, Vfscontl Venosta had replied that If Barrere 
was alluding to the Mediterranean, he would always find him ready 
' 
76PEA, XVI I I, No. 4476 1}1s_fil. 
77 1 4 DDF, XVI, No. 2 , 51. Text of the agreement delimiting 
the frontlerbetween French Somallland and Eritrea Is reproduced In 
Basdevant, Trait6s et conventions en vlgueur entre la France et les 
Qulssances ~trang~res, II, 767-68. 
78camllle Barrere, "Lettres a Delcass~, 11 p. 726. 
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· to talk "in confidence and as a friend." Visconti Venosta then 
expressed his own Inability to establish a correlation between the 
question of Tripoli and that of Morocco.79 In his analysis of 
Visconti Venosta's hesitation, Barrere wrote Delcass~ that although 
the Ital Ian minister recognized France's legitimate Interests In 
Morocco, he still feared to open the question prematurely since 
France was not alone In her Interest In the area. To this Delcass~ 
had retorted that France could well address the same words to Italy 
in the face of her desire for a French declaration of disinterest 
on T r I po 1 i ! 80 
In Visconti Venosta 1 s version of the resumption of talks, 
Barrere had requested a confidential discussion, In the course of 
which he told the foreign minister that France was ready to renew 
Its formal assurances respecting the status quo In Trlpoll-Cyrenalca 
and would not oppose eventual action Italy might exercise In order 
to extend her Influence In Trlpolltanla. However France desired to 
know, In return, that she would not meet with Italian opposition In 
Morocco. Visconti Venosta's objections to the proposal, he after-
wards wrote Tornlelll, had not derived from the base of the question 
but from a certain repugnance he felt In pledging Italy to remote, 
Incalculable action. 81 When the Ital Ian minister queried Barrere 
as to the nature of any French action In Morocco, the French ambas-
sador had reserved further elaboration. 
A few weeks later Barrere learned Visconti Venosta was In 
111 health and not expected to remain long In the cabinet. He 
79ooF1, 1, No. 51. 80 I b Id., No. 55 • 
81 serra, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, p. 88. 
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therefore began urging Delcass~ to proceed as quickly as possible 
with the negotiation of the declarations, asking as well for spe-
cific information with regard to Delcass~'s intentions in order to 
be prepared for all eventualities that might occur In subsequent 
discussions. Typical of the points on which he wished to be informed: 
was Delcass6 asking for a statement on all of Morocco? 
was It only mutual assurance that France renounced 
Trlpolitan territory and Italy, Moroccan? 
did France demand recognition of her superior rights 
to interior Morocco as far as the Atlanttc8!n exchange for her recognition of Italy's to Tripoli? 
By February 10 Barrere reported that there was fundamental 
accord on the contents of the declarations. Once Visconti Venosta 
understood the French sphere of influence reserved the question of 
Tangier and Spanish possessions on the Mediterranean coast, he was 
no longer concerned that France's Intentions In Morocco were not 
peaceful .83 Barrere's repeated assurance of French disinterest in 
Tripoli and of non-interference with the caravan routes had also 
relieved him of any anxiety over a possible clash between French and 
I ta 1 i an t nte res ts • 84 
There was then the matter of the form the declarations were 
to be given. Barrere rejected the declaration originally proposed 
by Delcasse, considering it Inopportune and even dangerous. 85 He 
or 
82camllle Barrere, "Lettres a Oelcass~, 11 pp. 726-28. Un-
dated, this letter was apparently written in response to Delcasse's 
letters to Barrere of January 7 and 20, 1900. 
eluded 
83 1 3 OOF , XV I, No. 20 • 
84camille Barrere, "Lettres a Delcasse," pp. 730-32. 
85ooF1, XVI, No. 79. The text of this declaration, not tn-
ln "f1ii" French diplomatic documents, Is among the papers of 
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pointed out that it was quite probable Viscontl Venosta would 
eventually wtsh to communicate the contents of any agreement to 
Italy's German allies. Obviously, a paper with the character of 
~veritable politic2l convention could present difficulties. Fur-
thermore, Barrere did not consider the problem to actually involve 
Morocco. Yet with regard to Tri pol I, he reminded Delcass~, he had 
always been of the opinion It would be a grave error not to repeat 
France's verbal assurances by way of letters. Tripoli had its 
place In the Triple Alliance: "It was the object, under cover of 
destruction of Mediterranean balance, of a casus belli against 
France." Thus France was In a position, Barrere argued, of sup-
pressing not only the pretext but one of the principal bases of 
the treaty. If France persisted in asking Italy for a Moroccan 
guarantee, Barrere then insisted It be under a prudent form. In 
his opinion, this was best provided by an exchange of letters which 
had the London Convention of 1899 as their point of departure. 86 
Barrere also objected to Delcass~'s use of the expression 
"acquisition of territory" in the letters. He preferred 1 imiting 
the De 1 cciss~ MSS • It reads: 
"Italy engages vis a vis France never to raise territorial 
claims in Morocco or oppose in any manner the efforts France might 
be led to make in order to establish her Influence there. This 
engagement extends neither to the question of Tangier, which remains 
open nor to Spain's present possessions on the Rlf coast, which 
France excludes from dlscus~ton. 
"France engages vis a vis Italy never to raise territorial 
claims fn Tripolitanta, as at present defined, or oppose Jn any 
manner the efforts Italy might be led to make in order to establish 
her influence there." Delcasse, "Projet de declaration," February 4, 
1900, AAE, PD. 
86cami 11 e Barre re' "Lett res a De 1 cass~, II pp. 7 30-32. 
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their phrasing to the effect that Insofar as France was concerned, 
the convention had no Intention of cutting the caravan routes of 
Trlpoll-Cyrenalca and that France's colonial expansion stopped at 
the borders of that reglon.87 
As for the Ital tan letter on Morocco, Barr~re merely 
wanted It to lnfonn France that Italy found nothing Incompatible 
with her own Interests were France In a position of power In 
Morocco. 
Barr~re's overriding concern at thts stage of the negotia-
tions was to eliminate any reason for a violation of the secrecy 
of the correspondence. He felt, of itself, tt should contain no-
thing that could be construed In any way as being menacing In 
character.88 Delcass6 agreed to these requests, Insisting only 
that the character of the declarations be that of a response by 
France to Italy's request for a statement on Tripoli •89 
According to Barr~re, Delcass6 1 s acquiescence left him 
with two alternatives: 
a response, In letter fonn, to Italy's request for 
assurance that France had no Intention of interrupt-
ing the caravan communications of Trlpolltanla with 
the African Interior and that French colonial expan-
sion would stop at the Tripolltan borders, 
If Delcass6 persisted on grafting Morocco onto the 
Tripoli affatr, having Italy tnfonn France, In con-
sequence of the above-s'tated letter, that she rftali! 
found nothing contrary to her own Interests lnCJe-
fense of France's interests as "Putssance volslne" 
of Morocco. 
87 1btd. 881btd. 
89ooFl, XVI, No. 72, n. 2. 
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Since the latter formula consisted of assurances to Italy 
and contained nothing contrary to Italian Interests, Barrere con-
sidered it a less dangerous form than any other for the Morocco-
Trfpol f declaratton.90 
Barr~re planned on being In Paris during most of April, 
and although another ministerial crisis arose In Italy during 
March, Visconti Venosta advised the French ambassador before his 
departure of his own desire to carry their exchange of views on 
Tripoli and Morocco through to a concluslon.9 1 On Barrere's re-
turn, the Ital tan minister then Indicated his Interest in extending 
the proposals still farther than had been France's Intent. The 
French government would pledge herself to not occupying Tripoli, 
Visconti Venosta observed, but did not authorize Italy to assert 
her rights In the region. In other words, France conserved the 
right to formally oppose her eventual Ital Ian expansion In Tripoli. 
Barrere Immediately grasped the implications of Visconti 
Venosta•s proposal. His response was to be crucial in the subse· 
quent development of Franco-Ital tan relations. Although Delcass~ 
had not expressed his position on the particular point made by the 
Italian minister, Barrere unequivocally stated that French approba-
tion of an Ital Ian move In Tripoli would have to carry, as a condi-
tion, Italy's non-engagement against France In Europe.92 He 
' pointed out that while recognizing the justice of Visconti Venosta's 
distinction, Italy could certainly understand France's reserve to-
wards such a hypothetical undertaking. An Italy free of any 
90 1bid., No. 79. 
921btd., No. 136. 
91 6 Ibid., No. 13 , Annex. 
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palftlcal or military obligations against France would make every 
difference to France In Afrlca.93 
Negotiations continued In this spirit, Visconti Venosta 
fully aware of the obstacles the Triple Alliance placed In the way 
of French assent to the new Mediterranean orientation of his pollcy.94 
Bc-rr~re by now had no doubt that the direction of Ital Ian foreign 
paltcy was centered on Tripoli. His conviction was strengthened 
through observation of the Consulta·lnsplred press as well as by 
Visconti Venosta's own overtures to hlm.95 
During the course of the discussions that followed, De1cass6 
expressed his willingness to accede to Visconti Venosta•s request 
for a more pos It Ive 1 fmt tat Ion on the French sphere of Influence• 
expressing to Bcrr~re at the same time his hope the lt?l tan minister 
would recognize the necessity of granting the reciprocal assurances 
France was seektng.96 Yet France would enter Into the 1'1.!'.lrger 
arrangement Italy sought," Barrere reiterated to Visconti Venosta, 
only to the extent Italy was able to extend pacific assurances to 
France respect Ing her own treaties with the Germanic powers. Until 
that time conversations would have to remain confined to what 
Barr~ re deft ned as "the pre 1 lml nary stages": excl udl ng French 
recognition of Ital Ian sights on Tripoli and a para11e1 arrangement 
for Morocco.97 
931bld. 1 No. 136, Annex. 941.!?.U!., Nos. 136, 148. 
95tb1d., No. 136. A report to Delcass6 from Ambassador 
de Noallles-tn' Berlin also nofed Italy's apparently strong Interest 
In Tri pol I at this time. !2f. 1 XVI, No. 156. 
96tbld., Nos. 148, 160. 97tbid., No. 171. 
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Accordingly, on June 9, Barrere submitted three proposed 
letters to Delcasse, urging lnmediate reply since the Ital Ian mi-
nisterial crisis was expected to crest within a matter of days. 
Basically they remained confined to the negative agreement which 
excluded French recognition of ftallan designs on Tripoli and laid 
down a parallel arrangement regarding Morocco.9 8 Barrere himself 
was satisfied with the letters Insofar as they terminated his con-
cept of the first phase of the current Franco-Italian negotiations: 
establishing the existence of friendly discussions ~nd exchanges 
of view which envisioned an entente between France and Italy on the 
ground of their former divisions. His concern for haste centered on 
what Barrere believed would be Visconti Venosta's absence In? re-
constituted Italian ccblnet.99 
Precisely because of this doubt as to Italy's future foreign 
minister, however, Delcass~ refused to authorize the exchange of 
letters. Since Independent operations had already resulted In 
France's expansion In the defined areas, he preferred to continue 
the negotiations with Italy after her governmental crisis was re-
solved and he knew with whom he would be dealing In the future. 100 
Barrere did not agree with the French minister, maintaining 
that the probability of Visconti Venosta's withdrawal only increased 
the need for expressing the results of recent Franco-Italian 
' 
98For texts of the letters of proposal see DDF1, XVI, No. 171, 
Annexes 1, 2 and 3. 
99 I b I d • • No • 1 71 • 
100 8 Ibid., No. 1 5. See Andrew, Th~ophtle Oelcass~ and the 
Entente CorcrraTe, pp. 153-57 for French expansion on the Moroccan 
border In this period. 
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discussions under Visconti Venosta 1 s signature. In Barrere's 
opinion It was more than likely the views of Visconti Venosta 1 s 
successor would differ. 101 He objected to Delcasse's point of view 
because it appeared to imply a complete entente could only be 
reached if Visconti Venosta were a permanent minister, which could 
never be the case in I ta 1 y! Barre re wou 1 d prefer to have taken 
advantage of the Italian minister's presence and have Ital Ian policy 
so firmly engaged in the path on which France had thrust it his 
successors could only reverse Its direction with difficulty. Even 
with Visconti Venosta, he had complained to Delc~ss6, we weren't 
at all certain the second step would follow! 102 
Barrere was convinced it was essential for France to con-
elude the agreement Oelcasse now held in abeyance. Urging him to 
act, he reminded Oelcasse that if--as Barrere--the foreign minister 
viewed the matter as much
1 
European as African, he realized there 
were serious reasons for writing, as well as for having already 
given verbal assurance, that France had no intention of going Into 
Tripoli. Neither could he fall to recognize Italy's right to ex-
tend her influence in Tripoli when, In exchange, she left France 
free in Morocco. You know, Barrere told Delcass~, Italy will 
modify her alliances only If ft becomes politically expedient for 
her to do so. What France then had to do was create that Interest. 
Beyond financial and commetcial questions, Barrere felt, Italian 
interests lay In the Mediterranean, in Tri pol I; Italy's fear was 
precisely that France might first enter this area. This fear had 
been one of the causes leading to Italy's current alliances. Since 
101 ooF1 XVI, No. 187. 
-- , 
l02 1btd., No. 190. 
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France had no interest In Tripoli, he reasoned, she should suppress 
Italy's apprehensions tn writing. The day Italy asked France to go 
farther and recognize her right to extend her influence in Tripoli, 
Fr~nce could dem~nd in return--beyond her liberty in Morocco--the 
guarantee that Italian alliances were no longer directed ag~inst 
her. 103 
Delcass~ was not convinced by Barrere•s argument. He saw 
no fundamental problem, for Instance, were a less prudent foreign 
minister than Visconti Venosta to reveal a Morocco-Tripoli declara-
tion. As for Bcrrere•s preoccupation in snatching Italy from Gennan 
domination, he refused to be Impressed with the reasoning that 
Tripoli was the object of a casus belli against France, arguing that 
because France had no Intention of conquering Tripoli, the casus 
foederls could never be Invoked. France could not write Italy she 
did not covet Tripoli, Delcass~ added, without at the same time 
recognizing Italian rights, which merited compensation! And doing 
so, he concluded, would expose France to needless Involvement with 
Turkey--a factor Gennany would never hesitate to use against France 
in the event of any Ital fan indiscretion. Delcass~ also felt that 
the more generalized phrasing Barrere had proposed In exchange for 
France's declaration of disinterest might permit Spain and England 
to claim their Mediterranean Interests were being threatened. 104 
As events developed, Visconti Venosta maintained his post 
In the new Italian cabinet formed on June 24, 1900. He and Barrere 
then contined their efforts to produce a declaration which would 
103 1bid. l04 1bld., N 203 0. • 
satisfy all who were party to it.105 B y Ju 1 y 2 1 Ba r re re f e 1 t 
sufficient agreement had been reached to propose that Visconti 
venosta meet him In Rome to sign the exchange of letters. 106 
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Visconti Venosta, however, considered the letters• phrasing too 
restrictive with respect to Tri pol t. Leaving shortly on his annual 
vacation, Barrere decided to postpone a resumption of negotiations 
until his return in November.107 On November 12 he submitted another 
letter of proposal to Visconti Venosta. 108 
When submitting the November 12 letter-proposal, Barrere 
had expressed regret that agreement had not been reached in an over-
al 1 European sense. Visconti Venosta remarked In reply that more 
was involved than France's Interest in the Triple Alliance; there 
was also the question of Italy's surveillance and defense against 
one of her allies, the allusion being made of course with reference 
to Austrfa. 109 A few weeks later, however, the Italian minister 
Informed Barrere of his desire to acquaint Victor Emmanuel with the 
negotiations, which until then had been carried on in the greatest 
secrecy.llO King Victor Emmanuel Ill expressed his entire 
l051bld., No. 190, n. 2; Nos. 226, 230, 232, 236. 
1060013 
_, 111, No. 431 • l07ooF1, XVI, No. 251 • 
l O 8 1 b i d ., No • 375, n. 4. This document has not been found. 
l091bld., No. 375. Visconti Venosta was also in the final 
stages of negotiating two actords with Austria: the first pledging 
both governments to maintain the status quo in the Balkans; the 
second, a naval convention providing for the coordination of the 
Austrian and Italian fleets In case of war against France and Russia. 
The Austrian accords were the more significant In view of a recently 
concluded Russo-Austrian treaty. 
110 I b i d -. No • 40 1 • 
July had le~taly with a 
pressed by the young king, 
The assassination of King Humbert in 
new monarch. Barr~re was favorably im-
flndlng him both Intelligent and well-
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satisfaction with the rvppro2chment the tentative occords implied, 
and on December 29 Barrere wired De1c~ss~ that with only minor 
modifications of wording, complete agreement had been reached. To 
this Delcass~ responded January 2, 1901, authorizing Barrere to 
proceed In the signing and exchange of the letters.111 
The exchange of notes, pred?ted December 14 and 16, 1900, 
took place on Jenuary 4, 1901. In Barrere's letter to Visconti 
Veno!te the French Government ref ter~ted Its Intent of not extending 
its frontier or sphere of Influence to the province of Tripoli and 
of respecting caravAn conmuntcatlons between Tripoli and French 
territory. It did not, however, without French consent, recognize 
lte1y's right to expand In the Trlpolltan province. Visconti Venosta's 
reply recognized the right of FrAnce to extend her Influence In 
Morocco, with the reservation th~t If such action modified the poli-
tical or territorial Integrity of the Ch6rlften Empire In Morocco 
lt~ly was entitled to the development of her Influence In Tripoli •112 
Barrere attrched great slgnlflc~nce to this Medtterrane2n 
Accord, which he believed "modified profoundly, nnd to France's 
~dv~ntage, the position of active forces tn the Mediterranean." In 
his estim~tfon, it resolved one of the most dtff1cu1t rspects of 
Informed. Victor Enwnanuel Ill was also reputed to be an crdent 
irredentist, Barr~re wrote Delcass4, and had reportedly Informed 
his father-In-law, the Grand' Due Pierre Nicolaievltch, that he had 
had enough of the Triple A111~nce and Intended to maintain full 
liberty of 0ctlon. He would subordinate ltalt~n Independence to 
no one. Ibid., No. 374. 
111 Ibid., No. 413; No. 413, n. 2. 
11 2ooF2, I, No. 17. The Barr~re-Viscontl Venosta letters 
~re reproduced in Appendix I I. 
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Franco-Italian relations. Barrere saw the Medfterrane2n as the 
keystone of Italian action, contributing to the formation of her 
alliances against France and leading her to establish accords with 
England. Since Tunis, France had been suspected of attempting to 
expand her hegemony in the Mediterranean, not only in Morocco but 
tn Tripoli. Yet as much as Italy coveted Trlpolitanfa, she was 
unlikely to undertake any direct action for lack of sufficient mil-
itary and financial resources. Nor was she likely to secure the 
blessings of the Powers on any such venture, particularly her allies. 
Even her Internal affairs weighed the scales against any Ital tan 
Mediterranean undertaking. France, on the other hand, gained f2r 
more tangibly from the accord. In a sense, not only had Italy be-
come dependent on France with regard to her Tri pol itan aspirations; 
she recognized French rights to Morocco as well. To Barrere the 
Morocco-Tripoli accord had the additional value of greatly reducing 
fear and jealousy In ltaly--lessenlng, in turn, the posslbil tty of 
a Mediterranean agreement between Italy and England that he felt 
would actually have been directed against France. 11 3 
Delcass~ also evinced considerable satisfaction with what 
had been accomplished, sharing with Barrere an appreciation of the 
advantages Inherent In the Franco-Ital Ian Mediterranean accord of 
1900. Despite certain dissimilarities between his own views and 
those of Barr~re during the course of the negotiations, he had come 
to value particularly, he wrote Barrere, the essentially conservative 
character thct had ultimately prevailed in the occord. It excluded 
any temptation, on the part of Italy, to precipitate action In 
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Tripoli and of obliging France, 2t the sr:ime time, to 2ccelerC'lte her 
0 wn resolutions concerning Morocco. He was also 2ssured th2t Rome 
understood the importance of not disturbing the Mediterrane~n 
equilibrium--unless to reap legitimate compens2tion, were France one 
day constrained to renounce the status quo in Morocco and impose her 
sovereignty over the African empire. 114 The French minister thanked 
Barrere profusely for his skill and patience in the negotiations 
and, at Barrere's suggestion, informed Visconti Venosta of his ap-
preciation for the efficacious help the Italian minister had given. 
Oelcasse also had Barrere tell Visconti Venosta he considered it 
one of the privileges of his political life to have joined his own 
efforts to those of Visconti Venosta in the achievement of such ? 
felicitious accompl ishment.115 
Barrere, however, entertained greater cimbitions for Fre>nco-
Italian rapproachment than had resulted with the Mediterranean accord 
of 1900. The core of his over-all policy was the slow corrosion of 
Italy's ties to the Triple Alliance. He vieWP~ the Tunisian nego-
tiations, conmerctal arrangements, delimitation of the Red Sea bound-
aries, and Morocco-Tripoli accords as mere stages, stages marking the 
road to the vastly more significant political accords of 1902. 116 
For It was Barr~re's ultimate hope that the Trtpltce could gradually 
be emptied of its substance. 11 7 It was towards the achievement of 
this objective that his effdrts would henceforth be directed. 
114 Ibid., No. 255. 1151bld., Nos. 82, 255. l l 6 I b id • , No • 1 7 
117 • 8 2 6 Ibid., Nos. 118, 1 5, 201, 235, 258; DDF, II, Nos. 7 , 99, 
218; BO, I, No. 363; Jules Cambon, The Diplomatist, trans. by 
C. T.-:rurner (London, 1931), pp. 67-68; Charles-Roux, Trots ambassades 




THE NEUTRALITY ACCORD OF 1902 
A greater degree of cooperation as wel 1 as a noticeable 
Increase In the warmth of Franco-lta11an relations followed the 
exchange of the Barrere·Vlscontl Venosta letters. France bestowed 
the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honor on Victor Emmanuel Ill 
who, In turn, made the first appearance of an Ital Ian monarch at 
the French Prix de Rome exhibition In the Villa Medici •1 Repre-
sentatives of the two countries met to discuss a railroad project 
between N~c:e and Cuneo and also reached e modus agendi regarding 
the protection of the rights of Christians In Chlna.2 
Barr~re, however, was acutely ~were of the need to stlmu· 
late still closer collaboration between the two nations In order 
to achieve his ultimate objective of corroding Italy's ties to the 
Triple Alliance. One of the first steps he took towards attaining 
this goal was a natural one for the former journal 1st; he warned 
Delcass6 of the harm he believed various French newspapers were 
inflicting on Frcnco·ltallari relations. He cited journalistic pre-
occupation with Austro-ltallan antagonism as an example. While 
1Atklnson, "Ambassador of France," p. 108 from the Annual 
Register { 1901 ) , p. 259 • 
2 2 8 DOF , Nos. 5 , 72. 
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the subject was ce rta t nl y a worthwh I 1 e one, he remarked to h Is 
superior, It was one to be treated with prudence and discretion. 
sarrere felt the tactics being employed would only succeed In of-
fending a large number of Italians. He was convinced many of them 
regarded French articles on Ital Ian affairs as essentially aggres-
sive manoeuvres aimed at reducing Italy to isolation. Rather than 
countering France's own interests, Barrere suggested the newspapers 
adopt a more positive approach. He recommended the substttution 
of objective, rational articles that were supported by facts, fig-
ures and tables. These articles could demonstrate, for Instance, 
the incompatibility of Italian and Austro-Hungarian economic Inter-
ests. Italy's commercial treaty with Austria was due to expire in 
two years, Barrere reminded Delcass4, and It seemed doubtful at the 
moment Jt would be renewed on the same advantageous terms for Italian 
agricultural products. A suppression of the favorable terms accorded 
Ital Ian wines would provoke a severe agricultural crisis In Italy. 
Competently exposed, Barrere believed this thesis would have a con-
siderable Impact In Italy, one from which France could very well 
benefit!3 
Following the same line of reasoning, Barrere protested a 
proposed French surtax on wines having an alcoholic content of more 
than 12 per cent. Although a complementary proposal was being in-
troduced to exempt foreign wines from the tax, Barrere expected 
the latter proposal to encounter opposition on the part of French 
winegrowers. Were they successful, he felt Ital Ian reaction could 
3 I b i d • , No • 1 2 • 
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be sufficiently adverse to lead to demands for a modification of 
the recently concluded Franco-Ital tan Conmerctal Accord. France 
should not be destroying the hopes to which the Commercial Accord 
gave birth, he argued, further diminishing the advantages of the 
accord In the area of Its greatest Interest to ltaly.4 If Delc2ss4's 
Influence In protecting Ital Ian wines from the surtax were inef-
fectual, Italy would consider the matter a material and moral vio-
lation of the commercial arrangements the two countries had con-
tr2cted. In Barrere's estimation the repercussions on Franco-Ital Ian 
pol itlc<'ll relations would be serious .5 
Of course, a far broader application of economic assistance 
was Implicit In Barrere 1 s approach to achieving the degree of Franco-
ltallan rapprochement he sought. He deeply regretted the absence 
of French capital In the development of Ital tan industrial projects. 
French capital was, In Barrere's own words, "a powerful army in the 
conquest of foreign markets. 116 He considered ft unfortunate It was 
so Inexplicably timid at times, not only depriving France of the 
customary benefits she might expect from her assistance In this 
area but of the appreciable Influence normally accruing to such 
coope rat I on as we 11 .7 
In February Barrere took advantage of an opportunity provided 
by Oelcass4 1 s Senate budget address to underscore the concept of 
If 
Franco-Ital Ian rapport he was attempting to develop. Asked for his 
react I on to the remarks Delcass4 proposed making on France's I ta 11 an 
4 1bid., No. 13. 5 I b Id., No. 73. 
6 Ibid., No. 192. 71bld. Nos. 192, 579. 
88 
policy, the ambassador showed no hesitation in suggesting revisions 
which would make them accord more closely with his own thlnking. 8 
Barrere's efforts to Improve the Franco-Ital tan relation-
ship were not confined to the area of economics, however. To fur-
ther facilitate the achievement of his ultimate objective, he also 
repeatedly urged Delcasse to enlist the assistance of Emperor 
Nicholas of Russia and the Prince of Montenegro in Influencing the 
Quirinal in France's behalf.9 For Barrere was convinced consider-
able pressures would be brought to bear on the Ital Ian King to re-
new the Germanic all lances.lo In Barrere's opinion it was therefore 
imperative every effort be made to bring Italy's alliances into 
harmony wt th re-establ I shed Franco-Ital tan rapport and the moral 
obl igatlons that relationship lmposed. 11 
As matters developed, relations between the two countries 
were affected decisively by the emergence of the Zanardelll Ministry 
on February 14, In which the direction of foreign affairs was as-
sumed by Giulio Prlnetti •12 Prlnettt was a successful businessman 
81bld., Nos. 56, 59. Barrere preferred a warmer tone than 
Delcasse ~adopted, and one more flattering to Italy. He suggested, 
for instance, referring to Italy as "un grand pays volstn." 
91btd., Nos. 118, 132, 176, 252, 279, 300. As a natural 
rival of Austria-Hungary, Russia was in a position to exert consid-
erable influence on Italy's foreign-policy attitudes. Since Victor 
Emmanuel Ill was known to be deeply In love with his Montenegrin 
wife, Barrere also hoped the' relatives of the Princess would be 
able to develop francophllic tendencies in the Italian court. 
l O I b I d • , No • 1 04 • l l I b I d • 
12Pol ltlcally conservative, Giulio Prlnetti was Ital Ian 
foreign minister from February, 1901 to March, 1903. He had pre-
viously served as Minister of Public Works from July, 1896 to 
December, 1897. 
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from Milan who assumed office wtth an anti-Triple Alliance reputa-
tion. The reputation had Its origins in remarks Prinettl supposedly 
made while a deputy in 1891. Inexperienced in the role of diplomat 
ten years later, the new foreign minister gave immediate evidence 
of considerable indiscretion. The faux pas may well have been occz-
sioned by Prlnetti's attempt to offset any reservations his earlier 
pronouncements against the Triple Alliance may have led Italy's 
German allies to entertain towards him. In any event shortly after 
his nomination to the Consul ta, Prinetti remarked to Bavarian Minister 
Tucker that his earlier apprehensions were actually inspired by 
Crispian policy. However, Prfnettl had continued, since time and 
experience had demonstrated both the peaceful character of the 
Triplice and advantages afforded Italy by It, he Intended henceforth 
to direct all his efforts towards maintaining the alliance. This 
supposedly confidential disclosure appeared in papers In Milan and 
Berlin the following day. Publication of the remarks was believed 
to have originated with Prtnetti himself, despite his later denial 
to the Ital tan Parliament that any such conversation with Tucker 
had taken place.13 
Barrere and Prlnettt had been acquainted for several years 
and relations between the two were cordial, although Barrere Ini-
tially adopted a more reserved tone with Prlnettl than he had with 
Visconti Venosta. The reserve was based on more than the Ital tan 
minister's indiscretion to Baron Tucker. Bcrrere wrote In leter 
years th~t Prlnettl was at first hesitant end fearful. Newly arrived 
in the diplomatic milieu, with only a secondary standing In 
13 2 DDF, I, Nos. 92, 97, 150. 
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parliament and 1 ittle influence with his monarch, he was also sub-
jected to the pressures of the Germans who were fully aware of the 
approaching expiration of the tripartite treaty. Although Barrere 
felt Prinettt was in no position to adopt a definitive pro-French 
stand--which is where he was convinced the Ital Ian minister's per-
sonal sympathies actually lay--he thought Prinetti should at least 
have given France some pledge of his good will •14 As matters stood, 
in Barrere's opinion the new Italian minister still had "some way to 
go to walk with us in the path of peace and friendship. 11 15 
Yet by April relations between the two countries had become 
increasingly cordial. The French government condoned Italy's estab-
1 ishment of postal service In Tripoli, a stgnlflcant gesture to 
Barrere who believed Italy viewed France's acquiescence as verifica-
tion of her own disinterest In Tripoli •16 Barrere had also encour-
aged joint discussion by the two countries of a railroad linking 
the Adriatic with Constantinople, a project in which Italy had evinced 
great interest. 17 In addition, he attempted to draw Italy and France's 
ally, Russia, Into a closer relationship, assisting their endeavors 
to reach an economic entente. To this end he brought together his 
friend Luzzatti and Russian Ambassador Nelldoff, with whom he was 
on the closest of terms •18 
However, more than ~ny other factor, Barrere regarded the 
visit of the Italian fleet to Toulon as indispensable In Improving 
14 1bld., No. 92: II' Annex. 
-
15 1bid., I , No. 92. 16 1bid., No. 167. 
l71bid., No. 182. 181btd., No. 191. 
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Fr0nco-lt~lian relctions at this time. He attached such signifi-
ccnce to it, in fact, that in 1912 he referred to the events as the 
point of departure for the discussions which resulted tn the secret 
Neutrc:l tty Accord of 1902. "At that moment," he wrote, "F'ranco-
ltal Ian rapprochement was an accomplished fact. The Tunis tan nego-
tiations, commercial arrangements, delimitation of the two countries' 
Red Sea possessions, and finally Morocco-Tripoli accord of 1900, 
had been mere stages.19 
This visit, which took place In the spring of 1901, brought 
together French President Emile Loubet and Italy's royal family; 
the Italian fleet was under the command of the young Duke of Genoa. 
The festivities surrounding the event were of considerable import 
to Italy. Barr~re was In close touch with Delcass6 while arrange-
ments were being made amd emphatic in his insistence the occasion 
retain a strictly Franco-Ital Ian character.20 He expressed his 
disturbance on learning plans called for Russian participation In 
the festivities and laid down conditions of protocol he deemed requi-
site were Delcass6 unable to arrange diplomatically for the Russian's 
deperture.21 When three Russian ships subsequently arrived ln 
Toulon, Barrere, In response to Prlnettl's questioning, was able to 
inform the Italian minister the vessels were only in port for repairs 
and their arrival was entirely unofficial .22 
191btd., II, Annex. 20 4 I b Id., I , Nos • 1 3 , 1 70 • 
211bid., Nos. 137, 141, 164, 169. The situation developed 
out of President Loubet 1 s desire to demonstrate French Interest In 
a newly-launched Russian ship constructed by French shipbuilders. 
Delcass~ thought the Russian officers, and ~ny other foreign of-
ficials at Toulon, might be Invited to the dinner being held In 
honor of the Duke of Genoa. 
22 I b t d • , No. 1 70 • 
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Despite B2rrere's apprehension, the Toulon visit went 
smoothly and more than surpassed his expect~tlons. 2 3 In Barrere's 
estimation it created more than an excellent Impression throughout 
ftaly. The popular sentiment engendered also served to reduce much 
of the Import attached to the Triple Alliance. 24 The French nmbas-
sador was not alone in ascribing considerable significance to the 
Toulon demonstrations. Ambassador de Noailles informed Delcasse 
that the vlsit of the Italian fleet completely absorbed Germany's 
attention, where the question was already being raised as to whether 
or not Italy intended to desert the Triple Alltance.25 The official 
German reaction was, of course, one of Indifference, although Ger-
man diplomatic reports actually began commenting on the forthcoming 
event as early as February.26 At that time German Ambassador to 
Rome, Charles de Wedel, wrote von BUlow concerning Barr~re's great 
zezl in consol idattng Franco-Ital tan relations. German Ambassador 
to Pcirls, Hugo de Radol In, also reported Franco-Ital tan rappr10chement 
was being credited to Barr~re, "who had also concluded the Franco-
ltcil ian commercial accords. 1127 By March 31 Wedel expressed the fear 
Toulon was being exploited tn the press and supporting a widespread 
conviction of growing Franco-Ital Ian lntimacy.28 While Wedel sub-
sequently discounted any Idea of a change In Italy's attitude towards 
the renewal of the Triple Alliance, he nevertheless suggested that 
a more amical attitude towards Italy on England's part would 
f 
231bld., No. 185. 
25 I b Id., No. 190. 
24 I b I d • , Nos • 1 85 , 201 • 
26 • - ;;-i 
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contribute decisively to the future retention of Italy's political 
orientation. Wedel felt England could not only assure Italy of 
coastal protection but offer a guarantee as well against her greatest 
preoccupation, the displacement of Influence in the Mediterranean.29 
Several days after Wedel's dispatch to Berlin, British 
Ambassador Currie sent Lord Lansdowne a report of a conversation he 
had been engaged In by his Austrian and German colleagues. Discus-
sion had centered on England's attitude towards the renewal of the 
Triple Alliance and the reception of the Ital Ian fleet at Toulon. 
Currie related that while the Trlplice representatives had expressed 
confidence no change In policy was contemplated, both revealed 
considerable anxiety as to the effect the Toulon demonstrations 
might produce in Italy. Wedel, Currie added, specifically Indicated 
the desirability of greater English Interest In ltallan affalrs.30 
As these developments were unfolding, Barr~re began a 
vigorous drive aimed at bringing Italy's treaty commitments into 
harmony with the friendly rapport continuing to develop between the 
two countries. The rapprochement Imposed moral obligations, he 
told Delcass6 In February, Informing the French minister It was es-
sential Ambassador Tornielll have a clear understanding of France's 
Italian pollcy.31 Increased pressure being brought to bear on 
Italy to renew the Triple Al,1 lance made It Imperative there be no 
doubt as to France's position: regardless of the alliances Italy 
chose to conclude, they should contain no offensive obligations 
against France--even those under a defensive cover.32 
291 b Id • , No. 4960 lj_ 83~ • 
31 DDF2, I , No. 104. 
30so, 1, No. 352. 
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Barrere's pressure on Delcass~ to engage Torntel 11 tn 
discussion on this point intensified after Toulon.33 At the end 
of May he submitted a text which would convey the French position 
to the Ital tan ambassador and urged Delcass~ to speak to Tornielll 
before the upcoming Italian budgetary discussions scheduled for 
June.34 Barrere's concern was based on more than his observation 
of general Ital Ian preoccupation with renewal or modification of 
the Triple Alllance.35 His confidence in Prfnettf had lessened 
considerably In the course of the minister's first few months at 
the Consulta. Barrere feared Prlnettl lacked the authority and con-
viction necessary to follow an Independent path and envisioned 
Italy's possible reversion to the domination of Trlpllce poltcy.36 
To heighten the effect of his pronouncement to Tornlelll, Barrere 
suggested that Delcass6 draw the Italian ambassador's attention to 
one of the most decisive arguments In favor of Italy's modification 
of her political treaties: the rise in Italian stocks on the French 
market, unequal led since the Initial Franco-Ital Ian rupture. It 
would also be wise, Barrere advised, were Delcass~ to apprise 
Torntellt of Prlnetti's prior knowledge of their dlscusston.37 
In pressing the Issue as he obviously was, Barrere was not 
without the support of certain Influential Italian statesmen. As 
he reminded Oelcass6, Rudlnl, Luzzattl, Visconti Venosta and Sonnino 
had also expressed the opln(on that Italy's treaties should be 
331btd., Nos. 185, 201, 258, n. 1; Nos. 262, 267, 268. 
34 1btd., No. 258. 351bld., No. 118. 
361 b Id., No. 262. 371btd., No. 267. 
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modified to accord with current Franco-Italian rapport.38 Premier 
Giuseppe Zanardelll himself, In an interview accorded the Parts 
edition of the New York Herald a few months earlier, stated openly 
that Italy had to resolve questions of commerce as well as of 
a 11 i ance. Zana rde 11 t cons I de red t t "abso 1ute1 y necessary any sug-
gest l ons of animosity towards France be dissipated ••• France 
and Italy had to remain friends under any ct rcumstances! 11 39 
On June 7 Delcasse notified Barrere that his discussion 
with Tornielli had taken place. The points Barrere had signalled 
for inclusion In the conversation had been touched on and Tornielll 
was to inform Prlnettl of Delcass4 1 s remarks.40 The effects of the 
confrontation Barrere had urged were Immediate. June 9 Barrere 
wired Delcasse that Prlnettl had just given two verbal declarations. 
While discussing the imminent Italian budgetary debate, Barrere had 
again expressed hope the Impression would not be created that Italy 
planned on contracting any obligations directed against France. In 
response, Prinettl assured Barrere that he would not treat the 
question of the Triple Alliance. His discourse stated as well that 
if the Triple Alliance had once been aggressive In character, it 
was now compatible with the reestablished Franco-Ital fan rapproche-
ment.41 In reporting this conversation to Delcasse Barrere asked 
the French minister to be certain to allude to Prfnettl's assur-
ances when next speaking with Tornielli. He also advised Delcasse 
381bld., Nos. 104, 267, 268, 277. 
39clted by Serra, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, p. 106. 
40 2 41 DDF, I, No. 273. Ibid., No. 275. 
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to express his great satisfaction with this proof of the Ital tan 
government's position towards France. 
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Prinettl then reassured Barrere further by reading him an 
excerpt of his parliamentary address prior to Its actual delivery. 
Referring to the compatibility of Italy's Intimate relations with 
France and the Triple Alliance, the discourse alluded to the Toulon 
visit, In which the two peoples "having put aside reciprocal sus-
picions no longer recognized the existence of fundamental discord 
between their respective interests and yielded to demonstrations 
of cordial friendship that were so natural between two nations who 
we re s Is te rs by race, s pi rt t and cu 1 tu re . 1142 
When Barrere thanked the Italian minister for his gracious 
words, he wrote Delcass~, he could tell he visibly disturbed 
Prinetti by asking him if he wasn't afraid his address might leave 
the impression the Triple Alliance was about to be renewed. Prinetti 
Insisted Barrere was wrong In drawing such a conclusion, admitting 
however that his remarks regarding the Trlplice were the minimum 
he was in a position to make. As Italy's official representative 
he could not omit all reference to the alliance. Barrere interpreted 
Prinettl's explanation as a further Indication the renewal of Italy's 
alliances was not a simple Italian affair. France was Involved, 
and In a large way. Barrer~ had not pressed the Issue further, his 
report to Delcass~ continued, when he realized a further remark of 
Prlnetti's actually opened discussion on the character of the alli-
ance as it regarded France. Prinettl had cont1nted the conversation 
42 I b I d • , No • 29 3 • 
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with the significant observation that "the French press would be 
wrong in seeing in his words the intention of again contracting the 
same obligations towards the Germanic powers. 1143 
Barrere and Prlnetti met several days later, Barrere again 
clarified France's position with regard to the possible renewal of 
France's treaties. He ekplicftly advised the Italian minister that 
under its actual form, France did not consider the renewal of the 
Triple Alliance compatible with the manifestations of Franco-Italian 
friendship demonstrated at Toulon or with the recent accords the 
two countries had concluded. It would not be sufficient for Prinetti 
to tell him the treaty was not aggressive and Italy only obliged 
to provide a third Power with military assistance If the latter 
were attacked by France, Barrere continued. For in response Barrere 
would only Inform the Ital Ian minister France held a differing opin-
ion. "War Is more often brought on," the French ambassador stated, 
"by the one who declares it. Such a disposition would thus con-
stitute an indirect threat to our security. 1144 To this Prlnettl 
had replied that he was aware of Barrere's meaning and in response 
would offer him two declarations: 
--first, the Italian Government would not renew the Triple 
Alliance before Its anticipated expiration; 
--second, If renewed It would contain, with regard to 
Italy, no clause of a nature to arouse France's 
suspicions that her security w~s threatened 
either directly or Indirectly. ~ 
' Barrere considered these formal assurances to be of the 
greatest importance, providing French policy with the support it 




lacked and which he had long been seeklng.46 Delcass~ lnvnedlately 
advised Tornlellt of Prlnettl 1 s declarations to Barrere, not only 
expressing deep appreciation for them but accepting them formally 
In the name of France!47 
Other efforts of Barrere now began to reach harbor as wel 1. 
As Prlnettl was del lverlng his declarations to Barre re on June 25, 
Russian Ambassador Nelldoff was having an Important conversation 
with Victor Emmanuel Ill. Nelidoff advised the Ital Ian monarch 
that the Russian Emperor believed Franco-Ital Ian rapport would be 
gravely compromised If any clauses remained in ltctly's alliance 
treaties which were contradictory to the ties of Interest and frlend-
shl p between the two peoples.48 Nel idoff later told Barrere his 
words appeared to leave a visible impression on the young sovereign.49 
The path on which Italy, under Prinettl, now definitively 
embarked was a questionable and controversial one. It Is also one 
for which both Prlnettl and Italian foreign policy In general have 
been severely criticized. Italy first became a participant In the 
Triple Alliance In 1882, the bitterness permeating her relations 
with France in that period contributing significantly to Ital Ian 
participation In the Germanic alliance.so Accordingly, several 
articles of the treaty did bear directly on Franco-Italian relations. 
Consequently, Barrere 1 s persistent attempts to safeguard France 
'f 
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against the possibility of Italian hostility was a very real prob-
lem confronting Prinetti. 
Article II of the original Trlpllce pact declared that if 
Italy were attacked by France without provocation, Germany and 
Austria would come to Italy's assistance. Italy, in turn, was 
obliged to go to the assistance of Germany if the latter were at-
tacked without provocation by France.51 Under the terms of Arti-
cle V, if the peace of any of the contracting parties were threat-
ened, they would counsel together as to military measures to be 
taken with a view to eventual cooperation. In case of war they en-
gaged not to conclude an armistice, peace, or treaty except by 
common agreement.52 
In 1887 the original treaty was renewed, supplemented by 
new German-Italian and Austro-ltalian agreements. Article Ill of 
the separate German-Ital Ian treaty stated that if France moved to 
extend her occupation, protectorate or sovereignty in North Africa 
and Italy considered herself obliged to undertake action In North 
Africa to protect her Mediterranean position, the ensuing state of 
war between Italy and France would constitute the casus foederis 
on Italy's demand with all the effects foreseen by Articles II and 
V of the treaty of 1882.53 
France had only a gdneral Idea of these treaty stipulations 
when Barrere and Prlnettl began the discussions that ultimately 
resulted in the Neutrality Accord of 1902. On the basts of 
51Prlbram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, 
I, 66-67. 
521bld., 67-69. 531bld., 112-13. 
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confidential infonnation Barrere had man2ged to gather he had pre-
pared a report for Delcass~ fn June of 1900 which permitted France 
to reconstruct certain clauses apparently contained Jn the Trlplice 
treaty. Barrere had remarked when submitting his findings that "one 
of the principal objects of interest to a French ambassador to Rome 
should be In piercing the mystery of an alliance pact which concerns 
us to such a high degree. 1154 As a result of his Investigations It 
was Barrere's conclusion that 
the Triple Alliance was defensive In character In the 
sense it only engaged the contractants tf one of the 
two was attacked, 
an attempt by a third Power to seize Tripoli would 
constitute a casus belli. On this basis he reasoned 
that the occupation of Tripoli could lend the Triple 
Alliance an offensive character, 
if Austria-Hungary expanded territorially to the East 
she was obliged, In turn, to give Italy territorial 
compensat I on, 
subject to parliamentary approbation, the contractants 
were assured of most-favored nation treatment. 
Admitting the Trlpltce's defensive character, Barrere was 
nonetheless convinced It was open to extremely broad Interpretation 
respecting the allies' obligations. He thought It doubtful, for 
Instance, that Italy would consider herself dispensed from her obli-
gations If France were provoked to a declaration of war. On the 
contrary, he thought nothing would prevent her from going beyond 
the text Itself if Italy juJged ft opportune to be associated in an 
attack against France. Barrere was even Inclined to believe the 
latter eventuality had been foreseen In the negotiation of annexed 
54 1 67 DDF , XV I , No. 1 • 
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military protocols, in a stipulation granting Italy the right of 
intervention in a Franco-German confl let despite the absence of a 
f d . 55 casus oe eris. 
On the basis of considerations such as these Barrere had 
concluded the Triple Alliance was essentially offensive in character 
. 56 
and should be modified i~ the interests of French security. His 
views were shared by France's Russian ally. French Ambassador to 
St. Petersburg, Adrien Montebello, wrote Oelcasse that Russian 
Foreign Minister, Count Vladimir Lamsdorff, also thought Italy 
should disassociate herself from all clauses directed against 
France. Information the Russian Government had gathered on the 
matter also led him to believe Victor Emmanuel was personally dis-
posed to act accordingly.57 
Italy, however, was admittedly In a difficult position. 
Great as her need of France's good will and assistance might be, 
the Triple Alliance provided security in other areas she consid-
ered equally vital to her wellbeing. Austro-ltal Ian antagonism 
probably posed the greatest threat once Franco-Ital Ian animosity 
gave way to the rapprochement of recent years. The tension derived 
from various sources: history, temperament, irredentism, rivalry 
for Albanian influence, commercial competition, disagreement over 
58 
an ultimr~e Balkans settlement. The antagonism was intensified 
55QQ.E2, II, Annex. 
f 
571bld., I, No. 176. 
58see W. C. Askew's "The Austro•ltallan Antagonism," in 
Power, Public Opinion and Diplomacy, ed. by Lillian Parker Wallace 
TDurham, 1959), pp. 172-227. 
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by strained relations between the ruling families of the two coun-
tries, lc:rgely the result of Emperor Franz Joseph's failure to re-
turn King Humbert's visit to Austria-Hungary in 1881. Here again 
the complexity of the still broader international framework was a 
major factor. It had been primarily papal opposition that prevented 
the Emperor from journeying to Rome. 
In a discussion of the papacy with Barrere In 1901, Prinettl 
acknowledged the existence of suspicions still directed against 
Frence as a supposed advocate of the re-establishment of papal tem-
poral power. Prinettl himself felt such allegations could no longer 
be taken seriously and should be directed more realistically to-
wards Austria-Hungary. Franz Joseph was seventy-four, the Ital Ian 
minister remarked, and Archduke Francis Ferdlnand--the heir apparent 
and an Intense clerlcal--was not as weak-willed as rumour had lt!59 
Nor did Prlnettl conceal his anxiety over the fate of the 
Ital ian-Austrlan corrmerclal treaty. Indications pointed to a re-
newal on terms far less advantageous to Italy. In a discourse be-
fore the Delegations on May 22, Austrian Foreign Minister Agenor 
Goluchowskt had opposed the Idea of subordinating political alli-
ances to considerations of a purely commercial order. 60 It was 
precisely In this area, of course, that Barrere repeatedly urged 
Delcass~ to exert his tnflu~nce and enhance France's position 
through a more adroit exploitation of the Italian market. 61 
59 2 1 DDF , I , No. 3 1 • 60 1old., No. 249, n. 1. 
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Prtnettl, as his predecessor Visconti Venosta, was also 
aware of changes on the International scene. The Franco-Russian 
alliance was ft rm, he reminded Barrere, and France's relations with 
Gennany had undergone profound modification. "We Ital tans also have 
great need of peace, 11 he added, "but that is not Incompatible with 
the defense of our own Interests •11 62 
It was on this twofold basis that Prlnettl was obviously 
proceeding. For Italian Interests were unmistakably centered around 
Tripoli. In July Prinetti suggested that in order to dissipate any 
remaining suspicions regarding France's disinterest in Tripoli, the 
Barrere-Vlscontt Venosta letters be made pub1 ic. 63 
Barrere•s one reservation to the disclosure was the effect 
this step might produce within the Ottoman Empire, although he felt 
such difficulties might be surmounted beforehand. The letter accords 
could be presented as a means of relieving Italian apprehensions 
over French Intentions In Tripoli, he told Delcass~. Viewed under 
this aspect they could be regarded as a guarantee for the integ-
rity of the Ottoman Empire. However Delcass~ was 1nltla11y opposed 
to the Idea of publication confined to the declaration on Tripoli. 
He was certain it would raise the question as well of why there had 
been no reciprocal assurances concerning Morocco, and in Delcasse's 
mind the moment was still inppportune for any Moroccan disclosures.64 
Barrere and Delcasse apparently continued their discussions of 
Prinettl's proposal tn Paris, where Barrere was expected towards 
the end of August.65 
621bld N 311 631b 01d., N 334 ., o. • o. • 
64 1bid., Annotation du Ministre. 651bid. 
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However, a crisis In Franco-Ital Ian relations developed 
at this time over Franco-Turkish conflict. On August 26, 1901, 
France severed diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. Turk-
ish failure to comply with the arrangements subsequently agreed on 
to resolve their difficulties led to a French naval demonstration 
against the Ottoman Empire and ultimate occupation of Mitylene.66 
The Franco-Turkish developments were extremely disturbing to Prinetti, 
who discussed his concern with Ambassadors Wedel and Passettl. Ac-
cording to Wedel, Prlnettl queried him as to what action Germany 
would be wl 11 ing to take under Article VI of the Triple Al 1 iance 
were France to encroach on Turkish territory. He saw, the Italian 
Minister told Wedel, only two alternatives: the allies could ques-
tion France In a friendly way as to her objectives, or Italy could 
demand compensation.67 
Barrere's explanation of the Mitylene occupation apparently 
satisfied Prinettl, who decided against taking any impulsive action 
in the presence of an only temporary French occupation. He told 
Barrere he had advised the Porte to comply with French demands for 
satisfaction and postponed a pending courtesy visit of the Italian 
fleet to Constantinople until the Incident was settled. Neverthe-
less, the Ital Ian minister Informed Barrere, if the occupation was 
prolonged to the point of becoming permanent, the French government 
66 1bid. Nos. 464, 474, 490; Camille Barrere, "Lettres a 
Delcasst§11 ,--p:-748. The problem originated with Delcass6's determi-
nation to obtain reparations due French citizens for property dam-
age during the 1895-'96 Armenian Massacres. Delcass4 was also 
determined to maintain the French religious protectorate in the 
Turkish Empire, threatened by the Porte. 
67PEA, XXI, No. 5167 lj6sqJ_. 
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should not be surprised if Italy were forced to investigate what 
action she might have to take to safeguard her own Mediterranean 
68 
Interests! 
Italian apprehensions were actually augmented by the addi-
69 
tional fear of a French occupation of Ghadames. In the pursuit of 
brigands operating in Tunisia, French troops had reportedly pene-
trated almost to the walls of this town located on Trlpol l's 
western border. In reporting Prlnetti's concern over these mil i-
tary operations, Barr~re reminded Delcasse that any entry of 
French soldiers to Ghadames,accidental or provisional, would pro-
voke a dangerous reaction In Italy. To preclude the possibll ity 
of any Incident, he asked De1casse to issue explicit and rigid 
instructions to the military, placating Prinettl In the Interim 
with assurances that France "would hardly destroy with one hand 
d d II 70 , what she ha un erwritten with the other. When Barrere con-
veyed Delcasse's confirmation of France's scrupulous respect for 
Tripolitan territory, Prlnettl accepted it with obvious appreciation. 
, 
Delcasse himself had exhibited a certain annoyance with 
Italian apprehensions over Tripoli, finding It "superfluous after 
so many declarations to repeat that the most precise and formal 
.. 71 instructions have been given to avoid any incursion into Ghadames. 11 
Barrere reminded him, however, that a segment of the Italian public 
68 2 ' 
.Q.Qf., I, Nos. 474, 506. 
69 tbid., Nos. 465, 473, 474, 490. 
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was still convinced of Italy's obligation to match any undertaking 
attempted by other Powers or face dishonor. France was considered 
most suspect In this regard, some Italians convinced the recent 
naval demonstrations had not been undertaken to obtain satisfaction 
from the Sultan; rather, France was in reality awaiting an oppor-
tune occasion to seize Tripolltania. Barrere observed that news 
of a Franco-Turkish settlement came as a great surprise to these 
individuals. Still he felt the diplomatic crisis Indicated the con-
siderable progress that had been made In Franco-Ital Ian relations 
In recent years and was of the opinion that before the rapprocre.ment 
a similar situation would have created an explosive situation in 
ltaly.72 
Once his alann over Mitylene and Tripoli had subsided, 
Prinetti expressed interest in resuming the discussion of a publica-
tion of the Barrere-Vtsconti Venosta accords. Prlnetti now pro-
posed relating the matter directly to Mitylene, Barrere reported 
to Delcasse. The Italian minister remarked to Barrere that It had 
been erroneously reported Italy tried to provoke a countermanlfes-
tatfon of the Triple Alliance In the East. He asked Barrere tf 
Delcasse could not have himself interpolated on that allegation. 
Prlnettl went on to suggest that the French minister could then 
respond with an assurance of the amlcal relations that existed be-
tween the two countries, lncflcatlng the concordance of their views. 
Prlnettl, in turn, would have himself Interpolated in the Ital tan 
Chamber and conflnn Delcasse's words in the same terms. To enhance 
his bargaining power, Prtnettt reminded Barrere the time was fast 
72 1btd., No. 490. 
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approaching in which Italy would be engaged in treaty discussions 
with her allies. The publicity on Trii:;.)11 "would to a degree 
facilitate what Barrere was seeklng. 11 73 
Despite his previous reluctance, Delcass~ agreed In late 
November to permit Prinettl to make the declaration. The pronounce-
ment was to follow an Ital fan parliamentary debate in which the 
Italian minister formally commented on the recent Franco-Turkish 
conflict.74 On this occasion, as in the past, Barrere resolved the 
differences of fonn and content both ministers initially proposed 
for the decl~ration.75 The final version read as follows: 
Proposed Declaration 
France's recent naval demonstration cannot arouse any 
susceptibility in Italy nor disturb the mutual confidence which 
has become the rule In the relations of the two governments. 
This confidence is all the firmer on our part since the Govern-
ment of the Republ le for some time has taken care to inform us 
that the Franco-English convention of March 21, 1899 marked for 
France, in relation to the countries and regions adjoining the 
eastern frontier of Its African possessions (notably the vllayet 
of Tripoli) a limit It does not intend to succeed, adding that 
neither does it intend to cut the caravan routes from Tri pol i 
into Central Africa. Since then the friendly relations of the 
two countries have become such that the two governments have 
been able to exchange explanations, as clear as satisfying, on 
their interests 1n the Mediterranean Sea. And these explana-
tions have led them to become aware of a perfect concordance 
ln their views of wbgt is of a nature to interest their res-
pective situations.7 
As arrangements were being finalized, Barrere also impressed on 
Delcass~ the necessity of the French minister's own official confir-
mation of Prinetti's statement. Delcass~ agreed to do this on the 
occasion of his next budgetary discussion.77 
731bid., No. 504. 74 1bid., No. 508. 
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The Prlnetti decl.ert,tion, mi''de on December 14, 1901, pro-
duced nn excellent impression In ft~ly. According to B~rrere 1 s ac• 
count of lt•~l 111-n re~ctlon, even the former Crlsplan papers expressed 
satisfaction with the evidence of a new Franco·ttallan relatlonshlp.78 
Barrere took advant~ge of the annual New Year's reception at the 
fnrnese Palace to heighten the effect of the declaration and to lend 
French support to Its authentlclty.79 The amb•ssador's address to 
the French colony on that occasion confirmed the significance of 
the rnpport cre~ted by the Berrere•Vlscontl Venosta letters, noting 
the perfect accord that had been est~blfshed between the two govern-
ments as well as the absence of ~ny conf1 let over Hedlterraneun 
questions. 
Oespl te the favorable press his 11ddress recel ved, Bo rr~re 
still considered It essential that Delcass6 confirm Prlnettl's 
st•:ttement, and prefer~1bly In the French Chamber.so In vlew of the 
hnportanee that was certnfn to att;ich to the French minister's dis· 
cotJrse, he o1so suggested several points he hoped Delcass• would 
Incorporate In his remarks. Among others, he wanted confl rmation 
of his own New Year's address In order to dlspel 1 any Impression 
the French Ambassador to Italy was not In complete ~gre.-nt with 
hls government on the matter.81 
781bad •• Mo. s6s, 11. Mo. 57. In his delivery, Prlnettl 
altered the eclaratlon slightly. retaining the Intent of the sta· 
t.,.nt although In stronger and more definite phraseology. 
79tbld., Nos. s, 19, 26, S7. 
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On January 21, 1902 Delcass~ made the declaration Barrere 
had been seeking. Barrere found it less than satisfactory, however, 
and told Delcass4 quite bluntly that in the opinion of the Italian 
press clrcumstances had called for a warmer and less reserved ap-
preciation of Franco-Italian rapport. It would serve French inter-
ests well, he added, if Delcass~ were to again allude to the decla-
ration in the upcoming Senate budget discussions. 82 
Barrere's diplomatic endeavors had been compromised in the 
meanwhile by a rather serious faux pas on the part of his superior. 
Oelcass~ had accorded the Glornale d 1 1talia 1 s Ugo Ojetti an inter-
view which appeared in Le Temps on January 7, 1902. The interview 
touched on Franco-Italian interests In the Mediterranean, including 
France's desire for the maintenance of the status quo. When Ojettl 
made the observation that Italy also supported the status quo for 
Albania, Delcass~ had responded with the remark that France and 
Italy could only agree In the Balkans as well. Alluding to the 
sharing of friends, he unwisely added, "What Power better than Rus-
sia could understand and cooperate with Ital Ian Interests In the 
Balkan pentnsula? 11 83 
Reverberations were instantaneous, Ambassador Reverseaux 
reporting that Austrian Foreign Minister Goluchowski found the inter-
view so Incredible he could only conclude it was pure invention. 84 
f 
Barrere immediately requested authorization to make a fonnal denial 
of Delcasse's remarks on Albania, advising the French minister at 
831bld., No. 10, n. 1. 
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the same time that any reference to the subject in the French 
Chamber would cause Prinetti grave embarrassment. However, the 
denial Delcasse subsequently Issued was apparently satisfactory to 
Pri nett i. 85 
At this point the obvious concern of both Barrere and 
Prlnettl to make a public declaration of French disinterest In 
Tri pol f does raise the question of their specific objectives. The 
motivation underlying Barrere's continuous efforts to secure Del -
casse's approval for the action appears quite clear: the French 
ambassador hoped in this way to lead Prinetti along a path that 
would compel him to harmonize Italy's alliances with her newly-
established relationship with France.86 
Certain ambiguities present themselves, however, in a con-
sideration of Prinetti's objectives. His recurring admonitions to 
Barrere that only a revelation of the Mediterranean accords would 
f~cil itate negotiation of a revised Triple Alliance do not accord 
with the evidence contained In the German diplomatic documents. 87 
Perennial Ital tan Interest in Tripoli would, of course, have colored 
Prlnettf 's thinking. And Barrere's reports do reveal the enthu-
siasm with which both the Italian and French declarations were re-
ceived by the Ital Ian press, statesmen and general public. 88 In 
this sense the declaration unquestionably consolidated Prtnetti 1 s 
' 
position in various political circles where he sorely lacked sup-
port.89 Yet, objectively, there was no genuine need for publication 
85 I b Id., No. 8, 9, 16, 25 • 
86 Ibid., Annex . 
88ooF2 , I J No. 565; 11, No. 57. 
87Below, pp. 113-15. 
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of the accord. In the first place, the Ital Ian government would 
never have permitted Prlnettl to launch a Trfpolltan enterprfse.90 
Nor can the publication be considered essential as a means of ob-
taining additional Power support for Ital Ian Mediterranean ambi-
tions. Diplomatic documents reveal that even before December 14 
Prlnettl began divulging the contents of the accord In far more de-
tal 1 than was contained Jn the highly generalized declaration made 
before the Ital Ian Chamber.91 Furthermore, the pressure Germany 
exerted on England to Improve her relations with Italy, in conjunc-
tion with the confidential discussions In which Prinetti began to 
engage Lord Currie at this time, would appear to have been far more 
effective in eliciting the English declaration of disinterest ac-
tually obtained In March, 1902.92 
Whatever the Ital Ian minister hoped to achieve, Barr~re's 
diplomatic skills were more than adequate In safeguarding his own 
objectives from the dangers inherent In Prinett1 1 s dubious tactics. 
The developments which led to the conclusion of the Franco-Ital Ian 
Neutrality Accord in 1902 reveal the measure of the two diplomats. 
90Decleva, Da Adua a Sarajevo, p. 159. 
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Nos. 352, "fil. Included In the "list of sins" German Ambassador 
to London Metternich Informed Lord Lansdowne England had committed 
against Italy, Lord Salisbury's and British Ambassador Currie's 
negligence figured prominently. This position refutes somewhat 
the Decleva assumption that Prlnetti's insistence on obtaining a 
public statement of the accords derived from his desire to obtain 
analogous guarantees from Germany and Great Britain. See Decleva, 
Da Adua a SaraJevo, pp. 158-60. See below, p. 113. 
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By late December concern over the renewal of the Triple 
Allfance had became quite marked, not only In France and Italy but 
on the part of Germeny and Austria as well .93 Chancellor von BUiow 
drew pub1 tc attention to Germany's Interest In his Refchstag address 
on January 8. Touching on the question of the Trlp11ce and Italy's 
role tn the alliance, he Insisted that since the treaty was exclu· 
slvely defenslve--the Franco-Ital fan Mediterranean Accord was In 
no way contrary to the Triple Alliance. He emphasized the point 
with his now classic comment: "In a happy marriage the husband 
doesn't become overly distraught If his wife has an Innocent waltz 
w I th some one e 1 se • .,94 P rf vate 1 y, Ge nneny was not reg a rd Ing the 
mc1tter with the same serenity. 
Although Visconti Venosta had Indicated France and Italy 
were exchanging views with regard to Tripoli In 1900, he had not 
Informed Germany of the terms of the actual accord once It was 
concluded.95 BUlow, by his own admission. knew only the grandes 
1tgnes of the agreement.96 German apprehension mounted when 
Prlnettl began to gradually disclose the specific contents of the 
Barr~re-Vlscontl Venosta letters. Despite an officially benign 
attitude, BU1ow considered the agreement extre,,.ly dangerous.97 
93ooF2 , 11, Nos. 19, 23. 26, 27. 
94.J.lLJ.J!., No. 17. f 
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continued to affirm his intention of adhering to the declarations 
he had already given regarding the non-aggressive nature of Italy's 
treaty obligations as they pertained to France.98 From France's 
paint of view It was well Barr~re continued to urge Delcass6 to lose 
no opportunity of holding the Italian minister to his commltments.99 
German Foreign Counsellor Holstein's observation may provide the 
most revealing description of the path on which the Italian minister 
now set out. "Italy wants to go In search of booty, 11 Holstein 
noted, "and then to make the booty secure and protect it against 
anyone--even France--by the canons of the Triple Alllance. 11100 
On December 26 Prlnettl Informed German Ambassador Wedel 
of his readiness to sacrifice France's friendship to the Triple 
Alliance, declaring at the same time he would never sacrifice the 
Triple Alliance to the friendship of France! 101 The following week 
Wedel reported that Prlnettl had indicated his desire to proceed 
to a renewal of the Trlpllce as soon as Italy's commercial relations 
with her German allies could be satisfactorily regulated. The 
Italian minister confided that he had a completely free hand, hav-
ing given Barr~re no more than a promise the treaty would contain 
nothing aggressive against France. In view of his pacific Inter-
pretation of the treaty's base, Wedel expressed some surpi·ise at 
Prinettl's remark. Prtnettf then went on to say he had only spoken 
98ooF2 , 11, No. 99. 
991bld., Nos. 28, 99, 133, 143. 
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as he did in order to calm Barrere, whose concern the Italian 
minister attributed to a probable knowledge of the military accords. 
Although Prinettl himself was unacquainted with the protocols, he 
had no Intention of familiarizing himself with them, he explained, 
so he could continue declaring he had no knowledge of their con-
tents. When Wedel then remarked on the superfluousness of the mil-
itary accords in themselves, their application subordinate to the 
condi~ion of a French attack, Prinetti reminded Wedel It was also 
true the treaty itself could not be revealed to France! The Italian 
minister then suggested that since he had given Barrere "his word 
of honor" the treaty contained nothing aggressive against France, 
a preamble might be attached which could be made public and in 
which the allies would confirm the purely defensive nature of the 
a 11 i ance • 102 
It is quite significant, In view of his repeated declara-
tions to France, that Prlnetti himself exhibited no interest in 
suppressing Article II of the treaty. It was Article II of course, 
by which an isolated French attack against Germany or Italy suf-
ficed to put the three Triplice allies in action. Barrere consid-
ered this aspect of the Triple Alliance a sword pointed at France's 
heart. 103 However, as BUlow assessed the sltuation--if Article II 
were suppressed while Article Ill, pertaining to an attack of 
~ 
several powers against one of the contracting parties, were main-
tained, Italy would be the loser. A guarantee against the isolated 
1021bld., No. 5223 [271]. 
103ooF2 , 11, No. 168. 
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aggression, or its threat, by France had far more practical value 
to Italy than Germany.104 
Germany, of course, had no Intention of playing Prfnettl's 
game, and the Ital Ian minister was informed that if Italy under-
took any action in Tripoli ft would be in violation of Article IX 
of the Tri pl ice treaty whereby she pledged to maintain the status 
quo in Tripoli. Under the circumstances Germany would not recog-
nize the existence of a casus foederls and Italy would find herself 
outside the protection of the Triple Alliance. 105 
There appears to be little doubt that Barrere•s activities 
exercised a decisive influence in shaping the German line that 
noticeably hardened In this period. Barrere figures significantly 
in the German diplomatic documents between December, 1901 and 
February, 1902. 
On December 17 German Foreign Secretary Richthofen made note 
of the Influence attributed Barrere by Ital Ian Ambassador Lanza and 
British Charg6 d'Affalres Buchanan.106 That same day German Ambas-
sador Wedel was commenting at length on Barrere's tactics in a re-
port to BUlow. The ambassador's clever manoeuvres to draw France 
2nd Italy closely together had been preoccupying the Italian press, 
Wedel wrote, and It was said Barrere had assumed his role four years 
earlier convinced he would sbon be able to draw Italian policy into 
France's current. Despite this unwarranted optimism, Wedel continued, 
104PEA, XX I, No. 5227 j571~ • 
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Barrere had not succumbed to discouragement but adopted an atti-
tude of vent, vtdl, vicl and began to court the Italians with 
painstaking attention and political affability. Wedel considered 
Barr~re's termination of the Franco-Italian tariff war to be the 
first pillar in the bridge he was erecting to reunite France and 
Italy. And since the visit of the Italian fleet to Toulon, the 
German ambassador remarked, France had seized every opportunity to 
demon:.>trate consideration and amiability towards Italy. She sup-
ported her credit, enticed her with more favorable commercial re-
lations, and with the Mediterranean agreement had alleviated much 
of the Italian mistrust that originated in Italy's anxiety over 
Tripoli. l07 
BUlow himself was becoming Increasingly aware of how ef-
fectively B2rrere was Influencing Ital Ian foreign pollcy.108 He 
wrote Wedel tn early January regarding what he termed "M. Barrere's 
campaign to suppress Article II of the Triple Alliance. This role 
of adviser to Prlnetti in the formulation of a new treaty," BUlow 
commented, "Is of a nature to Increase our prudence. 11109 Since 
BUlow felt Barrere's concern derived less from the possibility of 
c: future Franco-German than Franco-Italian confl let, he considered 
it imperative to know If and under what circumstances Germany could 
count on Italy's support tn case of war. 
1071bld., No. 5203 Ll83~ • 
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On January 12 BUlow summoned Lanza to a meeting In which 
he informed the Italian ambassador that Germany was ready to renew 
the Triple Alliance but only on two conditions: Italy had to de-
clare she had concluded no accords with any other state which, of 
their nature, could compromise the defensive efflcocy of the Triple 
Alliance; the treaty was to remain unchanged In all aspects relat-
ing to Germany. He could not escape the impression, BUlow added, 
that Prinettl was too weak and trusting with regard to Barrere.110 
By the end of February Barrere was being referred to as 
"our principal adversary. 111 1 l The chancellor wrote Emperor 
William II that in Prlnettt's discussions with Wedel on the all I-
ance renewal the expression recurred on several occasions, stripped 
of any pretense, "Barrere wants this or he doesn't want that." 
Acceding to Barrere 1 s wishes, BUlow remarked, \\Ould leave the al-
liance directed solely, or at least principally against Russia. 
And from Barrere 1 s point of view, he added, that would probably 
be the best way of convincing the Russians that Germany nourished 
the darkest designs against her.112 
Prinetti, for hts part, had informed Wedel of his readiness 
to proceed to imnedlate renewal of the Trlpltce on January 12. He 
was willing to leave the treaty essentially unchanged, although he 
did hope to secure the preamble he had requested, a favorable com-
' 
merclal treaty and some modification with regard to the Balkans. 11 3 
l lOlbid., No. 5234 [511 s and 585:Q) • 
l l l 1bid., No. 5280 ~1271. 
112 1bid., No. 5272 ~0181 • 
1131bld., No. 5241 ~1181 • 
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By January 22 Prinetti had not only abandoned the idea of a 
pre2mble, the question of France no longer entered 1nto subsequent 
negotiations wtth any stgniftcance.114 
Barrere, in the meanwhile, continued to assume ft would be 
possible for Prinetti to obtain the treaty revisions he considered 
essential for France's security. His convictions In this regard 
had been strengthened by the support he bel teved they were also 
accorded by Messrs. Rudtnt, Luzzattl, Zanardelll, Glol ittl and 
Sann i no. 115 
On March 20, as Barrere had urged, Oelcasse again alluded 
to the excellence of Franco-Ital tan rapport tn an address before 
the French Senate. Barrere had been Involved in the preparation of 
that portion of the text relating to Franco-Italian rapport and 
also insisted an article be Inserted in the Journal de Debats to 
provoke comment on Delcasse's declaration by the French press. 116 
The address was so well received in Italy, Barrere reported, it put 
a campaign in motion to continue the consolidation of future Franco-
ltaltan rapport.117 
A few days later Prinetti informed Barrere that at BUlow's 
request he planned on meeting the chancellor during the l~tter's 
brief vacation in Venice. 118 According to Wedel it was actually 
1141bid., Nos. 5248 l5720J, 5283 /_572~, 5312 1_?73qi, 
5326 12_732.1 -;-5329 I ~74Ql , 5331+ [I74.!J , 5341 [}74~ • 
115 2 76 A DDF, II, No. , nnex. 
1161 b Id • , Nos • 14 3, 15 8, n. 1 • 
117 Ibid., Nos • 159, 181 • l 1 81 b id • , No. 168. 
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Prlnettl who had requested the meeting. 11 9 Barrere replied th2t 
he thought such an encounter was not only indicated but necessary, 
since ft would require Prlnettl to examine the new conditions 
underlying Italy's ties with Germany. He would say no more, Bar-
rere added, since he regarded Italy as a friend with whom It was 
no longer necessary to take precautions. At that Prlnettl again 
reassured Barrere of his fidelity to the declarations he had pre-
viously extended. There was no agreement between him and BUlow, 
the Italian minister stated, and he would "sign nothing tn the 
future that France could consider contrary to the bonds of friend-
ship uniting us or as a direct or Indirect threat to her secu-
rfty.11120 Although Prlnettl now Indicated It would probably not 
be possible to modify the actual text of the Trlpllce treaty, he 
told Barrere thClt "what she has the right to preoccupy herself 
with and consider hostile Is not in the treaty but tn the acts that 
a re annexed to 1 t. These must fa 11 and d 1 sappea r • 11 121 
In his report of the Prfnettl conversation Barrere Indi-
cated that, In his opinion, the door had been opened for negotia-
tion and an entente. And as he remarked to Delcasst!, "We at least 
119PEA, XXI, No. 5312 l.273~. 
120ooF2 , 11, No. 168. 
121 Ibid., No. 168, ~nnex. Victor Enwnanuel 111 had "been 
freed" of the'Obltgatfon of providing Germany with mllttary assis-
tance In the event of war In March, 1901. PEA, XX, No. 4966 ~82~ . 
It would appear the King hoped In this way tol>e free to tell 
France the Triple Alliance contained no offensive clauses di-
rected against her. By September, 1902, however, Ital Ian Chief of 
Staff Saletta spoke with his German colleagues as tho';!9h the mili-
tary convention was In effect. Ibid., XXI, No. 5426 l_2825]. 
Ital Ian Foreign Minister Tlttont;-Tn 1908, told the Russian ambas-
sador the military convention had been al}owed to lapse when the 
Triple Alliance was renewed In 1902. DDF , XI, No. 560. 
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have some th t ng to se 11 . . • st nee I ta 1 y accord t ng to the terms of 
the Notes [!arrere-Vlscontl Venost~ ••. can try nothing In Tri-
pol I without French consent.122 Barrere therefore suggested that 
when Delcass~ next spoke with Tornlelll he make? point of allud-
ing to Prlnettl's words and indicate that only the execution of the 
promises made could assure Franco-Ital Ian relations a long and fe-
cund future. 123 
When Prinettl returned to Rome at the end of March he told 
Barrere nothing definitive had been accomplished In Venice, the 
conversations centering on the pacific nature of the Triple Alli-
ance and the commercial treaty. In BUlow's report of the encounter 
Prtnettl had asked to discuss the modifications of the treaty he 
sought "in an academic manner. 11 124 Prlnetti, on the other hand, 
told Austrian Ambassador, Marius Pasettl, he had informed the Ger-
man chancellor he would refuse any pledges ''of a nature to menace 
the tranquil 1 lty and security of France. 11125 Barrere's own impres-
sion was that the meeting had been indecisive, Prlnettf lacking the 
courage to raise the question of modifying the clause France con-
sidered objecttonable.126 
Despite Prfnettl's repeated misrepresentations to Barrere 
of the Tri pl ice's character vis-a-vis France, Barrere still 
122ooF2, 11, No. l 6~, Annex. 
1231bid., Nos. 168, 180, Annex. 
124PEA, XXI, No. 5326 l27~ · 
125ooF2, No. 1 80) n. 2. 
1 2 6 I b i d • , Nos • 1 81 , 19 3 • 
--
121 
considered modification of the tredty to be lmperative.127 ·He 
urged Delcass~ to remind Tornlelll, on every possible occasion, 
that he was most anxious to learn Italy's intent In the matter of 
the treaty-renewal •128 This Delcass~ did on April 24, emphasizing 
his concern with a reference to various Berlin and Vienna publica-
tions that had begun to affirm the treaty's forthcoming renewal 
without modlfication. 129 The admonition proved highly effective. 
On April 28 Prlnetti conceded the val ldlty of France's objections 
to certain clauses In the Triple Al 1 lance, particularly to that 
which had become most disturbing to Barr~re--provocatlon of war by 
a Power not actually declaring it. Prlnetti told Barrere that 
when the time came for definitive conversations, he would be pre-
pared to leave no doubt on the limits of the obligations binding 
Italy. Barrere thought Prlnettl's remarks might well be the point 
of departure for a secret accord and advised Delcass~ not to mention 
the matter to Tornlellt .130 
A few days later Prinettl again unequivocally affirmed to 
Bsrrere that France was not named in the treaty of the Triple Alli-
ance and that only the annexes were of concern to her. However 
when Barrere again raised the question of Italy's position In a war 
against France that had been provoked by one of the Triplice allies, 
Prinetti replied that the moment for such discussion had not yet 
arrived, although he had every intention of explaining himself to 
Barrere and reaching conclusions on this question of provocation. 
An actual modification of the treaty text presented lnsunnountable 
1271btd., No. 194. 
129.1 bid., No. 218. 
ll81btd., No. 209. 
l30lbld., No. 224. 
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difficulties, the Italian minister continued. Among other interests 
to be safeguarded, Italy's commercial needs and her relationship 
with Austria precluded her leaving the Triple Allicince. Neverthe-
less, he anticipated being able to provide solutions which would 
completely satisfy France and be compatible with the most intimate 
relations between the two countries.131 Prinetti then admitted the 
Triple Allicnce was about to be renewed and suggested he and Barrere 
arrange for discussions on the future of Franco-Ital tan relations. 
It was his Intent, Barrere informed Delcass6, to request 
a protocol defining the rapports and reciprocal pacific Intentions 
of the two countries. This protocol: 
would engage them to refrain from attacking each other, of 
not participating In any aggression on the part of one or 
several Powers against one of the contractants, of not con-
sidering as ag2_r"esslve on the part of the contractants the 
[Jacuna in text.J manifest provocation, the abandonment of 
military protocols and other agreements of the same sort 
concerning us and envisaging war with us. 
Under this form the protocol would be directed towards England as 
wel 1 as Germany. 1.n Barrere's judgment It would provide France 
with all she hoped for.132 
Barrere also thought the moment opportune for encouraging 
Russian attentions to Italy and thus offset Austrian inferences 
that Influence In the Balkans was a matter of concern to only 
Austria-Hungary and Russta.f He thought as well It would be advan-
tageous to encourage a trip by Victor Enrnanuel Ill to Russia. The 
contact with Emperor Nicholas might counter Germanic Influences on 
the young monarch.133 
1 31 Ibid • , No • 225 • 132 I b Id., No. 235. l331bid. 
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Although Prtnettl was now encountering considerable diffi-
culties with Austria-Hungary In the negotiation of the Triplice 
renewal, responding to a budgetary interpolation in the Italian 
Chamber on Hay 23, he finally affirmed its forthcoming renewal . 134 
In a brief declaration he stated that the treaty was pacific and 
defensive in nature, containing no protocol or convention directed 
against France which could be considered in opposition to the excel-
lent relations Italy enjoyed with her Latin sister and hoped to de-
velop still further.135 
On Hay 24 Barr~re and Prtnetti completed their draft of a 
proposed bilateral declaration which Barrere took to Parts for 
discussion with Delcass~.136 Delcass~ then wired Charg6 d 1Affalres 
Legrand In Rome that the declaration was basically acceptable and, 
as prearranged, Prinettl could instruct Tornielli to proceed to 
transmit it to him formally in Parisl37 However, Tornielli consid-
ered the declaration to be so dangerous he refused to submit it be-
fore June 4, delaying communication until Prinetti again directed 
him to do so.138 On June 4 Torniell i read Delcass~ his handwritten 
1341btd., Nos. 222, 225, 262; PEA, XXI, Nos. 5332 l_?7~, 
5336 I s14]:---
135Prtnetti read the declaration to the German and Austrian 
?mbassadors prior to its delivery. PEA, XXI, No. 5369 LS76]J. 
According to French Charge d'Affaires Prinet it was well received 
in German papers, although the Gazette de Voss conmented that If 
the Italians simply wanted'an innocent waltz they had nothing to say; 
if they hoped to serve two masters, they would be creating an in-
decisive situation in ioternational relations of which they would be 
the first victims. DOF2, II, N. 267. 
136 ODF2, II, Nos. ~35, 263, 269, Annex. The proposed decla-
ration is reproduced in DOF, II, No. 263 and as Appendix I I I. 
1371bid., Nos. 269, 271, Annex. 
1381btd., Nos. 277, 278, 293, Annex. Legrand attributed 
copy of the declaration, which the French minister personally 
copied and retalned.139 
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Barrere then returned to Rome and resumed negotiation of 
the formal Neutrality Accord that was to follow the presentation 
of the declaration. Before a final text was agreed on, the preli-
minary draft was subjected to a number of revisions. Direction 
Pollttque had objected to a limited duration of time In the document--
five years for example-·on the grounds that It would pennlt Italy 
to become France's African neighbor regardless of the political re-
lations existing between the two countries at the time of expira-
tion. They therefore suggested the same duration apply as was ac-
corded under the earlier Mediterranean arrangements. Slnee Delcass6 
feared Italy would object to this change and compromise the nego-
tiations, Direction Polltlque proposed Instead an addition to the 
last paragraph. The statement "confonnlng to the spt rlt of the 
letter addressed by H. Barrere In the Visconti Venosta Ministry 
December 14, 1900, 11 was to be added after the words "which has a 
definitive character." Such a change would Indicate French conces-
sions with regard to Tripoli were accorded because of the friendly 
relations that had been established between France and Italy. Del-
cass6 subscribed to this view, and asked Barrere to have It Incor-
porated In the final draft, along with the stipulation that the du-
ration of the accord be at least equal to that of the Trlpllce.140 
Tornlelll's resistance to his lack of belief tn France's basic sin-
cerity. Barrere traced the hostility to the ambassador's conviction 
that France "was sworn to Imminent revolution." He warned Delcass.!, 
as he had In the past, to be on his guard with Tornlelll. 
l391bld., No. 277. 
1401bld., Nos. 291, 292. 
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Delcasse also Insisted on coupling the term 11 honor11 with "'security" 
in the paragraph relating to a declaration of war. He suggested 
another change In wording as well to avoid creating the impression 
that prior communication of Intent was given In order to "permit" 
the other contractant to assume a judgment of legitimate defense. 141 
Prlnettl was willing to accept France's formula on provoca-
tion but did insist on giving the declarations the form of a letter 
exchange as had been the case with the Mediterranean Accord. He 
told Barrere the King was extremely anxious to avoid any appearance 
of having negotiated a counter-treaty.1 42 Barrere acceded to this 
request, Insisting, In turn, that the signatures be exchanged be-
fore the end of the month; Prlnettl and Victor Emmanuel had both 
exhibited a reluctance to simultaneously sign the declaration and 
Triple Alliance renewal .143 It was also agreed that Italy would 
take the initiative in the letter exchange. Prinettl, In the name 
of the Ital tan government, would Incorporate the declarations In 
a letter to Barr~re. Its counterpart would be Barrere's letter to 
Prtnettl, reproducing the same declaration.144 Oelcasse consented 
to the concession on form In exchange for signature of the accord 
prior to the end of month.145 
Since the accord was to remain in force as long as Italy's 
actual International agreements were not modified, Delcasse con-
' 
stdered it essential that the accord stipulate France was to be 
141 lbtd., No. 291 • 142 1bid., No. 300. 
l431bid., Annex. 1441btd., No. 303. 
1451btd., No. 305. 
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informed of any modification tn Italy's alliances. He also wished 
further clartflcatton of the phrase relating to provocatlon.1 46 
Barrere hed foreseen this latter objection and already discussed It 
with Prlnettl. Prlnettl's understanding of provocation, Barrere re-
ported to Delcass6, was that It had to result from direct relations 
between the provoked and provoker, such as were Involved tn Fashoda, 
the publication of the Ems Dispatch, King William's refusal to re-
ceive Benedetti, and the Schnaebe16 Incident. The Hohenzollern 
candidacy, on the other hand, was not. Since Prlnettl had promised 
to send Barrere a letter expressing his full interpretation of the 
term, Barrere felt Delcass6's desires in the matter were fully met. 147 
The Barrere-Prtnettl letters, which were essentially a 
neutrality accord, were signed on June 30, 1902, two days after the 
renewal of the Triple All iance.148 Barrere's concern in pressing 
for the early conclusion was based on his fear of German interven-
tion. He wrote Delcass6 that he had been under very close observa-
tion and, although unable to divine the truth, German suspicions 
were obviously aroused and considerable pressure exerted on Pri-
netti .149 The observation was accurate. Wedel, for Instance, had 
been Instructed by BUlow to act on Prlnettl and set the tone of the 
Ital tan press. 110ur gracious Sovereign will be following the mani-
festation of the principal organs of this press with extreme In- I 
terest, 11 the chancellor noted In his dispatch to the Rome ambassador.1sli 
1461btd., Nos. 311, 312. 1471btd., No. 312. 
1481bld., Nos. 311, 313. 149tbld., No. 316. 
150PEA, XXI, No. 5396 ~7741. 
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BUlow had instructed Ambassador Lanza, in turn, to warn Prinetti 
to be on guard against France, whose "good conduct marked hidden 
motives. 11 151 
The Barrere-Prfnettl letters deliberately opened with a 
reference to the reciprocal Franco-Italian positions In Morocco 
and Tri pol I •152 As Barrere commented, it was not without reason 
Italy associated this question with her interpretation of the Triple 
All lance. She hoped tn that way to justify her Interpretation of 
the Trlpl ice, signifying the Importance she attached to a regula-
tion of French and Ital tan Interests in the Mediterranean. It was 
a vital emphasis In her subsequent guarantees to France In the even-
tual lty of a Franco-German confllct.153 
On July 11, Prlnetti responded to Barr~re•s written request 
for a more precise Interpretation of Italy's understanding of the 
term "direct provocation" employed In the declaratlons.154 The 
letter confirmed the verbal Interpretation Prlnettl had previously 
conveyed.· 
Delcass~ took advantage of a Chamber interpolation on July 3 
to again allude to the excellent rapport existing between France 
and Italy. Referring to a certain concern France had experienced 
1 51 DD F2 , I I , No • 31 6 • 
~ 
1521bld., No. 329. The Barrere-Prfnetti letters are re-
produced In Appendix IV. On their dating, see below, p. 151, n. 4. 
1 5 3 I b f d • , Annex • 
1541btd., Nos. 329 340. These letters are reproduced fn 
Appendix IV---wfth the Barr~re-Prinett1 letters. 
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when announcement was made of the Trlpllce renewal, the foreign 
minister remarked that the preoccupation had not been of long du-
ration: 
••. the Government of the King having taken care itself 
to clarify and settle the situation. And the declarations 
which have been given us have permitted us to acquire the 
certitude that the policy of Italy, in consequence of its 
al 1 lances, ts directed neither directly nor ind I rectly 
against France; that It could tn no Instance be construed 
as a menace to us, either under a diplomatic form or through 
protocols or under International military stipulations; and 
that in no event, or under any form, can Italy become either 
the lnstf~~nt or the ally to any aggression against our 
country. 
Barrere reported that the declaration met with great success In 
ltaly. 156 Even Tornlelll conveyed Prinettl's fonnal appreclatlon.157 
However, Tornlellt was also responsible for what Barr~re 
regarded as the one Jarring Incident surrounding the achievement 
of the 1902 accord. Marcel Hutln published an interview In the 
July 13 Echo de Paris entitled "Le Roi d' Ital le et la Tripllce. 11 
In this Interview with Tornlelll, the ambassador--whose Identity 
was unquestionable although not speclfied--stated that the Triple 
Alliance had been renewed unchanged. Hutin drew the Inevitable 
conclusion that there could be no doubt at all If France were to 
declare war on Germany, Italy would march against her. 158 Prfnettl 
attempted to excuse Torniellf on the grounds the ambassador had 
been misunderstood or misquoted. He also justified the indiscretion 
on the bas ls of Torn t e 11 i 's' i gno ranee of deve 1 opments which had 
taken place between France and Italy In recent months. However the 
l55lbid., No. 324, n. l. 
l571bld., No. 324. 
1561bid., Nos. 320, 326. 
15 8 f b id • , No • 3 32 , n • l . 
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Quai d'Orsay considered It highly Improbable Tornlelll was unin-
fonned~ 159 
Despite his dim view of the Echo interview, Barrere was 
well satisfied with the 1902 accord. Prior to its negotiation, he 
observed, an access of jealousy or bad humour sufficed to dispose 
lt2ly to listen to the suggestions of Fr~nce's adversaries and to 
interpret or modify her alliances In a sense dangerous to Frcnce. 
He felt the Neutrality Accord made that impossible. Italy's obliga-
tion to notify France of any modification of the Triple Alliance 
would appear to make It difficult for her to modify it to France's 
detriment. The accord also supposed, by its wording, that France 
was familiar with at least that part of the Tripllce concerning 
France. Italy, in avowing It, would automatically be suspect of 
having divulged the tenns of the Triple Alliance. Barrere consi-
dered, further, that the Italian government would have to look twice 
before placing herself in a situation where she would alienate 
France's friendship. To do so would place her under the dominance 
of her allies, without France for counterweight, and under condi-
tions worse than they had previously been since Italy no longer 
found powerful support from England. 160 It was also Barrere•s 
159tbld., No. 349. Visconti Venosta had also Inferred 
Tornielli wB"SU"naware of the transaction of the 1900 Mediterranean 
accords. Serra's research ln the Visconti Venosta archives prove 
this was not the case. C. ffarrere e l'lntesa, p. 134. 
160ooF2 , 11, Annex. Italy did receive assurance of British 
dlslnterest--rn Tripoli on March 2, 1902. However, Lord Lansdowne 
refused to give Prinettt the type of declaration he initially re-
quested, limiting English assurances to 11 ••• no aggresstve_or 
ambitious designs ••• maintenance of the status quo .•. ~uch, 
if altered to b~ in confonnity with Italian Interests •.. 11 
The statement gives no indication of renewed Anglo-Italian rapport, 
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conviction that the declarations on Morocco and Tripoli lo~t none 
of their interest for France as long as she had not definitively 
established her dominion over the Cherlfien territory.l6l 
Barrere summed up the accomplishments of the accords in a 
letter to Delcasse. In his view they left France ready to attend 
to the defense of her national interests in full security and safe 
from all men0ce. She was freed from all possible coalition against 
her in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, maktng It possible for her 
to develop her legitimate influence in Morocco. She was also assured 
the security of her alpine border. And in no way to be underesti-
m2ted, he ?dded, there was the psychologic2l lift the new relation-
ship with Italy afforded. "Yesterdciy, 11 he wrote, "we were con-
demned to Impotence; today we ccn s pe?k and act." l 62 
Italy was also content. Under the terms of the Barrere-
Prinetti letters, prior French initiative in Morocco was no longer 
a prerequisite for her own action in Tri pol I. The accord secured 
her more irrmediate benefits as well. 
Italy had long sought the entry of her bonds on the Paris 
Bourse. Prior to the signature of the 1902 accord, Barrere h;:1d 
2dvised their admission only when Franco-lt2lian pol itlcal relations 
comparable to that existing prior to the 1890 1 s. It would appear, 
in f?ct, thnt Britain's ~ssurance of disinterest was l~rgely the 
result of Prinetti's disclosure of the Barrere-Visconti Venosta 
letters of 1900. BO, I, Nos. 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 
359, 360. For a dTtfering interpretation see Andrew, Th6ophile 
Delcasse and the Entente Cordiale, pp. 188-89. 
161 ooF2, II, Annex. 
162camille Barrere, 11Lettres a Oelcasse 11 , p. 753. 
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h0d been definitively concluded. ~hen Prlnetti had bro?ched this 
question on June 26, Bc-irrere informed him there would be no dif-
ficulty in the m2tter cfter the decler?tions under negotiation 
were signed. July 1, 1902 Barrere flCcordingly requested announce-
ment to be made that Ital Ian bonds were being admitted to the Paris 
Bourse. Significantly, he wished the announcement to be made through 
the Rome Emb~ssy, not through Ant>~ssodor Tornfellt. In November 
Prlnettt and Ital Ian Treasury Minister di Brogl lo then requested 
odmltt~nce of new 3 1/2 per cent bonds to the Bourse as well. Ber· 
r~re repl led that the French FlnAnce Ministry would grant authori-
2atlon provided none were entered before the beginning months of 
the coming year. In this way Barrere adhered to the principles he 
had previously enunciated to De1cass6: the financial operations 
Italy envisaged with France became~ reAllty once a po11tlce1 r?p-
prochement had been effected between the two count des. 163 
With the conclusion of the Neutral tty Accord B~rrere had 
re2llzed the objective he set out to uccompltsh, ~nd which he had 
described so prophetlc<"lly to Delcess~ in December, 1900. "In., 
ye?r and one-h?lf I will h2ve ?ccompltshed here ~1\ th~t rem~tns 
to me ~s Important bust ness, 11 he wrote nfte r the Medi te rraneen Ac-
cord had been concluded. 0 There remflln now only the all t.?nces ." 
Eighteen months later he h~d lndeed'~xtrlcrted from hts post all 
the t'lllurtng work of great atplomacy It Ci'n provlde. 11 164 
163Q!>_[2, II, No. 483. 
l64Barrere n Delcass~, December 30, 1900, AAE, PB, V. 
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CHAPTER V 
' BARRERE AND THE 
FRANCO-ITALIAN RAPPROCHEMENT 
When Camille Barrere assumed responsibility as French 
Ambassador to Rome In February, 1898 the long-standing antagonism 
between the two nations had yet to be resolved. Although a d6tente 
had been reached after Italy's Adowa disaster In 1896, Franco-
Ital Ian relations remained extremely tenuous. 1 The efforts of 
H~notaux and Billot to terminate the troublesome tariff war had 
not been fruitful. Yet In less than nine months of diplomatic en-
deavor, Barrere succeeded In concluding a conmerclal treaty tn 
November, 1898. He regarded the resumption of conmerctal relations, 
however, as no more than a preliminary In effecting an over-all 
Frrinco-ltallan reconcll latlon. In Barrere 1 s estimation the essen-
tial first step towards the attainment of this ultimate objective 
lay In the development of mutual Franco-Italian Interests. He en-
visioned such cooperation as the requisite means of eliminating 
sources of friction between the two countrles.2 
The rapprochement rtself was actually accomplished during 
the course of Barrere's first four years In Rome, culminating In 
the Neutrality Accord of 1902. Its achievement may be considered 
1Georges Oethan, "Le rapprochement franco-italien, 1896-
1900,11 Revue d'Histol re dfplomatlgue, LXX ( 1956), 323-29. 
2ooF2, 1 , No. 11 8. 
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lvrgely due Barrere's efforts and the diplomacy he exercised so 
skillfully between 1898 and 1902. This acknowledgement was ex-
pressed by a number of Barrere 1 s contemporaries, among whom the 
Cambons, Charles-Roux, Combarieu, Luzzatti and Dllke figure pro-
mtnently.3 Modern historians recently engaged In studying this 
area also tend to regard Barrere's role during this period of 
Franco-Ital Ian rapprochement to have been lndispensable.4 There 
are differing interpretations of course as to precisely where 
credit should be laid for the achievement. Langer, for example, 
regards the work of rapproche'llent to be largely due Hanotaux and 
Blllot. 5 Yet his interpretation, based so extensively on Bil lot's 
writings, is open to question. More recently Thomas I lams has also 
credited Hanotaux with the Franco-Ital Ian rapprocrement, although 
Iiams' study Is limited to the period 1894-98 and does not attempt 
a comparative evaluation of Hanotaux's achievement In the specific 
area of Franco-Ital Ian relations.6 
In any attempt at assessing the roles of the individuals 
involved tn the Franco-Ital Ian rapprochement, there can be no 
3pau1 Cambon, Correspondance: 1870-1924 (Parts, 1940-46), 
Ill, 369; Jules Cambon, The Diplomatist, trans. by C. T. Turner (London, 1931), pp. 67-68; Charles-Roux, Trots ambassades a la veil le 
de la guerre, p. 122; A .Combarieu Sept ans ~ l 1Elys~e avec le Pr~sldent Emile Loubet: 1899-190~ (Parts, 1932), p. 122; Luzzattt, 
~, I, 75-77. See Charles-Roux "L'oeuvre dlplomatlque de Camille 
Barrere, 11 Revue des Deux Mondes, 14, LXlll (1941), 176 for the Dtlke 
letter regarding Barr~re. " 
4The works of Serra and Decleva are among the most recent 
studying this period of Franco-Italian relations. 
5Langer, The Diplomacy of lmperfalfsm, II, 205. 
6Thomas M. Iiams, Dreyfus, Diplomatists and the Dual Al-
l I a nee (Parts, 1962) , pp. 105 -15, 149-52 • 
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question of Gambettz 1 s influence in shaping the fundamental atti-
tudes of his young proteges on La R~publlque francalse: the men 
who would fonnulate French foreign policy during the 1890's. Yet 
Gambetta's Influence was an indirect one. The Triple Alliance, 
major source of French antipathy towards Italy, was not concluded 
until the year of Gambetta 1 s death. Moreover, Gambetta's work it·· 
self was characterized by a highly personalized quality and con-
tained a minimum of doctrine and Ideology. It dealt with actual 
rather than theoretical policies. It is certainly true that the 
spirit of revanche, and basic attitude towards Germany on which an 
alliance with England was predicated, are concepts which Delcass~, 
Hanotaux, Barrere and Paul Cambon absorbed during the years of their 
association with Gambetta. Delcass~ himself acknowledged the idea 
of a political accord wlth England to be Gambetta 1 s legacy.7 
Freycinet also related Gambetta's vision of an alliance between 
France, Russia and England. According to Freyclnet, Gambetta had 
spoken to the Prince of Wales In 1880 of a Franco-Russian accord 
which could serve as a guarantee against German aggression.a 
Not surprisingly then Paul Cambon could write his son in 
1904 that "the day a satisfactory entente can be establ I shed be-
ween France, Russia and England, with Italy as an eventual support, 
we 1 11 be In a post ti on to ta 1 k w I th Germany. 119 Cambon had grasped 
the Implications of Gambetta's ideas much earlier, however. In 
7 Above 1 p • 4 3 . 
8s. Lee, King Edward VII (London, 1925), I, 452. 
9pau1 Cambon, Correspondance: 1870-1924, I, 332-33. 
1889 he wrote in a personal letter to Eugene Spuller: 
I consider the reconciliation of France and Italy, and 
later an entente of these two powers with England as the 
obvious goal of French policy--embroilment with Italy 
would put a sword in our back the day of the duel with 
Germany, it would alienate us with England whom she 
considers our counterbalance In the Mediterranean. Ac-
comodation with Italy is equality of forces with Gennany 
and England's good will .lu 
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The same Cambon wrote Barrere in 1919 of the "rapprochement with 
I ta 1 y that ts your work." 11 
Cambon•s theme in 1889 was that which had appeared in 
B;:rrere•s writings fully a decade before his appointment to Rome. 
The Triple Alliance was a threat to France! Since the weak spot 
in the alliance was Italy, it was essential she be detached from 
the menacing coalltion.1 2 Nor as a young diplomat had Barrere 
underestimated the difficulties inherent in that task. He realized 
that any Franco-Italian reconciliation would only be achieved after 
a long period of preliminary d~tentel3 
In a sense, then, If only as a result of the Influence he 
exerted on the future architects of French foreign policy, Gambetta's 
mark Is apparent on the Franco-Italian rapprochement. The influence 
was indirect, however, and It would be inaccurate to attribute the 
specific Idea of a Franco-Ital tan alliance to the ardent republi-
can of the t370's. 
A more difficult assessment to make Is the significance of 
Hanotaux's role In effecting the rapprocrement. While It Is true 
10 1btd. 
12ooF1, x, No. 68. 
l l I b i d • , I I I , 369 • 
l31bld., No. 486. 
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a detente was reached during Hanotaux's ministry, it remained 
merely a detente. There are strong arguments for attributing the 
failure of this preliminary thaw to reach fruition to the policies 
adopted by Hanotaux and his Rome ambassador, Albert Billot. 
Hanotaux gave little indication of Interest in gaining 
Italy's good will when negotiating the Tunisian treaty in 1896. 
He was adamant in the demands he made of Italy, refusing Visconti 
Venosta 1 s requests to prorogue the ltalo-Tunlslan treaty or com-
bine commercial negotiations for new ltalo-Tunisian and Franco-
Ital ian treaties.1 4 Once the treaty was ratified, he adopted a 
fundamentally temporizing attitude in response to Italian entrea-
ties to open negotiations for a conmercial accord.15 His one con-
cession was to agree that discussions might be undertaken if they 
were carried on with the utmost secrecy. Only in Hay of 1897, when 
Italian apprehensions over French activity in Tripoli were mounting, 
did Hanotaux indicate positive interest in arriving at a more sat-
isfactory relationship with Italy. However, what he then sought 
was a statement of reciprocal disinterest in Tripolitanta.16 Vis-
conti Venosta, despite his desire to improve Franco-Italian rela-
tions, was reluctant to enter into a secret accord with France that 
might be considered contrary to Italy's good faith with her Trtplice 
allles.17 Yet Germany's negative response to Visconti Venosta's 
approaches eventually led th~ Italian foreign minister to enter 
14serra, La guesttone tunlstna, pp. 406-15. 
15 1 2 8 6 DDF, XIII, Nos. 2, 19, 3 0. 
16serra, C. Barrera e 1 1 Intesa, p. 53. 
1700~, II, Nos. 30, 45, 51; Serra, C. Barr~re e l'intesa, 
pp. 53-55. 
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willingly into negotiation of the accord Hanotaux was seeklng.18 
However Hanotaux's insistence on concluding a formal protocol was 
to bring the Franco-Italian discussions to a standstill. Hanotaux 
was unwilling to accede to Visconti Venosta's request that the 
mutual Franco-Ital tan pledges be framed in a single declaration.19 
Although the separate discussions relating to a commercial 
accord were continued, various concessions France demanded of 
Italy eventually resulted in another stalemate that was not re-
solved until December, 1897.20 Here again Hanotaux proved some-
what lntranstgeant. Regarding the responsibility for the original 
economic rupture In 1886 to be Italy's, he considered France's de-
mands moderate and any further negotiation Impractical tf Italy 
was unwilling to recognize them as such.21 The Impasse was only 
bridged with Luzzattl's formal notlftcatlon of Italy's desire to 
continue negotiating specific points of disagreement. It appears 
highly significant that shortly after the resumption of commercial 
discussions, announcement was made of Barrere's nomination as 
French Ambassador to Rome. 22 
Barrere's predecessor, Albert Billot, has also been cre-
dited with the essential achievement of Franco-Ital fan rapprochem~nt.23 
18ser_r_a, c. Barrere e 1' Intesa, pp. 59-60; PEA, XIV, 
No. 3529 j3292_1 • , 
19serra, c. Barrere e 1 'Intesa, pp. 55-56. 
20DoF1, XIII, No. 151; Billot, La France et l'ltalle, II, 
412-14. 
21 Bl11ot, La France et 1' ltalie, II, 420; Luzzattl, Opere, 526. 
22rhe announcement was made on December 24, 1897. 
23see Emory's "The Mission of Albert Billot" for a syn pathetic 
Yet there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Billot, to the 
contrary, bears much of the responsibility for Its delay. 
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Bil lot's personal rapport with his diplomatic colleagues 
apparently left a great deal to be desired. TOl111laso Tittoni wrote 
of ht s ambassado rsh t p as "most unfortunate in tone and resu 1 ts •11 
He found Billot haughty and arrogant and believed he exercised a 
negative influence In Rome, both personally and as a result of his 
own rapport with the Qual d'Orsay. 24 According to Serra, a good 
deal of Bil lot's unpopularity stemmed from his attempts to pres-
sure the king and Rudlni for the text of the Triple Alliance. 25 
Serra also relates that rumours circulated as well that Billot had 
fomented the French newspaper campaign against Crlspl and ltaly. 26 
While these considerations remain highly subjective, there is cer-
tainly some question as to Hanotaux's own satisfaction with his 
ambassador. Visconti Venosta had knowledge of Bil lot's proposed 
substitution as early as January of 1897; Tornielli heard Hanotaux 
first refer to Barrere In March. 27 Yet Billot officially submitted 
his resignation for reasons of health in December, 1897--flrst 
broaching the subject with Hvnotaux that surrvner.28 
interpretation of Billot and his role in the Franco-Italian rap-
prochanent. Dethan also treats Bil lot favorably, although ac-
knowledging Barrere's larger role in the over-all rapprochement. 
"Le rapprochement franco-ltalten, 1896-1900", pp. 223-29. 
24r. Tlttoni, "Vis fte ad ambasciatori," Nuova Antalogia, 4, 
CVlll (1903}, 147. 
25serra, La guestione tunlstna, p. 133. 
26serra, C. Barr~re e 1 1 Intesa, p. 62. 
27tbld •. 
28Emory, "The Mission of Albert Billot," p. 220. 
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In assessing Bil lot's diplomatic activities it becomes 
immediately apparent that his fundamental approach towards achiev-
ing a Franco-Italian rapprochement differed radically from that 
of his successor. Barrere, of course, regarded the resumption of 
economic rapport as the keystone to reconciliation. He was con-
vinced Italian animosity towards France could be overcome If no 
opportunity was lost that might lead to more satisfactory economic 
arrangements. In Barrera's estimation the attainment of political 
objectives in Italy would only be possible when an improved eco-
nomic relationship had been established. Luzzattl attested to the 
wisdom of this approach whereby Barrere demonstrated France's "sin-
cerity and friendship without questioning Italy on the matter of 
her all iances. 1129 Bil lot's preoccupation with Italy's political 
alliances, however, appears to have impeded the successful con-
clusion of the conmercial accord he professedly sought. Once the 
Tunisian treaty had been ratified and Italy pressed for the con-
clusion of a commercial treaty, Billot repeatedly temporized. He 
was suspicious of Italy's actual motivation in seeking an entente 
and expressed reservations about reaching complete economic agree-
ment unless significant advantages for France were involved.30 
Barrere was also aware of the leverage to be gained through an 
adroit h~ndling of financial considerations. Yet he was acutely 
aware, as he constantly reminded the Quai d 10rsay, that any rap-
~ 
prochement would be secured only when Italy believed it was in her 
29Luzzatti, Opere, II, 526. 
30Billot himself wrote In January, 1899: 11 lf we were unable 
to detach the Italians from the Triple Alliance, we could at least 
create opposing interests and, In a certain measure, paralyze their 
actlon. 11 Emory, "The Mission of Albert Billot..,'' pp. 221-30. 
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best interests to work towards Its achievement.31 The principle 
on which Barrere therefore predicated his activities in Rome was 
to create that interest. 
Perhaps the differing approaches of the two ambassadors 
are revealed most clearly in a remark Billot made to H2notaux In 
March, 1897. In the course of a conve rsat I on with Bi 11 ot, Luzzatt l 
had discussed hts intention of formally requesting reactivation 
of negotiations for a COITl'nercial accord. He asked Billot to ~ct 
as an intermediary, hoping to assure a favorable reception to his 
overtures. 11 1 did not accept the engagement of becoming advocate 
in the cause the Italian minister pleaded so warmly," Bl 1 lot wrote 
Hanotaux. "All I promised was to prepare you to expect it ••• 
and conscientiously report the arguments that are believed here to 
lend It support. 11 32 
Bil lot's rather negative approach ts also apparent in his 
attitude towards the Italian statesmen with whom he was in cons-
tant contact. He never appeared entirely sympathetic, for lnstvnce, 
to Luzzattt and his aims. At one point, in 1896, he wrote Hanotaux 
that he was certain Luzzatti's concern for haste In opening com-
mercial discussions was rather suspect. He suggested Luzzatti's 
impatience was due the minister's desire to place a financial pro-
gram before the Italian pa~liament. According to Billot, that would 
permit Luzzatti to indicate the me~ns he planned on using to resolve 
Italy's budgetary problems and reestablish its finances on a solid 
basls.33 Billot seemed to ignore the fact that this motivation 
31ooF1' XIV, No. 253. 32 I b i d • , X I I I , No • 1 51 • 
33stllot, La France et l'ltalie, II, 18. 
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was not at all Incompatible with the reestablishment of commercial 
peace between the two countries. Unlike Billot, Barrere tended 
to regard Luzzattl's eagerness as an asset. His reports to Hano-
taux stress the positive aspects of the former Ital Ian minister's 
outlook; the transaction of a commercial accord, after all, cons-
tituting the "fl rst act of a new era In Franco-Ital fan relations, 
the certitude of renewing financial relations with the Paris mar-
ket that were necessary to free her from the tutelage of others •11 34 
A further Incident reinforces the Impression that, far 
from having effected the Franco-Ital Ian rapproachment, Billot was 
actually Ill-suited for his role In Italy during this critical 
period In Franco-Ital Ian relations. In the January, 1899 Issue of 
Revue des Oeux Mandes, Billot published an article which clearly 
exposed the efforts of the French Embassy to detach Italy from the 
Triple All lance. In a dispatch to the British Foreign Office at 
the time, Ambassador Currie described the piece as "singularly 
indiscreet," noting as well that Barr~re's success In concluding 
the commercial treaty had quite obviously excited the jealousy of 
his predecessor.35 Jeopardizing important diplomatic activity 
that has just begun to evidence success Implies, at best, a lack 
of the fundamental tact essential In one engaged In the delicate 
work of reconciliation. 
Delcass~'s signal success In achieving the Triple Entente 
Inevitably raises the question of his role In the earlier Franco-
Ital fan rapprocl-ement. There ts little documentary evidence of 
34ooFl, XIV, No. 120 35eo, 1, No. 347. 
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the French foreign minister's initial attitude towards the Ital tan 
rapprochement as such. However, as Barrere, Delcasse shared in the 
ideas and aspirations Gambetta had inspired. Barrere himself also 
noted that Delcasse arrived at the Quai d'Orsay when relations bet-
ween France and Italy were strained. It was essential an entente 
of some sort be found in Rome to preclude the poss lb 111 ty of Franco-
1 tali an confltct.36 
As foreign minister Delcasse was absorbed In the complex-
ities of France's over-all foreign policy. Theoretically, at 
least, his ambassadors not only represented his views of French 
policy in their respective posts they provided him, In turn, with 
an Intimate knowledge of affairs In the countries to which they 
were assigned. In this regard Delcasse was singularly fortunate. 
The reputation enjoyed by Paul Cambon as French Ambassador to 
London has seldom been surpassed.37 Although less known, the di-
plomatic achievements of Barrere are frequently compared with those 
of h Is friend and cwnte rpa rt In London. 38 
The working relationship that existed between Barrere and 
Delcasse has a decided significance for any assessment of their 
achievements. Their rapport was not one ordinarily established 
between an ambassador and his superlor.39 Reflecting the Intimacy 
36caml11e Barrere, ~'La chute de Delcasse," pp. 604-05. 
37see Keith Eubank, Paul Cambon: Master Diplomatist (Nonnan, 
Oklahoma, 1960) for a recent evaluation of Cai11bon and his work. 
38Not!l, Camille Barrere, pp. 38, 76; G. P. Gooch, Before 
the War: Studies In Diplomacy (New York, 1938), I, 126; Andrew, 
Theophlle Delcasse and the Entente Cordiale, p. 287. 
39sar~re was best man at Delcasse's wedding. Andrew refers 
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of their long-standing friendship, it pennftted Barrere a freedom 
of suggestion and criticism that emerges throughout his reports 
and letters. Thus, on the one hand, Barrere might complain it had 
been too long since he last received any personal word from his 
old friend and rather severely chasttze him, on the other, for 
a lack of discretion In his dealings with the Ital tan ambassador 
In Parls.40 Barrere himself remarked on the complete liberty of 
action Delcass4 accorded him In his diplomatic actlvltles.41 
Barrere's work In Rome had begun, of course, before De1-
cass6 assumed his post at the Quat d'Orsay In May, 1898. It was 
then, In Delcass4's unofficial capacity, that Barrere had first 
Introduced his friend to Rudlni and Visconti Venosta.42 The infor-
mal discussions Delcass6 subsequently engaged In with these Ital Ian 
men of state were probably a significant element In the development 
of his later attitude towards France's Ital tan policy. While 
Barrere and Delcass6 were In baste agreement on the necessity of 
effecting a closer Franco-Ital tan relationship, a study of the 
Barrere-Delcass6 diplomatic and personal correspondence suggests 
that Barrere exercised a decisive Influence on the actual develop-
ment of Oelcass~'s Ital Ian policy. This In no way casts Delcass6 
In a negative role; rather, It demonstrates the great confidence 
he placed in the judgment and ability of his ambassador. 
' to Barrere as perhaps Oelcasst1's "closest friend In publ le 1 lfe. 11 
Th6ophlle Delcass4 and the Entente Cordlale, p. 10, n. 4. 
40earrere a Delcass4, May 5, 1901, AAE, PB, IV; Cami 1 le 
Barrere, "Lettres a Delcass6, 11 pp. 725-26. 
41camllle Barrere, "La chute de Delcass4!, 11 p. 607. 
42serra, C. Barrere e 1 'Intesa, p. 73. 
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Barrere's ultimate diplomatic objective in Rome was the cor-
rosion of Italy's ties to the Triple Alliance, hoping thereby to 
empty the Triplice of Its substance.43 Hts program for accomplish-
tng thls mission was twofold, Its most lrrmediate aspect to be 
achieved by eliminating the sources of friction and discord that 
existed between France and ltaly.44 The work of realizing this 
ambition was facilitated by the conclusion of a Franco-Italian com-
mercial treaty in 1898. The ambition itself was realized in 1900 
with the conclusion of the Mediterranean Accord. This accord suc-
ceeded In resolving one of the most difficult aspects of Franco-
Ital Ian relations and opened the path to the conclusion of the 
Neutrality Accord of 1902, the accord In which Barrl!re's ultimate 
objective for Italy was culminated. It has been the aim of this 
dissertation to establish that these accords of 1900 and 1902, and 
the rapprocrement they signify, were achieved principally through 
the efforts of Camille Barrere and that in his diplomatic endeavors 
he received the active cooperation and support of French Foreign 
Minister Th~ophile Delcasse. 
The ft rst direct steps leading to this end were taken after 
the conclusion of the Anglo-French African Convention In 1899.45 
Barrere responded to Italy's angry reaction to the agreement by 
urging Delcass~ to offer Italy a declaration of French disinterest 
' 43ooF2, 1, Nos. 118, 185, 201, 235, 238, II, Nos. 76, 99, 
218; Jules Cambon, The Diplomatist, pp. 67-68; Charles-Roux, Trots 
ambassades francaises ~ la vellle de la guerre, p. 12. 
44 2 DDF , I, No. 118. 
45The developments leading to the Mediterranean Accord of 
1900 are covered in Chapter II, pp. 32-51. 
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in Trlpolttanta. The foreign minister was Initially unwilling to 
accede to this request, preferring to alleviate Italian apprehen-
sion by means of a generalized reassurance of France's good inten-
tions. Yet Delcasse gradually succumbed to Barrere's persuasion, 
first promising to grant such a declaration lf Visconti Venosta 
were returned to power, and then not only responding to the lat-
ter's overtures but grafting onto It his own des I re for a recipro-
cal Ital Ian declaration on Morocco.46 
In the interval spanning these concessions, Barrere In-
creased his efforts to improve Franco-Italian rapport, cultivating 
his own personal relationships within the diplomatic orbit and 
taking advantage of the opportunity provided at Cagliari to strength-
en the sense of Franco-Italian friendship. The task was not eased 
by Ambassador Tornie111 1 s negative reaction to Delcasse's proposal 
or Visconti Venosta's hesitation in the face of probable French 
activity in Morocco. 
Barrere had Initially disapproved Delcasse's suggestion 
of a Moroccan declaration, feeling it injected complications that 
could easily jeopardize the conclusion of negotiations on the 
more urgent issue of Tripolitania. Yet when it became apparent an 
46Andrew suggests that Delcass~'s policy towards Italy 
changed at the beginning of the Boer War. At thct time he de-
termined to distinguish th~ international question from the Franco-
Moroccan question in Moroccan affairs, settling the fonner with 
each power separately in order to possess the freedom to settle 
the latter directly with Morocco. He fGlt that Barrere, on the 
other hand, was'~reoccupied with the desire to wrest Italy from 
German domination." At the same tL\1e, Delcasse was reluctant to 
seize the Initiative with Italy on a Morocco-Tripoli agreement 
because he wanted to avotd giving any impress ton of French pres-
sure on Italy to sanction French ambitions In Morocco. Theophile 
Delcass~ and the Entente Cordtale, pp. 138-41. 
146 
Impasse had been reached, Barrere bridged the gulf threatening to 
separate the two nations. He arranged the settlement of a Red Sea 
boundary dispute to lta,y•s satisfaction, urging on Oe1cass4' the 
necessity of adopting a conciliatory approach during the course of 
the negotiations. He then successfully reopened discussions on the 
Morocco-Tripoli declarations. By February 10, 1900 he had reached 
fundamental accord with Visconti Venosta on their contents. When 
quest Ion next arose as to the form the declarations were to assume, 
Barrere argued against Oe1cass6 1 s suggestion of a formal convention, 
preferring to embody the statements In letters of exchange. Delcass~ 
acquiesced, as he also did with regard to B~rrare•s objections to 
various qualifications the foreign minister would have lncorpor~ted 
Into the documents. 
Barr~re's most significant Initiative In the negotiations, 
however, was exercised In Aprll of 1900. When Visconti Venosta ex-
pressed a desire to extend the proposals still further and gain 
French approbation of an Ital Ian move In Tripoli, Barrere Immedi-
ately establ lshed as a !1ne gua n~n, the condition of Italy's non-
engagement against France fn Europe. Despite Delcess6•s subsequent 
willingness to accede to Visconti Venosta's request, Barrere con-
tinued to reiterate that France would enter Into the larger arr;~n­
ment only to the extent she received pacific assurances as to the 
nature of Italy's treaties with her Tr1p1f~. allies. Visconti 
Venosta was not willing to meet this demand, and the Barrere-
Vlscontl Venosta 1etter accords remained confined to the Mediter-
ranean. Yet Barrere•s decision had been decisive, laying the 
groundwork for the negotiation of the subsequent Neutrality Accord 
of 1902. 
Even on Its O\.'ln merits, of course, the Mediterranean 
Accord was crucial In the developnent of F(c;inco-ltal Jan rapproach-
ment. As Barrere wrote Delcasst!, Ital Ian Interests were Mediter-
ranean, and they were centered on Trtpol I. At the same tlrne. Italy 
feared a corresponding Interest on the part of France~ Because 
that Interest was non-exlste-it, Barrere had repeatedly argued In 
support of suppressing Italian apprehension In writing. The day 
Italy desired more-·a recognition of her right to expand In Trt-
poll--France would be tn a position to demand the guarantee lta11an 
alliances were no longer directed against her. In the Interim Bar-
r~re had secured ltaly 1 s recognition of France's right to extend 
her Influence tn Morocco. While France. In turn, dlselalmcad any 
Intent of expansion In Tripoli, she did not recognize Italy's right 
to expand In Tripoli without her prior consent. De1cass• himself 
appreciated all that had been accomplished with the accords. As 
well as thankl ng Barre re for the skll l he had demonstrated 1 n their 
negotiation, he acknowledged the value he had come to place on 
their essentially conservative character. That this tone ultimately 
prevalled \11as primarily due the insight and persistence of his am-
bassador. 
Havtng achieved his Initial objective In Italy, Barr~re 
Intensified his efforts to attain the far more significant "detach-
ment of Italy's offensive ob1 fgatlons" against France. This work 
was successfully culminated wtth the Neutrality Accords of 1902.47 
Here again, Barrere•s Initial approach lay In the active encourage-
ment of French collaboration with Italy. The areas In which he 
1
J-
7The developments leading to the conclusion of the Neu-
tral lty Accord of 1902 are covered In Chapter IV, 
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promoted Franco-Ital tan cooperation were diverse, ranging from 
railroad projects to capital investment and wine Importation. 
Barrere also urged Delcasse to enlist the aid of Russia In develop-
ing Franco-Ital Ian ties, attempting to draw Italy and Russia Into 
a closer relationship himself by means of his own contacts tn Rome. 
While engaging In these activities, Barrere also sought to offset 
what he regarded as the deleterious effects of French Journal Ism 
on Improved Franco-Italian rapport. 
The most significant activity In this period, of course, 
was thP.t surrounding the visit of the Ital Ian fleet to Toulon. Be-
cause of the great Importance he attached to the event, Bar~re 
was In close touch with Oelcass4 on a11 arrangements made for the 
festivities surrounding the occasion. 
Toulon 1 s signal success inaugurated the drive Barrere then 
undertook to bring Italy's treaty commitments into harmony with the 
new Franco-ltallan relationship. Baste to the program he adopted 
for this task was an Insistence on Delcass~'s corroboration and re-
inforcement In Parts of his own activities in Rome. Thus, tn 
February of 1901 he advised Delcass~ how essential It was for Tor-
niel 1 I to have a clear understanding of France•s Ital tan policy. 
Similar requests occurrro repeatedly, the specific points Bsrr~re 
wished emphasized always cl~arly defined. 
The first Indication of the two-pronged campaign's success 
came In June, when Prlnettl assured Barr~re of the Trlpllce 1 s non-
aggresstve character. Using Prlnettl's statement as his opening, 
Barrere began stressing French concern over the Incompatibility of 
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the Triple All lance with Franco-Italian friendship, particularly 
in the matter of provocation. It led to Prinetti's formal assur-
ance that if renewed, the Triple Alliance would not contain any 
causes directed against France. Delcass~, In accordance with Bar-
rere's program, then advised Torniell i he formally accepted the 
Prinetti declaration made in Rome. 
Barrere's attention next turned to Prinetti's request for 
publication of the Barrere-Vlsconti Venosta letters. Delcass~ had 
opposed such a move, only consenting to a disclosure of the Medi-
terranean Agreement after France's occupation of Mttylene. In the 
negotiations that then followed, Barrere resolved the differences 
of form and content that Delcass~ and Prinettl initially proposed 
for the declaration Prlnettl subsequently made before the Ital Ian 
Senate. 
Perhaps at no time was the significance of Barrere 1 s cru-
cial role In effecting the Franco-Italian rapprochement more ap-
parent than during the months following Prlnettl's disclosure of 
French disinterest In Tripoli and the renewal of the Triple All l-
ance. More Is Involved than the acknowledgment of Barrere's In-
fluence In diplomatic circles. In his efforts to safeguard France 
against the offensive aspects of Italy's participation In the Tri-
ple Alliance, Barrere operatrd under serious disadvantages. In 
the first Instance, not only did he lack precise knowledge of the 
Tri pl Ice's terms as they related to France--he was del ibe:rately 
misled by Prinetti as to what those terms were. Throughout the 
spri·ng of 1902, Prinetti continued assuring Barrere that nothing 
in the treaty itself could be construed as a direct or indirect 
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threat to France's security, affirming that her only concern 
should be with "the annexed acts." Even tn a Senate declaration 
of May 23, Prinettl stated unequivocally that the treaty contained 
no protocols or conventions directed against France. Yet an appli-
cation of Article II of the treaty specifically engaged Germany 
and Italy against France, and as early as January 12 Prlnettl had 
infonned German Ambassador Wedel of his willingness to renew the 
treaty essentially unchanged~ According to Wedel's report to BUlow, 
Prlnetti had also abandoned his request for a preamble that would 
publicly affirm the alliance's defensive nature by January 22. It 
was only April 28 that Prlnettl conceded to Barr~re the validity 
I 
of France's objections to certain clauses in the treaty. Without 
Barr~re's perspicacity, as well as the skill he demonstrated in 
negotiating with Prlnettt, It would appear highly Improbable the 
Neutrality Accord of 1902 could have been concluded.48 It was 
Barr~re who successfully led Prtnettl to the point of desiring to 
formally harmonize Franco-ltaltan relations. It was Barr~re who 
then seized the opportunity presented by Prlnettt's desire to 
48As well ~s Barr~re's difficulties in dealing with Pri-
nettl, there remained the additional problem he encountered wtth 
Ital tan Ambassador to Paris Tornlellt. Their antagonisms have al-
ready been cited. As Direction Polltlque noted after Torntelll's 
alleged Interview In l'Echo de Parts, July 13, 1902, 
A government that does not have enough confidence in its agent 
to keep him Informed of all that concerns its relations with 
the country where he i~ accredited, recalls him, no longer per-
mitting him to speak and act In Its behalf. If, however, such 
a situation actually exists, it should not be pennitted to 
continue. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not 
be deprived In this way of a direct means of communication 
with the Ital Ian government. 
DDF2, II, No. 349, Annotation du Departement. 
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request a protocol defining the rapports and pacific Intents of 
the two countries. In the negotiation of the fonnal accord that 
ensued, It was again Barrere who assumed the role of intermediary 
between the two foreign ministers, winning acceptance of the var-
ious revisions demanded or, on his own Initiative, suggesting 
others In order to hasten the accord to a conclusion. This Neu-
tral tty Accord, signed June 30, 1902, put a definitive seal on the 
Franco-lta11an rapprochement that began developing with the con-
clusion of a commercial treaty In 1898.49 Its achievement was Bar-
re re 1s accompl I shment. In terms of h Is object Ives It demonstrated 
considerable success In dlmtntshtng long-standing Franco-Ital Ian 
antagonisms and In emptying the Triple Alliance of Its substance 
as a political Instrument directed against France. 
A total evaluation of Franco-Ital Ian rapprochement as It 
evolved between 1898 and 1902 cannot be attempted within the con-
fines of this dissertation; the full significance of Barrere's 
achievement ts only revealed In the events of succeeding years. 
The more outstanding effects of the work Barrere began In these 
49Although signed June 30, 1902, the letters were dated 
November 1 and 2, 1902 to comply with the desires of Prtnettf 
and Victor Enmanuel Ill. Both objected to signing them at the 
time of the Trlplice renewal. As a precaution, however, It was 
prearranged that a duplicate set of letters were also signed, 
dated July 11 and 12, 1902. These duplicates were then destroyed, 
November 2 • 1902. Th ts pos~ed no problem for Barre re. As he re-
marked, Prlnettl had always affirmed It was essential any Franco-
Ital Ian accord be In hannony with Italy's alllances--understood 
to mean Ital tan alliances as they were renewed, without the mili-
tary protocols. France had never asked Italy to enter Into an 
engagement contradictory to her alliances. In Barr~re's judgment, 
"that would have raised an entl re different order of questions, 
and what faith could we have had ln a government capable of vlolat-
1 ng the conml tments she had made to others?" Ibid. , Annex, 
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years occur in a later period. They are discernible in the influ-
ence of Franco-Ital Ian rapport on: the Algeclras Conference of 
1905, the ltalo-Turktsh War of 1911 -12 and, ultimately, Italy's 
emergence as an ally of France tn 1915.50 Although Paul Cambon 
signed the secret Anglo-French-Russian-Italian Convention against 
Germany, it was Barrere who negotiated Italy's Inclusion tn the 
alliance against the Central Powers. As his associate Charles-Roux 
remarked, "the act was only accomplished because he had sewn and 
maintained in the Triple Alliance a germ of dissolution, the prin-
ciple of its disintegration. 11 51 
Perhaps the extent of Barrere's personal role In the 
Franco-Italian rapprochement ts most appropriately expressed tn 
the tribute accorded him by the Ital Ian statesman-financier Luigi 
Luzzatt:I who wrote: 
When our illustrious Ambassador Barrere, as far In the 
future as possible, retires from public ltfe, I would hope 
he might write with me a book of memoirs--ln which we would 
recount all that Mephistopheles In the course of thirty 
years has attemo~ed to divide France from Italy ••• nor 
Is he yet dead~!> 
501t was largely through Barrere's efforts that the offices 
of Visconti Venosta were secured as Italy's representative at the 
Algeciras Conference. There, the Italian statesman decidedly 
exercised his influence in France's behalf. On Algeclras and the 
ltalo-Turkish war see Laroche, Qutnze ans ~ Rome avec Camille Bar-
rere, pp. 261-66 and Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism: 
1]10'-1925, pp. 338-41, 366-81. 
5lcharles-Roux, SoLvenirs diplomatigues (Paris, 1958), I, 12. 
52Luzzatti, Opere, I, 75-77. 
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COMMERCIAL ACCORD: 1898 
A 
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Hts Excellency Count Torntelll, Ital Ian Ambassador to 
Parts, to His Excellency H. Delcass~, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Parts, November 21, 1898 
With the objective of establishing a commercial modus 
vivendi between Italy and France, and as a result of negotiations 
undertaken for this purpose between H. Luigi Luzzattl, Ital tan 
Parliament Deputy, and myself and HM. Bompard, Director In the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Chandeze, Director of Com-
merce, and G. Bousquet, State Counsellor and General Director of 
Customs in October and November, 1898, I have the honor of pre-
senting Your Excellency with the table of tartff reductions on 
certain articles for which my Government Intends to seek Italian 
Parliamentary approval as well as the modification of certain 
regulations which will govirn the application of certain articles 
of the tariff. 
The Government of the King, noting the declaration which 
has been made by the Government of the Republic that, when the 
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Ital tan tariff is adjusted according to the conditions indicated 
In the aforementioned table the most-favored-nation customs treat-
ment will apply to Italian products in France, with the exception 
of silk and silk goods, has authorized me to notify Your Excellency 
that cognlz~nt of the modification of regulations that will govern 
the application of certain articles of the French customs tariff, 
it engages, on its side, to propose in exchange to its Parliament 
the application of most-favored-nation customs treatment on French 
products, with the exception of silk and silk goods. 
B 
His Excellency H. Delcass6, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
to His Excellency Count Tornlellt, Italian Ambassador to Parts. 
Parts, November 21, 1898 
I have the honor of acknowledging receipt of the letter 
Your Excellency addressed me today, transmitting the table of re-
ductions and regulations governing the application of certain 
articles of the Italian customs tariff that the Royal Government 
proposes submitting to Parliamentary approbation or to prescribe 
to the customs administration at the same time it requests Parlia-
mentary authorization to apply to French product~ other than silk 
and silk goods, the most-favored-nation customs treatment. 
~ 
In response to this communication, I have the honor of 
confirming to Your Excellency that, on its part, the Government 
of the Republic will request Parliamentary authorization to apply 
to Ital tan products, other than silk and silk goods, the most-
favored-nation customs treatment, at the same time this treatment 
wi11 be applied in Italy to French products, after the Italian 
tariff has been modified according to the conditions indicated on 
the table attached to your letter of today. 
Your Excellency will also find attached the modification 
of regulations which will be followed by French customs in the 
application of certain articles of the tariff and which, you 
informed me in your letter of today, you have duly noted. 
c 
Verbal Note 
The Italian Ambassador to Paris to the French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. 
The Italian Government agrees that most-favored-nation 
treatment will be applied to the products of French colonies, upon 
their entry into Italy, and to Ital Ian products upon their entry 
into French colonies, with the exception of the colony of Erythema 
as regards exportation to, as well as importation from, France. 
Paris, November 21, 1898 
APPENDIX II 
THE FRANCO-ITALIAN 
MEDITERRANEAN ACCORD: 1900 
A 
His Excellency M. Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome, 
to Hts Excellency M. le Marquis Visconti Venosta. 
Rome, December 14, 1900 
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Following the conclusion between France and Great Britain 
of the Convention of March 21, 1899 my government, replying to 
your honorable predecessor, had the occasion to give to him, 
through me, explanations of a nature to dissipate all equivoca-
tion on the significance of this instrument. 
Since then Your Excellency has expressed the opinion that 
these assurances, reiterated in a more explicit manner, would 
contribute to strengthening the good relations between our two 
countries. 
I have been authorited, in consequence, by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, to make known to Your Excellency, because of 
the friendly relations which have been established between France 
and Italy and with the thought that this explanation will improve 
them further, that the Convention of March 21, 1899, In leaving 
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the vllayet of Tripoli outside of the partition of Influence 
that it sanctions, marks for the French sphere of influence In 
relation to Trlpolitania-Cyrenalca a limit that the Government 
of the Republic has no intention of surpassing and that It does 
not enter Into Its p1ans to Intercept the caravan communications 
of Tripoli with the regions envisioned by the aforesaid conven-
tion. 
These explanations, which we have agreed to keep secret, 
will contribute, I have no doubt, to the consolidation on this 
point, as on others, of the friendly relations between our two 
countries. 
B 
Hts Excellency M. le Marquis Visconti Venosta, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency M. Barrere, Ambassador of 
France. 
Rome, December 16, 1900 
The current situation In the Mediterranean and the even-
tual ltles which could occur In that area have formed between us 
the object of a friendly exchange of Ideas, our governments being 
equally animated by the desire of eliminating, In this regard, 
everything which would be c~pable of compromising, in the present 
and in the future, mutually good understanding. 
In that which more particularly concerns Morocco, It has 
resulted from our conversations that the action of France has the 
objective of exercizlng and of safeguarding the rights which 
result for her from the proxlmlty of her territory with that 
Emp f re. 
Thus defined, I have recognized that such an action is 
not, In our eyes, of a nature to injure the Interests of Italy 
as a Mediterranean Power. 
It has been equally understood that if a modification 
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of the political or territorial status of Morocco were to occur, 
Italy would reserve to herself, as a measure of reciprocity, the 
right eventually to develop her influence in relation to Tripo-
1 itania-Cyrenaica. 
These explanations, which we have agreed to keep secret, 
will contribute, I have no doubt, to the consolidation of 
friendly relations between our two countries. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
' BARRERE-PRINETTI PROPOSED 
BILATERAL DECLARATION: HAY 24, 1902 
The undersigned, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the King 
and Ambassador of France to Hts Majesty, duly authorized by their 
respective governments, have exchanged the following declarations: 
In reference to the letters exchanged on December 14 and 
16, 1900 between the Marquis Visconti Venosta and M. Barr~re re-
garding the reciprocal situation of their two countries In the 
Mediterranean basin, and more especially on their respective Inter-
ests In Tripoli and Morocco, they consider ft proper to render the 
engagements that resulted more precise, In the sense that each of 
the two Powers will be able freely to develop Its sphere of in-
fluence In the aforementioned regions at the moment It judges op-
portune, without the action of one of them being necessarily sub-
ordinated to that of the other. 
The undersigned declare that this interpretation leaves 
no divergence between their governments regarding their respective 
' 
interests in the Mediterranean. And this declaration has led them 
to formulate the following arrangements relative to their general 
relations, which the two governments engage to observe. 
The two Powers will not engage themselves against each 
other In any direct or Indirect aggression; they will not asso-
ciate themselves, directly or Indirectly, with any aggression 
directed against one of them by one or more Powers and, in case 
of aggression, they will observe a strict neutrality towards 
each other. 
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It would be the same If one of the two Powers were cons-
trained to declare war for the defense of Its security. For the 
case to be considered as legitimate defense, they must previously 
notify each other. 
In order to remain faithful to the spirit of friendship 
which has Inspired the present declarations, the undersigned state 
that there does not exist on either side and that there will not 
be concluded by the two Powers, any protocol or military agreement 
of an International contractual nature which would be In conflict 
with the present declarations. 
It Is understood that, save for the Interpretation of 
the Mediterranean Interests of the two Powers, which has a defini-
tive character, the above declarations will be valid for .•• 
years and will remain secret. 
Hade In two coples,fthe . . . 
APPENDIX IV 
THE FRANCO-ITALIAN 
NEUTRALITY ACCORD: 1902 
A 
M. Prinettt, Ital tan Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
M. Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome. 
Rome, Ju 1 y · 1 0, 1902 
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As a result of the conversations we have had touching the 
reciprocal situation of Italy and France in the Mediterranean ba-
sin, and touching more especially the respective interests of the 
two nations in Trlpolitania-Cyrenaica and Morocco, It appeared 
opportune to us to make more precise the engagements which result 
from the letters exchanged on this subject between Your Excellency 
and the Marquis Visconti Venosta, December 14 and 16, 1900, in 
the sense that each of the two Powers will be able freely to devel-
op its sphere of influence f n the aforementioned regions at the 
moment it will judge opportune, and without the action of one of 
them being necessarily subordinated to that of the other. It was 
explained on this occasion that by the limit of French expansion 
fn North Africa, alluded to in the letter cited above of Your 
Excellency of December 14, 1900, is understood the frontier of 
Trlpolitanfa indicated by the map annexed to the declaration of 
March 21, 1899, additional to the Anglo-French Convention of 
June 14, 1898. 
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We have ascertained that this interpretation leaves actu-
al 1 y no divergence between our two Governments on their respective 
interests in the Mediterranean. 
On the occasion of these conversations, and in order to 
eliminate in a definitive manner all possible misunderstanding 
between our two countries, I do not hesitate, In order to make 
their general relations more precise, to make spontaneously to 
Your Excellency, in the name of the Government of His Majesty the 
King, the following declarations: 
Should France be the object of a direct or Indirect ag-
gression on the part of one or more Powers, Italy would maintain 
a strict neutrality. 
It would be the same were France, as the result of a direct 
provocation, to find herself compelled, for the defense of her 
honor or of her security, to take the initiative of a declaration 
of war. In this eventual lty, the Government of the Republic must 
previously communicate Its intention to the Royal Government, en-
abling the latter to determine that It ts Indeed a case of direct 
provocation. 
In order to remain faithful to the spirit of friendship 
which has Inspired the present declarations, I am authorized, fur-
ther, to confirm to you that there does not exist on the part of 
Italy, and that there will not be concluded by her, any protocol 
or military arrangement of an International contractual order 
which would be In conflict with the present declarations. 
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I have to add that, save for the Interpretation of the 
Mediterranean interests of the two Powers, to which a definitive 
character has been given, in conformity with the spirit of the 
correspondence exchanged December 14 and 16, 1900 between Your 
Excellency and the Marquis Visconti Venosta, the declarations 
which precede being In harmony with the actual international en-
gagements of Italy, the Royal Government understands that they 
will have their full value as long as It has not Informed the 
Government of the Re pub 1 t c that these engagements have been mod-
i fled. 
I would be grateful were Your Excellency to acknowledge 
receipt of this corrmuntcatlon, which must remain secret, In the 
name of the Government of the Republic. 
B 
M. Barr~re, Ambassador of the French Republic to Rome, 
to M. Prtnetti, Ital tan Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Rome, July 10, 1902 
In your letter of \Oday, Your Excellency has desired to 
remind me that following our conversations with respect to the 
reciprocal situation of France and Italy in the Mediterranean 
basin, and more especially on the respective Interests of the two 
countries in Tripolitania--Cyrenaica and Morocco--it appeared op-
portune to us to make more precise the engagements which result 
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from the letters exchanged on this subject December 14 and 16, 1900 
between the Marquis Visconti Venosta and me, tn the sense that each 
of the two Powers will be able freely to develop its shere of In-
fluence ln the aforementioned regions at the moment tt will judge 
opportune and without the action of one of them being necessarily 
subordinated to that of the other. 
It was explained on that occasion that by the limit of 
French expansion in North Africa, alluded to in my letter cited 
above of December 14, 1900, is understood the frontier of Tripol 1-
tania indicated by the map annexed to the declaration of March 21, 
1899, additional to the Anglo-French Convention of June 14, 1898. 
This interpretation leaves, as we have stated, no actual 
divergence between our two Governments in their respective inter-
ests in the Mediterranean, and with the objective of eliminating, 
In a definitive manner, all possible misunderstanding between our 
two countries, you have been authorized by the Government of His 
Majesty to make spontaneously certain declarations Intended to 
make more precise the general rapport of Italy vis-~-vts France. 
have the honor of presenting Your Excellency with these 
declarations in the name of my Government. 
I am authorized, in return, to formulate In the following 
~ 
manner the conditions by which France understands, on her part, 
and In the same friendly spirit, to govern her general rapport 
vis-a-vis Italy. 
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Should Italy be the object of a direct or indirect aggres-
sion on the part of one or more Powers, France would maintain a 
strict neutrality. 
It would be the same were Italy, as the result of a direct 
provocation, to find herself compelled, for the defense of her 
honor or of her security, to take the initiative of a declaration 
of war. In this eventuality, the Royal Government must previously 
communicate Its intention to the Government of the Republic, enab-
ling the latter to determine that it is indeed a case of direct 
provocation. 
am authorized to declare to you as well that there does 
not exist on the part of France, and that there will be concluded, 
no protocol or military arrangement of an international contrac-
tual order which would be in conflict with the present declarations. 
It ts understood, of course, that save for the interpreta-
tion of the Mediterranean interests of the two Powers, to which a 
definitive character has been given, In conformity with the spirit 
of the correspondence exchanged December 14 and 16, 1900 between 
the Marquis Visconti Venosta and me, the preceding declarations, 
which are to remain secret, being in harmony with the active inter-
national engagements of Italy, will have their full value as long 
as the Royal Government hasfnot Informed the Government of the 
Republic these engagements have been modified. 
c 
H. Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome, to H. Prinetti, 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Rome, July 11, 1902 
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Regarding the declarations we have exchanged by our letters 
of yesterday on the general relations of France and Italy, it seems 
necessary to me, to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, to 
make more precise the meaning and intent which should be attri-
buted to the word, direct, In the expression, direct provocation. 
I would be grateful to receive confirmation of precisely 
what, In your opinion, the term signifies. 
D 
M. Prlnetti, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to 
M. Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome. 
Rome, July 11, 1902 
In your letter of today you have expressed the desire 
that, in order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, I 
make more precise for you the meaning and intent to be attributed 
to the word, direct, in the~expression, direct provocation used 
in the declarations I made in my letter to you of yesterday. 
I hasten to confirm for you In the matter what I have had 
the occasion to express to you verbally. The word, direct, has 
this meaning and intent, in understanding that an action could 
be considered eventually as constituting provocation tf it con-
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